A Response to the Navy's "Vigorous Defense" of the Littoral Combat Ship

By BEN FREEMAN, PhD.

We certainly caused a stir last week after we sent a letter to Congress reporting that the USS Freedom, the first ship commissioned under the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, has been plagued with cracks, flooding, corrosion, and repeated engine failures.

In response to our letter, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA) amended the National Defense Authorization Act, “demanding that the Navy 'fess up to Congress on problems with its Littoral Combat Ship,” according to  AOL Defense. Hunter confirmed that our letter was the impetus for the amendment. "I didn't realize the Navy had been so restrictive in its reporting even with DoD," Rep. Hunter told AOL Defense. "We just want to know what's going on."

Rep. Hunter is joined in this bipartisan push for oversight of the LCS program by fellow House Armed Services Committee Members Hank Johnson (D-GA), who issued a statement supporting Hunter’s amendment, and Jackie Speier (D-CA), who sources confirm will be issuing LCS legislation of her own. And just yesterday, The Hill reported that Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and John McCain (R-AZ), the Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, respectively, have called for a Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of the program. 

It all seemed to touch a nerve with the Navy, which quickly moved to defend the $120 billion LCS program, which calls for a new wave of nimble combat ships designed to operate close to shore. The beleaguered Freedom, manufactured by Lockheed Martin, is one of two LCS designs.

The Navy issued a response to our letter so quickly that even Defense News remarked that it was delivered with “uncharacteristic alacrity.”

One point the Navy protests is our statement that LCS ships will make up as much as half of the Navy's surface fleet. The Navy cites a report to Congress that says the LSCS will account for 22 percent of the "21st Century Battle Force."

We can admit when we're wrong. But in this case the "22 percent" the Navy cites is not accurate, either. The planned 55 LCS ships will account for 38 percent of the Navy's surface combatant ships.

As for the rest of the Navy's response to our letter, we'll beg to differ and stand by our work.

Here's a side-by-side comparison of the Navy's response and our rebuttal:

What our letter said

“Senior Navy officials have publicly praised the LCS program. However, the Navy has been reluctant to share documents related to LCS vulnerabilities with entities such as the Pentagon’s Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).”

The Navy's Response		Our Rebuttal
This is not correct. The LCS Program Office has been working in close coordination with the DOT&E community since the early days of the program. DOT&E has been an active member of the T&E Working level Integrated Program Teams (WIPTs) since 2004 and most recently at the [Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)] level in the milestone-related Integrating IPTs (IIPTs) and Overarching IPTs (OIPTs) that occurred in 2011. Draft Detail Design Integrated Survivability Assessment Reports (DDISAR) were provided to DOT&E in the second quarter of fiscal 2012 to initiate discussions while modeling results and shot line selections are completed. DOT&E is working with the program office to complete the DDISARs and move toward developing Total Ship Survivability Trials (TSST) plans that assess Seaframe survivability in fiscal 2014. DOT&E will receive the final DDISARs prior to the planning and conduct of the TSSTs. Additionally, the LCS Program Office provided a draft of the 57mm Live Fire Test and Evaluation Management Plan to OSD/DOT&E on 29 March, and received comments on 3 April 2012. Comment resolution is in process.		The only two documents the Navy confirms sharing with DOT&E are a “draft of the 57mm Live Fire Test and Evaluation Management Plan,” and a draft of the “Detail Design Integrated Survivability Assessment Reports.” Both of which were just recently received by DOT&E. As our letter indicates, the Navy possessed several documents related to the ship’s performance and equipment failures that it failed to share with DOT&E. Plans to create trials in 2014 do nothing to improve oversight of a ship that will be deployed to Singapore in 2012.

 

What our letter said

•  “… (LCS-1, the first LCS ship) has been plagued by flawed designs and failed equipment since being commissioned, has at least 17 known cracks.”


• “Before and during the ship’s second set of rough water trials in February 2011, 17 cracks were found on the ship’…”


• “Another crack was discovered “below the waterline and is currently allowing water in... When discovered there was rust washing onto the painted surface. It is thought this is rust from the exposed crack surface. It is unknown how long this crack existed prior to being discovered.”


