The Project On Government Oversight (POGO) Blog

Senate Report Silent on Fusion Center Reliance on Contractors

The Senate released an investigative report on Wednesday sharply criticizing anti-terrorism facilities set up throughout the country after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to coordinate federal, state, and local intelligence. As the Project On Government Oversight detailed yesterday, the report found that these “fusion centers,” which have cost the federal government anywhere from $289 million to $1.4 billion total (incredibly, the government does not have a more exact figure), are producing very little useful terrorism-related intelligence and are committing widespread violations of citizens’ civil liberties.

But there’s another potential problem with fusion centers that the report did not address.

The centers rely on private contractors, and it isn’t clear that contractors should be playing such a big role in this sensitive work. 

Federal contracting law  lists “the direction and control of intelligence and counter-intelligence operations” as an inherently governmental function—in other words, a function that must be performed by a government employee.

The Senate report says that certain aspects of the program rely on contractors to the extent that contractor employees sometimes outnumber government employees and that some contractor employees are “under-trained or poor performers.”

Senate Investigation Found DHS Intelligence Centers Wasted Money and Violated Civil Liberties

By MIA STEINLE

Updated October 5, 2012.

A Department of Homeland Security effort to improve the sharing of terrorism-related intelligence among state and local governments and with officials in Washington has yielded “shoddy” information and civil liberties violations, according to a Senate investigation.

The two-year bipartisan investigation by the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found that the Department of Homeland Security’s poor oversight of “fusion centers”—local intelligence-sharing hubs it created in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11—led to “hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars” being wasted.

“The investigation found that top DHS officials consistently made positive public comments about the value and importance of fusion centers’ contributions to federal counterterrorism efforts, even as internal reviews and non-public assessments highlighted problems at the centers and dysfunction in DHS’ own operations,” the report said.

Up to $1.4 billion of federal funds has been spent on fusion centers since 2003, according to the investigation.

“But the report documents spending on items that did little to help share intelligence, including gadgets such as ‘shirt button’ cameras, $6,000 laptops and big-screen televisions. One fusion center spent $45,000 on a decked-out SUV that a city official used for commuting,” The Washington Post reported.

Washington Post Series on U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Requires Closer Look

By PETER STOCKTON and LYDIA DENNETT

Two weeks ago, The Washington Post ran a two-part series by Dana Priest examining the current U.S. nuclear arsenal and the cost of modernizing it. The first part, “Aging U.S. nuclear arsenal slated for costly and long-delayed modernization,” focused on the long delays and rising costs of modernizing U.S. nuclear warheads and facilities. The second, “The B61 bomb: A case study in costs and needs,” focused specifically on the oldest nuclear bomb in the U.S. arsenal, the B61. In both articles, the extraordinary cost of modernizing and maintaining our stockpile of nuclear warheads is highlighted. However, there is a significant lack of context in the articles: they heavily quote nuclear weapons complex officials who have strong bureaucratic interest in promoting the notion that our nuclear arsenal is outdated and unreliable unless more money is poured into programs, even though that view is not supported by any concrete data.

We don't need to spend over $350 billion building unnecessary nuclear Taj Mahals and refurbishing far more warheads than the U.S. intends to maintain in the nuclear stockpile. Instead, we should be investing in real national security priorities that meet the needs of our troops and address the realities of our modern world, not in the ghosts of a Cold War that has been over for more than 20 years.

Workers at Tennessee Nuclear Facility Say Safety Takes Backseat to Deadlines

By MIA STEINLE

Some workers who are designing and building a major nuclear weapons facility for the government say they feel pressure to put deadlines ahead of safety, according to a recent Department of Energy report.

“Interviewees indicated that schedule pressures can inhibit reporting of concerns,” the report said.

“The heavy emphasis on performance metrics and cost, often at the perceived expense of understanding and developing the right technology, has created issues for the completion of the project,” the report said.

The June report focused on part of the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tenn., that is intended to consolidate operations involving bomb-grade uranium for the nation’s nuclear arsenal. When completed, the Uranium Processing Facility will be used for the assembly, disassembly and storage of bomb components and of bomb-grade uranium, according to its website.

The report was posted on a government web site just days after a major security breach at Y-12 last month, when three protesters, including an 82-year-old nun, broke into a high-security area of Y-12. The anti-nuclear activists bypassed security guards and several fences to enter the complex, the Knoxville News-Sentinel reported. The new uranium facility is being built in the same high-security area.

Where's the Oversight at Nuclear Labs? Hands-Off Approach is Recipe for Disaster

Energy Secretary Steven Chu has preached a hands-off approach to contractors at nuclear facilities. It's not working.

 

By PETER STOCKTON and LYDIA DENNETT

As the saying goes, “The fish rots from the head down.” This is certainly the case at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tenn., where an 82-year-old nun and two accomplices recently broke in, raising serious questions about the Department of Energy’s (DOE) security strategy.

