The Project On Government Oversight (POGO) Blog

President Opposes Nuke Facility, Threatens to Veto Defense Bill

The President said he will veto the National Defense Authorization Act as it is currently written because it includes, among other things, funding for a costly nuclear weapons facility, according to a statement the White House released yesterday.

The Administration “strongly objects” to efforts to construct the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR) in 2013, according to the President.

“The Departments of Defense and Energy agree that, in light of today's fiscal environment, CMRR can be deferred for at least five years, and funds reallocated to support higher priority nuclear weapons goals,” the President wrote.

The November 29 statement echoes the President’s latest budget request, which proposed delaying construction of the nearly $6-billion facility and using existing facilities to fulfill its missions. The CMRR-NF would produce and store plutonium pits, a primary component of nuclear weapons.

Our Nuclear Insecurity Complex

Back in July, an 82-year-old nun and two fellow peace activists breached the security at the Y-12 nuclear weapons facility in Tennessee. The red-faced federal officials who subsequently promised thorough oversight proclaimed they had "no tolerance" for that kind of negligence.

Since then, it's only gotten worse for the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — the semiautonomous agency in charge of securing nuclear materials at our national laboratories and weapons production facilities.

An inspector general's report found that a Y-12 security contractor got caught cheating just before a security performance evaluation administered after the break-in. Then last month, Nuclear Weapons and Materials Monitor and the Albuquerque Journal reported that a new and expensive security system at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico is so botched it may require Congress to rescue it with up to $41 million in emergency funding.

The federal government did go ahead and fire that Y-12 security contractor, Wackenhut Oak Ridge. But that doesn't address its role in loosening oversight of the contractors who run our nuclear facilities. The hands-off approach to contractors championed by Energy Secretary Stephen Chu is one of the reasons why we're facing a security crisis in our nuclear weapons complex.

Energy IG Finds Security Contractor Cheated

Cheating on security tests has become almost as common as in high school classrooms

By PETER STOCKTON and LYDIA DENNETT

Cheating on security tests is nothing new for Wackenhut Services Inc.’s Oak Ridge unit (WSI-OR) at the Y-12 National Security Complex. In September POGO reported that, once again, Wackenhut, the security contractor at the Tennessee nuclear weapons facility, was accused of cheating on security performance tests that were administered at the complex after an 82-year-old nun and two accomplices broke in this July.

Now, the Department of Energy (DOE) Inspector General (IG) has released a report about the cheating, finding that copies of the test questions and answers “had been distributed in advance of the test to…the very people whose knowledge was to have been evaluated as part of this process.”

According to the IG report, the test was sent by encrypted email to “trusted agents” at Babcock and Wilcox Y-12, the managing and operating contractor at Y-12, for review. One of the officials sent the test to a WSI-OR manager for comment, an apparently common practice as these officials often don’t have the specific knowledge to provide informed feedback. The WSI-OR manager proceeded to send the test materials to two other Protective Force officers, none of whom were deemed trusted agents. The WSI-OR officials “treated the documents as if they were a training aid and widely distributed it to a variety of officers.” This cheating was discovered when a federal inspector found a copy of the test on the seat of a guard vehicle the day before it was to be administered.

The IG report called the failure to safeguard the test “inexplicable and inexcusable.”

Video: POGO Pops Up in Y-12 Hearing

By ANDRE FRANCISCO

POGO got a friendly mention last month during a hearing of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. The hearing focused on nuclear stockpile security and specifically the break-in at the Y-12 National Security Complex by three anti-nuclear weapons activists, including an 82-year-old nun. 

Inspector General Report Warns of Budget Overruns in Nuke Refurbishment

A W76 warhead is launched from a submarine

By MIA STEINLE

Government officials overseeing the refurbishment of nuclear warheads that date to the Cold War say they can keep the work on budget. But they can’t explain how.

That’s one of the findings of a new report issued Sept. 26 by the Department of Energy inspector general.

The effort to extend the shelf-life of warheads designed for submarine launch is running years behind schedule, and unless the government can find a cheaper way to complete the job, it’s on track for “large cost overruns,” the audit concluded.

The work is the responsibility of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), an agency within the Department of Energy. A senior official there “expressed confidence” that the agency could make up for lost time without going over budget, the inspector general reported.

However, the report said officials working on the program “could not provide plans detailing actions necessary to achieve the needed cost reductions.”

Based on estimates from its fiscal year 2012 budget, NNSA will receive about $1.5 billion to complete upgrades to the W76 warheads by 2016. The project is now estimated to cost almost $1.8 billion, according to the audit.

That would put the agency over budget by $221 million, the inspector general’s report said.

Washington Post Series on U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Requires Closer Look

By PETER STOCKTON and LYDIA DENNETT

Two weeks ago, The Washington Post ran a two-part series by Dana Priest examining the current U.S. nuclear arsenal and the cost of modernizing it. The first part, “Aging U.S. nuclear arsenal slated for costly and long-delayed modernization,” focused on the long delays and rising costs of modernizing U.S. nuclear warheads and facilities. The second, “The B61 bomb: A case study in costs and needs,” focused specifically on the oldest nuclear bomb in the U.S. arsenal, the B61. In both articles, the extraordinary cost of modernizing and maintaining our stockpile of nuclear warheads is highlighted. However, there is a significant lack of context in the articles: they heavily quote nuclear weapons complex officials who have strong bureaucratic interest in promoting the notion that our nuclear arsenal is outdated and unreliable unless more money is poured into programs, even though that view is not supported by any concrete data.

We don't need to spend over $350 billion building unnecessary nuclear Taj Mahals and refurbishing far more warheads than the U.S. intends to maintain in the nuclear stockpile. Instead, we should be investing in real national security priorities that meet the needs of our troops and address the realities of our modern world, not in the ghosts of a Cold War that has been over for more than 20 years.

'Extensive' Oversight of Nuclear Weapons Facilities Not Such a Bad Idea, After All, Official Says

By MIA STEINLE

Poneman

In 2010, a top Department of Energy official wrote a memo saying government contractors responsible for safety and security at nuclear weapons facilities should be spared "excessive Federal oversight."

The official, Deputy Secretary Daniel B. Poneman, also said contractors managing the facilities should be allowed to operate without “overly prescriptive Departmental requirements.”

What a difference a nun makes.

When a House subcommittee convened Wednesday to probe how an 82-year-old nun and two other peace activists managed to penetrate one of the most sensitive facilities in the nation’s nuclear weapons complex, Poneman emphasized that the contractors need extensive government oversight.

“Safety and security are key performance standards and elements of every contract and extensive oversight is required to ensure stewardship as well as legal and regulatory requirements are met,” Poneman said in written testimony.

Cheating on Security Tests at Y-12 is Nothing New

By PETER STOCKTON and LYDIA DENNETT

Shortly after the security breach at Y-12 National Security Complex on July 28, the Independent Oversight Program at the Department of Energy (DOE) headquarters sent a team to Y-12 to conduct performance tests on the effectiveness of the Wackenhut Services Inc Oak Ridge guard force, according to a POGO source at the DOE. Two days ago, The Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor (printed with permission) reported that a federal inspector discovered copies of questions and answers from the written portion of the performance test in a guard force vehicle. The newest security director of Y-12, John Garrity, who took over the position after the break-in a month ago, has now been administratively re-assigned.

This incident of cheating on a performance test at Y-12 is nothing new for Wackenhut. Prior to the break in at Y-12, POGO had received an anonymous tip voicing concerns about cheating on security tests that sounded credible. We could not verify the allegation so were not able to release it at the time. But after another source contacted POGO and the latest revelation about guards with test questions and answers, there is certainly justification to do so now.

The source stated that “Wackenhut has a history of cheating on performance tests at Y12 and other locations. All of the in house testing that is scheduled to occur is relayed in advance to the security personnel so they always do a great job. All drills and tests done for the occasional outside agency are relayed ahead of time as to what they will be. There is no honest testing taking place. The security force cannot do any response without practicing and rehearsing ahead of time as they almost always do. Even though Wackenhut was caught cheating during an IG investigation in 2004, they were allowed to not only keep their contract, they were allowed to continue testing themselves. This is clearly a conflict on [sic] interest as it has been and it continiues [sic] to go on.”

Break-In Reveals "Ineptitude" at Nuke Facility, Probe Finds

By MIA STEINLE

A government investigation into the recent break-in at a nuclear weapons facility in Oak Ridge, Tenn., blamed longstanding security weaknesses and “troubling displays of ineptitude” by facility personnel.

The probe by a federal inspector general found that security problems, some of which personnel had been aware of for months, “directly contributed” to the July incident, when activists including an 82-year-old nun penetrated three fences and staged an anti-nuclear protest.