• “Similarly, cracks in the deck plating and center walkway on the port side were mirrored by corresponding cracks on the starboard side. Fifteen experts, including a source within the Navy, have informed POGO that the cracks in nearly identical locations on opposite sides of the ship may be indicative of systematic design issues.”


• “Last May, the LCS program manager issued near term operating guidance for LCS-1, which placed significant constraints on the ship’s safe operating envelope (SOE).”


• “Specifically, the new guidance states that in rough water (sea state 7; 19.5- to 29.5-foot waves) with following seas, the ship cannot travel at speeds greater than 20 knots, and cannot travel into head seas at any speed. Even in calmer seas (sea state 5; 8.2- to 13.1-foot waves) the ship’s peak speed into head seas is capped at 15 knots, relegating the Navy’s “cheetah of the seas” to freighter speeds.”

The Navy's Response		Our Rebuttal
Speed restrictions for LCS 1 have been lifted. With regard to the cracking discussion, these are not new findings. LCS 1 has experienced minor structural issues. The details of the cracks found on LCS 1 were briefed to the defense committees, including the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) over a year ago (March 2011). All repairs were conducted using approved repair procedures and satisfactorily inspected by American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and the appropriate Naval Technical Authority. Thorough analyses and reviews of the designs and construction documentation were conducted, with the goal of improved production processes. Design changes, as necessary, have been incorporated in future hulls to resolve noted issues. Production processes were modified as needed, to prevent future issues. These design changes were implemented into LCS 1 throughout her post delivery period, the ship has been approved to operate with the full scope of the approved Safe Operating Envelope (SOE) since completion of the repairs.		The Navy’s claim that the cracking issues have been reported is partially correct. The cracks were reported, but the extent of the cracking was not. These cracks have been repaired, but the cracking problem continues according to sources close to the program. Faulty welds and construction continue to cause new cracks on the ship that the Navy has yet to report. The Navy also claims “the ship has been approved to operate within the full scope of the approved Safe Operating Envelope (SOE) since completion of the repairs.” But, being approved to operate within the full scope of the SOE and actually operating are completely different. The simple fact is that since completion of these repairs the ship has been unable to successfully perform at the upper end of its SOE.

 

What our letter said

 “From the time the Navy accepted LCS-1 from Lockheed Martin on September 18, 2008, until the ship went into dry dock in the summer of 2011 — not even 1,000 days later — there were 640 chargeable equipment failures on the ship. On average then, something on the ship failed on two out of every three days.”

The Navy's Response		Our Rebuttal
As with any ship, all equipment failures on LCS 1, regardless of how minor the impact to mission, have been meticulously tracked, and this data has been invaluable in improving the reliability of ship systems. The 640 chargeable equipment failures from Ship Delivery until the summer dry docking, tracked in the LCS 1 Data Collection, Analysis, and Corrective Action System (DCACAS) represent all equipment failures to the ship for all systems (propulsion, combat systems, auxiliaries, habitability, C4I, etc) regardless of whether the equipment was repaired by the crew or off ship maintenance personnel. The 640 failures referenced include multiple failures on a piece of equipment (38 for the Main Propulsion Diesel Engine) and single failures to equipment (one Man Overboard Indicator). From the DCACAS report dated 31 Aug 2011, approximately 12 percent of the equipment failures since delivery can be attributed to the Ship Service Diesel Generators (SSDGs). In May 2010 the Navy and Lockheed Martin instituted a Product Improvement Program for the SSDG. The resulting effort increased Mean Time Between Failures (MBTF) for the equipment from less than 150 hours (October 2008) to over 500 hours (April 2011). This is a case of how the DCACAS data is used to improve the reliability of the ships early in the acquisition program. Overall the DCACAS data is a mechanism to evaluate every failure on the ship to determine if it can be attributed to infant mortality of the equipment, normal wear and tear for that equipment/component, or is a trend that needs to be addressed via design changes or reliability growth efforts.		The Navy does not dispute the 640 failures, which had not been previously reported. The Navy mentions that the DCACAS data is used to determine if failure can be attributed to infant mortality, normal wear and tear, or is a trend. Their file confirms that nearly a third of these failures were potential or confirmed trends, which, according to the Navy should “be addressed via design changes or reliability growth efforts.” This is precisely our rationale for questioning this ship’s design.