Energy Secretary Steven Chu said in a statement provided to the Knoxville News Sentinel on Monday: “The department has no tolerance for security breaches at any of our sites, and I am committed to ensure that those responsible will be held accountable.” But there is no denying that Y-12 was a giant failure of federal oversight. Now the people being axed are lower-level employees rather than those who have allowed the security standards to fall far below acceptable levels, such as Secretary Chu, himself.

Secretary Chu should be the first on the chopping block. He has been preaching for years that government overseers should get off the back of the contractors and everything will be fine. Then, of course, he is shocked when Y-12 is successfully attacked by an 82-year-old nun.

After only one year in the position, Secretary Chu’s deputy secretary, Daniel B Poneman, sent a memorandum (PDF) to the department with a safety and security reform plan aimed at curtailing pesky government oversight. “Contractors are provided the flexibility to tailor and implement safety programs in light of their situation without excessive Federal oversight or overly prescriptive Departmental requirements,” the memo said.

It should be clear by now that the current culture at DOE and its semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is to take their orders from contractors and provide little or no oversight. As the previous head of contractor-operated laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Secretary Chu made clear his disdain for federal oversight, DOE insiders told the Project ON Government Oversight (POGO). In fact, he’s been successful in creating a culture of federal hands off the contractors in the weapons complex.

Y-12 Nuclear Facility Goes on Lockdown After Security Breach

 

In this National Nuclear Safety Administration photo from 2010, officials at the Y-12 nuclear facility show off "state-of-the-art security technology."

 

By JOE NEWMAN

As officials at the Y-12 nuclear weapons facility sort through their recent security breakdown, they've decided it might be best to move all of their nuclear materials, including highly-enriched uranium, into their on-site vaults.

The Knoxville News Sentinel's Frank Munger reported that the "security stand-down" is expected to last into next week. The federal contractor that runs the Oakridge, Tenn., facility made the decision with the support of the National Nuclear Security Administration. Munger writes:

According to the federal NNSA, "This is being done to address additional security training and execution deficiencies identified by the contractor after Saturday's incident. However, all nuclear materials at Y-12 are in safe, secure storage and we remain entirely confident in the security of Y-12's facilities."

The Saturday "incident" involved three peace activists, including an 82-year-old nun, who cut through three fences surrounding the facility, posted a banner on one of the buildings and poured human blood on the premises, according to the News Sentinel's orginal story about the break in.The activists were arrested under federal trespassing charges and are expected to appear in court Thursday.

The Project On Government Oversight's Peter Stockton, an expert in nuclear security, told Munger that the security breach could be a sign of a much bigger problem.

"The DOE's unprecedented response to last weekend's break-in, alarming as that incident initially appeared, suggests that it has revealed even more drastic flaws in the security at the Y-12 facility," Stockton said via email. "At this point we can only guess what those flaws might be."

Joe Newman is the director of communciations for the Project On Government Oversight. Image is from Flickr user NNSANews.

Follow @JFNewman

Mission Impossible? Not for 82-year-old Anti-Nuclear Weapons Activist

Michael R. Walli, 63, Megan Rice, 82, Greg Boertje-Obed, 57, succeeded in a disarmament action at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Nuclear facility before dawn.

 

[Update: The federal contractor who runs the Y-12 facility has put the complex under a "security stand-down," the Knoxville News Sentinel reports. Click here to read more.]

By MIA STEINLE

When a nuclear weapons facility can’t stop infiltration by an octogenarian nun, it’s time to reassess its security standards.

The 82-year-old nun, accompanied by two other anti-nuclear activists, broke into Tennessee’s Y-12 National Security Complex early Saturday morning, the Knoxville News Sentinel first reported.

“The Department of Energy has repeatedly claimed that security at the site, which houses 300 to 400 metric tons of bomb-grade uranium, is robust enough to defend against more than a dozen heavily-armed terrorists with inside knowledge of security procedures” Peter Stockton, a nuclear security expert at the Project On Government Oversight (POGO), ironically observed.

“It looks like the Boy Scouts could have done a better job” securing the site, he added.

After cutting through three fences surrounding the facility, the activists “posted a banner on one of the buildings and poured human blood on the premises,” the News Sentinel reported. The activists were arrested under federal trespassing charges and will remain in jail until a hearing this Thursday, according to the newspaper.

DHS Guidance on Contracting Meetings with Industry

By SCOTT AMEY

Jason Miller at Federal News Radio reported (click here for the audio) that the Department of Homeland Security’s National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) has draft guidance on holding meetings with industry representatives. This is a great move considering that the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) issued two memos educating the federal acquisition workforce about ways it can better team with industry.

The draft guidance states that government and industry meetings should only be scheduled after agency officials receive information about those requesting the meeting, the meeting’s purpose, names and titles of those participating, contracting opportunities they are seeking as well as additional information about prior NPPD meetings with the entity, potential conflicts related to current and former DHS/NPPD officials, and the entity’s history of contracting with DHS.

If the government is serious about learning from industry throughout the acquisition process, there should be polices to ensure that those meetings are above reproach. The draft guidance by NPPD would do that. It would create a level playing field for all contractors and help acquisition employees avoid ethics violations, including violations of the Procurement Integrity Act, personal and organizational conflicts of interest, revolving door abuses, and violations of lobbying rules. The draft guidance might also help achieve OFPP’s goals to engage small businesses and subgroups of small businesses, and improve communications with contractors that the agency has not worked with before.