The facility’s federal and contractor managers knew of “a substantial backlog of degraded and/or nonoperational security equipment” at the Y-12 National Security Complex prior to the break-in, according to the inspector general.  The security camera that faced the site of the break-in hadn’t been working for about six months, he wrote.

The findings were reported in an Aug. 29 memo by Gregory Friedman, the inspector general for the Department of Energy.

After the activists broke through a fence surrounding the complex, a security guard turned off an alarm without seeking its cause, Friedman wrote.

Other security guards interviewed by the inspector general’s office said they assumed the sound of a hammer beating against the facility wall was coming from maintenance workers, who they said sometimes show up “in the hours of darkness and without warning,” Friedman said.

“In short, the actions of these officers were inconsistent with the gravity of the situation and existing protocols,” he said.

Some Senators Want to Waste Big Bucks on Unnecessary Nuke Facility

Congressional attempts to fund a new nuclear weapons facility are “alarming,” given that experts say the facility is unnecessary, according to a letter the Project On Government Oversight sent yesterday to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu.

Several senators did an end-run around Chu earlier this summer when they wrote letters to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta urging him to fund the nuclear weapons facility, known as the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. Chu’s Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) oversee the nation’s nuclear weapons complex.

The facility, which would enable the nation to increase its production of a primary component of nuclear weapons, has seen its estimated cost increase from $375 million to nearly $6 billion over the course of a decade. And experts—including former nuclear weapons facility officials—have said the facility is not necessary to ensure national security, POGO reported in January.

Y-12 Security to Finally Be Tested

By PETER STOCKTON

After an embarrassing breach of security at the Y-12 National Security Complex in July, the Project On Government Oversight has learned that the Department of Energy’s Office of Independent Oversight Program (IO) will conduct a full review of security at Y-12 before the end of this month, including a performance test of the guard force, which means force-on-force exercises.

The IO team arrived today at Y-12, and POGO is concerned that there is pressure on IO to dumb-down the performance tests by DOE Program Offices and the Office of the Secretary. IO might be capable, but under the circumstances, DOE should consider using the Defense Department’s Grizzly Hitch as the adversaries. They are a unit of the Army Special Forces out of Fort Bragg that have been used in the past to test DOE guard forces. In fact, because they are independent of DOE, they would provide a true assessment of Y-12’s security operations.

POGO has also learned that IO teams will conduct additional performance tests (including force-on-force drills) at each of the CAT 1 sites—sites with bomb-grade uranium and plutonium—including Savannah River, Oak Ridge National Lab, Idaho National Lab, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Pantex. Those tests are scheduled for the next twelve months, but POGO believes they should be conducted in the next six months or less.

Additionally, a DoD security team will conduct force-on-force security tests in September at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

These security tests are needed, but DOE and DoD must ensure that they present genuine conditions and that security forces aren’t practicing based on a scripted plan. If an 82-year-old nun was able to breach Y-12 and wander around, we need to reconsider our approach to protecting the nuclear arsenal.

Peter Stockton is a senior investigator at the Project On Government Oversight. Image from U.S. Army.

Guard Scapegoated in the Y-12 Security Debacle

By PETER STOCKTON and LYDIA DENNETT

The Y-12 National Security Complex, operated by Babcock and Wilcox Y-12 (B&W Y-12) and secured by WSI-Oak Ridge (WSI-OR), went on lockdown after a security breach that a top Department of Energy (DOE) official told POGO was the “worst disaster in the history of the bomb program.” The DOE official added: “We spend $1.2 billion annually on security and what are we getting for it?

Who is held accountable? Of course it’s only one security guard—the one who actually did his job and apprehended the three activists who wandered around the secure areas of the facility. In an August 10, 2012, letter, Kirk Garland—a guard with 30 years of experience at DOE nuclear weapons sites, over 21 years of which were at Rocky Flats and Pantex—was fired for his “failed” responsibilities after discovering the three activists. According to Garland, he was fired for allegedly turning his back on the three intruders, which he doesn’t recall doing. That he did not, in fact, ever turn his back was confirmed by Megan Rice, the now famous 82-year-old nun, who told POGO that she was watching Garland and he never took his eyes off the three activists. Other WSI-OR and B&W Y-12 employees were reassigned to other jobs or were allowed to retire, but only Garland lost his job. Mr. Garland should be reinstated immediately.