What our letter said

“Secretary of the Navy Raymond Mabus told the Senate Armed Services Committee in December 2010 that both variants of the LCS were performing well, and that “LCS–1, the Freedom, demonstrated some of the things we can expect during her maiden deployment earlier this year.” Then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead echoed this praise for the LCS-1, stating “I deployed LCS earlier than any other ship class to assure we were on the right path operationally. It is clear to me that we are.”

The Navy's Response		Our Rebuttal
USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) arrived in San Diego on April 23, 2010, successfully completing her maiden deployment more than two years ahead of schedule and three to five years faster than conventional ship acquisition strategies. LCS 1 traveled 6,500 miles, transiting the Panama Canal. Highlights of operations in 3rd and 4th Fleet Areas of Responsibility include theater security cooperation port visits in Colombia, Panama, and Mexico, successful performance of strike group operations with the USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group, joint maneuvers with the Mexican Navy, and counter-illicit trafficking patrols which resulted in 4 interdictions yielding over 5 tons of cocaine, 2 seized vessels, and 9 suspected smugglers taken into custody. The second phase of the early deployment included LCS 1 participating in the bi-annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise with 14 other nations, 34 ships, 5 submarines, 100 aircraft and over 20,000 personnel. The early deployment included the development of a coordinated logistics support plan. The lessons learned from the LCS 1 deployment have provided critical data to inform the permanent support plan for the 55 ships of the LCS class, as well as valuable information used in the construction of both LCS 3 and the Block buy ships.		These quotes are not an “issue” that we raised. We mentioned them in context of the ship’s failures to show the disconnect between what Navy officials were telling Congress and what was actually happening on the ship.

 

What our letter said

 “Mabus and Roughead failed to mention that during the approximately two-month deployment when the ship traveled from Mayport, Florida, to its home port in San Diego, California, there were more than 80 equipment failures on the ship. These failures were not trivial, and placed the crew of the ship in undue danger. For example, on March 6, 2010, while the ship was in the midst of counter-drug trafficking operations and reportedly “conducted four drug seizures, netting more than five tons of cocaine, detained nine suspected drug smugglers, and disabled two ‘go-fast’ drug vessels,” there was a darken ship event (the electricity on the entire ship went out), temporarily leaving the ship adrift at sea.”

The Navy's Response		Our Rebuttal
Throughout its deployment, LCS 1 safely operated and conducted its mission. Few of the 80 equipment failures cited above were mission critical. The ship did experience a brief loss of power, however, it should be noted that many commercial and U.S. Navy vessels have periods of power loss due to plant set-up and operator control. In the event of power loss, there are specific U.S. Navy procedures documented in the Engineering Operational Sequencing System (EOSS) to quickly restore power throughout the ship. To address concerns documented with electric power generation, the LCS Program executed Electric Plant Reliability Improvement Programs on both ship designs to increase reliability of ship service diesel generators and the performance and management of the shipboard electrical systems. This has resulted in changes that have been implemented through post-delivery availabilities on LCS 1 and LCS 2 as well as captured for LCS 3 and follow ships. Additionally, sensors were installed to monitor performance trends.		The Navy confirmed “the ship did experience a brief loss of power” while deployed, which again had not been previously reported or shared with Congress in any public testimony. In addition, the Navy claims that, “Throughout its deployment, LCS 1 safely operated and conducted its mission. Few of the 80 equipment failures cited above were mission critical. The ship did experience a brief loss of power…” The fact that other ships lose power does nothing to lessen the danger of unexpected power outages on a ship the Navy would have us believe can survive naval warfare. In other words, the Navy admits there were mission critical failures, including a brief loss of power, on this LCS-1 mission. This stands in stark contrast to Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus telling Congress that this mission was a success and the ship “demonstrated some of the things we can expect.” Unless we are to expect rampant equipment failures, it appears that the Navy was misleading Congress about these issues.

What our letter said

  “According to the DoD’s DOT&E FY 2011 Annual Report, the LCS is “not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat environment.”

The Navy's Response		Our Rebuttal
The LCS Ships are built to meet Joint Requirements Oversight Council-approved survivability requirements and include OPNAVINST 9070.1 Level 1 Survivability standards [note: OPNAVINSTs are instructions issued with the office of the chief of naval operations]. The LCS design specifically includes Level 1 plus additional tailored survivability enhancements (“Level 1+”). LCS survivability depends on a combination of ship design, ship numbers, and ship CONOPS [concepts of operations] which says LCS will; • Operate as part of a networked battle force • Conduct independent operations only in low to medium threat scenarios • Operate as part of a networked battle force operation in high threat environments • Create Battle Space/Avoid being hit • Rely on networked battle force for threat attrition • Rely on overboard systems • Fight and survive if hit • Ship design: Accept ship mission kill; keep ship afloat and protect crew after hit • Battle force design: Maintain battle force fight-through capability through LCS numbers and mission flexibility • Withdraw/reposition if hit LCS is designed to maintain essential mobility after a hit, allowing the ship to exit the battle area under its own power. The LCS systems allow ship’s crew to navigate and communicate while repositioning after a hit all the while utilizing numbers (of LCSs), and CONOPS as force multipliers. LCS incorporates survivability systems to perform required missions in the littoral with an emphasis on crew survival.		The Navy again confirms that the LCS has a “Level 1+” survivability rating. According to the Navy “Level I represents the least severe environment anticipated and excludes the need for enhanced survivability…in the immediate area of an engaged Battle Group or in the general war-at-sea region.” In other words, the ship is not expected to survive a true battle at sea. Additionally, given that the littoral combat ship will, by definition, be operating close to shore, it is also extremely vulnerable to land-based attacks, which it is ill-equipped to defend against. The Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Greenert recently said the LCS was not prepared to “challenge the Chinese military” and you can’t “send it into an anti-access area.” In short, this is a surface combatant that can’t truly engage in surface combat.

What our letter said

 “Sources close to LCS-1 have now told POGO that after more than six months in port, the ship has been back to sea just twice. The sources also informed us about critical problems that surfaced on the ship during those two outings: several vital components on the ship failed including, at some point in both trips, each of the four engines.”

The Navy's Response		Our Rebuttal
LCS 1 had one of two gas turbines engines fail after over three years of operations (including post-delivery testing, fleet operations and ship early deployment). The root cause analysis of the engine failure revealed that the gas turbine intakes were allowing salt spray to be ingested into the engine intake structure during high seas evolutions, which lead to the eventual failure of a high pressure turbine blade. The salt water did not induce corrosion internal to the engine. However, it changed the air flow through the engine, which eventually led to the failure. As a result of the failure, a redesign of the intake structure along with improved mating seals was implemented on LCS 1 on post delivery and is in-line for LCS 3 and subsequent ships.		The Navy does not dispute these previously unreported engine failures. They only discuss the results of an engine failure that occurred in 2010, which we do not mention in our letter.

What our letter said

 “In addition, there were shaft seal failures during the last trip, which led to flooding.”

The Navy's Response		Our Rebuttal
During February 2012 sea trials LCS 1 suffered a failure of the port shaft mechanical seal (1 of 4 such seals). The remaining underway portion of the sea trial was ended and the ship returned to port unassisted. The failed boost shaft stern tube seal was analyzed by independent third party to gain insight into the failure. Repairs to the Port Boost Stern Tube Seal have been completed and the USS Freedom undocked on April 7. All other stern tube seals on FREEDOM were inspected and found not to have this issue. Due to manufacturing timelines and differences, it was determined that LCS 3 seals were not at risk of the same issue. In addition, LCS 3 seals have undergone extensive operation without failure.		The Navy reports that shaft seals on the other engines of LCS-1 and those on LCS-3 were not at risk of this same failure. However, prior to this incident, the Navy was not aware the shaft seal that blew was at risk of failing either. In short, the Navy has not taken any corrective action in response to this issue.

What our letter said

 “The DOT&E’s FY 2011 Annual Report states that “[t]he program offices have not released any formal developmental T&E reports.” The report goes on to state that “the Navy should continue to report vulnerabilities discovered during live fire tests and analyses. Doing so will inform acquisition decisions as soon as possible in the procurement of the LCS class.”

The Navy's Response		Our Rebuttal
The Navy is actively developing the required reports documenting the results of all the Developmental Testing that has occurred on LCS 1. Once completed, these reports will be delivered to DOT&E as required.		The Navy confirms the DOT&E’s statement, which we referenced in our letter, that “[t]he program offices have not released any formal developmental T&E reports.” In fact, the Navy’s response to this specific critique confirms that “the required reports documenting the results of all the Developmental Testing that has occurred on LCS 1” have not been completed. The Navy states that they will be delivered to DOT&E once they are, but offer no explanation as to why they have not been completed. It is not unreasonable to ask the Navy to provide testing and evaluation reports for a ship that is scheduled to be deployed to Singapore and has already been deployed in the Caribbean. If the ship is performing as well as the Navy claims they should be eager to provide these reports.

What our letter said

 “The Navy has also repeatedly made significant changes to the program while giving Congress little time to evaluate these changes.”

The Navy's Response		Our Rebuttal
Configuration change management has been a key factor in controlling program cost. After incorporation of lessons learned from the lead ships into follow ships, the Program Office has controlled the design baseline closely in order to manage risk and cost. The Program Office has captured and continues to capture data from these “first of class” vessels. The “first of class” discussion is an important perspective to add. USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2) not only are they “first of class” vessels but they were procured using research and development funds in a manner outside the bounds of previous ship programs. Previous combatant procurements leverage off of years of research and development, integration testing and validation of systems using surrogate platforms. Aegis Cruisers implemented a new combat system that was tested for over ten years on surrogate ships to a hull form that had already been tested and delivered. Aegis destroyers laid the same propulsion, power generation and combat system into a new hull form. All of these efforts did not preclude these ships from seeing “first of class” challenges. The LCS programs however, took measures to instrument and collect data on the hull designs, execute design reviews/design updates and implement those findings into the follow-on awards. In addition, those findings have led to upgrades and changes on LCS 1 and LCS 2 to ensure that these research and development hulls are viable assets. LCS 1 has traveled more than 65,000 nautical miles since it was delivered to the Navy in September 2008 and continues to meet our expectations.		The Navy fails to respond to the actual issue we raised related to Congressional notification of program changes, specifically the shift from a down-select to a dual-award acquisition strategy. The Navy opted to instead discuss the “first of class” challenges on Aegis ships. It’s true that all first of class ships will have problems. However, the extent and nature of the problems on this littoral combat ship are far more problematic than on other ships. Faulty welds, design, and ship construction are the root cause of many of this ship’s failings. These are not first of class issues; they are basic ship-building issues that appear to have been largely ignored on this ship.

Ben Freeman is a POGO investigator.

Follow @BenFreemanDC

Photo via  U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Comments

[Greg Williams]

Wasn't LCS supposed to be analogous to the Army's Stryker - Cheaper, more numerous and faster than more traditional platforms? And isn't it also similar in that it has wound up more expensive and therefore less numerous than traditional platforms? If so, why not cancel the program outright? If we're going to keep LCS at all, I like the idea of keeping both classes if we can actually create meaningful competition between the classes/designs/contractors.

What does anyone else think?

The commentary in US Naval Institute Proceedings continues to provide very mixed reviews.

[J William Halfpenny]

What can you expect from something designed and built with
GREED being the operating factor governing the job? What do you think is going to happen to these Naval sell-outs that approve all this shoddy work? 1/2d