FEMA Waiver Program Limits Debt Recoveries to 4 Cents for Every Dollar Improperly Spent

 

By SCOTT AMEY

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is operating a program that waives erroneous disaster payments in the vast majority of cases. FEMA errors resulted from manual processing errors, duplication of payments, failure of personnel to verify loss, and other mistakes.

According to a Department of Homeland Security Inspector General report, the Disaster Assistance Recoupment Fairness Act of 2011 (DARFA) waivers are being granted in nearly all cases. As of June 22, 2012, FEMA adjudicated 7,439 cases totaling $37,094,697 that were initially identified for recoupment. Of that amount, FEMA has granted waivers for applicants in approximately 96 percent of the cases it has reviewed. Specifically, FEMA has granted 7,160 waivers and denied 279 waivers totaling $35,497,327 and $1,594,129, respectively. Additionally, FEMA has expended an estimated $2,589,076 on the program, including planning and implementing provisions of the waiver process, training employees, and conducting waiver activities. For those who weren’t math majors, that means that the government debt waiver program is costing $1 million more than the amount of all program recoveries.

DARFA (see Sec. 565) authorizes FEMA to waive debt owed to the government because of an improper disaster assistance payment if the payment was caused by an error by FEMA, was not the fault of the debtor, and the collection would be against equity and good conscience. A waiver is also dependent on the debtor having a household income of less than $90,000 per year. A household with an annual income of more than $90,000 whose case meets the other qualifying criteria is eligible for a partial waiver. Waivers cannot be granted in cases of fraud by the debtor. The law applies to improper disaster payments made between August 28, 2005 and December 31, 2010.

Contractors at Nuke Facilities Mishandled Explosives, Report Says

By MIA STEINLE

Contractors at several government nuclear facilities have routinely mishandled explosives, unnecessarily endangering the lives of employees and the public, according to an inspector general's report released today.

The Department of Energy inspector general reported that the contractors that operate four sites that handle nuclear materials did not fully comply with the department’s explosives safety manual -– a nearly 500-page guide to handling and storing explosives. The sites in question are Los Alamos and Sandia national laboratories, which perform nuclear weapons missions; Idaho National Laboratory, home to nuclear energy programs, among other science missions; and the Savannah River Site, which performs nuclear waste repurposing and cleanup.

The report said that management at the sites “took immediate action” in response to the inspector general recommendations, resolving many of the issues the report details.  Among these issues were incorrect signage that misrepresented explosive hazards and the storage of combustible material in explosives bunkers.

Intelligence Chief Uses Unreliable Lie Detector Technology to Plug Media Leaks

Actor Mandy Patinkin, portraying a ficitional CIA agent in Showtime's Homeland series, undergoes a polygraph exam (photo by CBS Broadcasting)

By DANA LIEBELSON and ADAM ZAGORIN

The late William Safire, conservative columnist and veteran of the Nixon White House, called the lie detector test a “form of torture” that “breeds the opposite of security.” Writing in The New York Times a decade ago, he said “the hit-and-miss machine” had been thoroughly “discredited.”

But this week, the nation’s top intelligence official announced that the government is expanding its use of the polygraph to expose federal employees who leak classified information to the media.

The testing could put intelligence workers at risk of being falsely stigmatized, jeopardizing their careers and their ability to contribute to the national security. It also could have a chilling effect on employees considering blowing the whistle on government wrongdoing, whistleblower advocates said.

“It is clearly at odds with everything we learned in our report,” said Stephen E. Fienberg, a professor of statistics and social science at Carnegie Mellon University who led a 2003 National Research Council study of the use of polygraphs in security screenings.

Briefing a Senate committee on the study in 2003, Fienberg put it this way: “Unfortunately tests that are sensitive enough to spot most violators will also mistakenly mark large numbers of innocent test takers as guilty.”

Secret Service Prostitution Scandal Poses a Daunting Challenge for Homeland Security's Acting Inspector General

By JAKE WIENS

Following news that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s Office of Inspector General (OIG) plans to be more directly involved in investigating the Secret Service prostitution scandal, some have concluded that Members of Congress--several of whom did not trust the Secret Service to investigate itself--will now be satisfied that the inquiry will be independent and credible. But if recent history is any guide, the fact that the DHS OIG lacks permanent leadership may cause some lawmakers to question whether that office is fit to handle such a politically explosive investigation, especially if the inquiry drags on or does not turn up evidence of misconduct by high-level officials.  

Case in point: a recent probe by the DOJ OIG into allegations that agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) were directed to allow suspected straw buyers to purchase weapons, including AK-47s, and then subsequently lost track of those weapons, elicited congressional concerns about the independence of the DOJ OIG—which at the time was led by an acting official as the DHS OIG is now.

In a March 2011 letter to the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), the body that oversees IGs, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA), requested that the ATF inquiry be handled by an outside OIG, citing the lack of a permanent IG at DOJ as one of the reasons: