Yesterday the House unanimously passed its defense acquisition reform bill, the Weapons Acquisition System Reform Through Enhancing Technical Knowledge and Oversight (WASTE TKO) Act of 2009, H.R. 2101. The Senate also unanimously passed S. 454, the Weapons Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (including the horrific Murray-Chambliss amendment notifying Congress whether program terminations are "consistent with the national security objectives for the national technology and industrial base"). And on Tuesday, the Department of Defense's (DoD) Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued a memorandum to Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the service secretaries stating his support for defense acquisition reform. So, everybody's on board to restore discipline to the procurement process, the problem's fixed, right?
Well, not exactly. As a letter that POGO sent with National Taxpayers Union, Taxpayers for Common Sense, and U.S. PIRG outlines, there are some significant differences in how the Senate and the House approach the problem, and how far Congress goes towards solving this problem will largely be determined by whether the key principles in the bill are preserved in conference. But legislation isn't going to solve the problem, and I have to agree with Travis Sharp at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation (though he is only one of many with these concerns) that it would be misguided to think that this is a panacea.
Instead, the success of the bill is reliant upon Congress and the Pentagon enforcing the rules--and as anyone who watched Congress defend their pet projects in the House and Senate Armed Services' hearings these past two days can attest, there are at least 19 different reasons to wonder if Congress is up to the task (and that's really just the latest--we were already familiar with 44). While I don't anticipate Congress ditching their parochial interests any time soon, and don't even think that's a fair measure of the success of this legislation, here are a few (but by no means an exhaustive list) of the issues Congress and watchdogs should continue to monitor to see if all of this rhetoric has translated into real change:
1. On the independent cost estimates issue, seeing whether independent program estimate numbers are placed in budget requests;
2. Looking to see if DoD and Congress can sit on their hands until programs have demonstrated that they have the design and technological maturity that merits receiving Milestone approval and being pushed farther into production;
3. If the requirements for number 2 are waived, that they are waived for legitimate reasons; and
4. When costs get out of control because number 2 was waived, whether DoD will really factors in costs as part of whether a program is viable for the future. And in the event that they cancel a program because they determine it is something we can't afford, whether Congress will allow that cancellation to stay in place.
-- Mandy Smithberger