By T.X. Hammes
This writing originally appeared on The Will and the Wallet
The Department of Defense is facing the perfect storm—looming budget cuts, continuing engagement in multiple conflicts, and an expanding threat spectrum. Debate already is raging about how to prioritize defense missions and spending, and its conclusions should directly impact how U.S. forces are structured, equipped, and trained. Yet Congress and the administration will be tempted to avoid these tough decisions, and heavy dependence on private security contractors could allow them to do just that.
The precedent for this certainly exists. We sacrificed force structure in 1990s-era budget cuts and then hired record numbers of contractors to serve in the conflict zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. Part of that decision was economic, and planning to use contractors in future conflict zones will reinforce this tendency.
There are some clear advantages to using contractors in conflict zones. In some niches, they bring capabilities that the government may lack, such as large numbers of interpreters or the capability to deliver supplies through Taliban held passes leading to Afghanistan. Even more importantly, they are released when no longer needed, unlike military personnel, many of whom will serve until retirement and then collect a pension. Still, according to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the ultimate long-term cost-effectiveness of contractors relative to troops is unclear.
Contractors have strategic impacts alongside the economic one but, alarmingly, the government has not yet seriously examined that issue. If it did, it would find that contractors have major, inherent, and negative impacts on our current counterinsurgency campaigns. The United States authorizes them to use deadly force in our name even though our government cannot effectively control their quality or their actions. Unsurprisingly, local populations then hold the United States responsible for everything the contractors do or fail to do. U.S. legitimacy in the eyes of the population is severely undercut. And, at the same time, contractors also dramatically change local power structures by competing with the host government for a limited pool of qualified personnel.
The strategic damage doesn’t end here, though. Back home, using contractors reduces the political capital necessary to commit U.S. forces to war and the incentives for Americans to hold U.S. leaders accountable for these conflicts. If the U.S. were not using contractors, it would need to double the 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and add tens of thousands more in Iraq. The increased strain might have reduced the administration’s willingness to enter yet another long and expensive civil war. Contractor casualties also are off the books, in effect. Few Americans know that in the first six months of 2010, contractors suffered more casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan than U.S. troops.
These dangerous effects on strategy are not worth whatever economic benefit these contractors offer. A number of reforms can help us capitalize on any private sector efficiencies more responsibly, and all of them center on using military personnel for military tasks.
Our default position should be to have no U.S. government contractors employed in conflict outside secure facilities. To free up troops to fill the billets in conflict zones, contractors should be hired to run the support functions at home and overseas that do not specifically require trained, military personnel.
If our capacity is exceeded, we should resort to hiring contractors to operate among the people only after exhausting the capacity of the host government and its contractors. In that circumstance, our contractors always must be under the direct supervision of a U.S. government employee. Even then, the United States must work with international organizations to develop policies, procedures and institutions to deal with the presence of armed contractors in conflict zones.
Back home, Congress members and administration officials need to readjust their expectations of contractors accordingly. Private security firms cannot be an escape clause from choosing a disciplined strategy or a shield from public accountability for these decisions.
Taken together, our approach to contracting should focus on their ability to do repetitive, administrative, predictable tasks in a non-conflict environment. Indeed, no other approach better serves the U.S. citizens that pay for our national security than to ensure that whatever efficiencies we find don’t get in the way of our national policy and strategy.
Colonel Thomas X. Hammes is a retired U.S. Marine. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of the U.S. government. A fuller discussion of this issue can be found in Center for Strategic Research Strategic Forum 260: Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad and the Strategic Impact.
Image: shaun wong
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