What's in a Name?

Last week, the Department of Energy (DOE) again changed its policy on the protection of nuclear weapons facilities that house weapons-grade and weapons-quantities of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Formerly known as the Design Basis Threat (DBT), the new policy will now be called the Graded Security Protection (GSP) plan.

The change in policy comes after years of criticism from Congress, POGO, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the media on the ever-changing security requirements in the 2003, 2004, and 2005 DBTs.  For instance, when the 2004 DBT proved to be too expensive, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) created the diluted 2005 DBT, or as some called it, the "Dollar Based Threat."

The decision to restructure the security requirements comes on the heels of an embarrassing security test failure at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in April 2008.  Because Livermore Lab cannot meet current security standards, DOE has exempted the site from those standards, calling it a "non-enduring site."

While details of the GSP are classified, POGO has heard from its sources that the security requirements will vary from site to site.  We understand that Pantex and the Office of Secure Transport, which produce and transport nuclear weapons, will still be complying with the highest level of requirements, comparable to those in the 2004 DBT.  At other sites, however, we get the feeling that DOE will reduce the security requirements.  We have heard there will be a committee of experts who will analyze the security requirements needed at each site.

One thing we don't understand is why different sites need different requirements when they are all guarding the same thing: plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

The decision to rename the Design Basis Threat is reminiscent of an episode in the 1970s and 1980s, when a large amount of bomb-grade nuclear material went missing from the weapons sites.  The nuclear material was originally called MUF: "Missing and Unaccounted For."  But when officials began to realize how much material had gone missing--at one facility, for example, the MUF consisted of 200 lbs. of highly enriched uranium, which was never found--DOE decided to change the acronym from MUF to ID: "Inventory Differences."

-- Ingrid Drake and Peter Stockton

Comments

[Dave]

This excerpt from the May 2008 minutes of the University of California Board of Regent's Committee on Oversight of the Department of Energy Laboratories, gives a slightly different view...

"Mr. Darling (UC Executive Vice President) turned to the matter of a security audit of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory that occurred in March and April. He noted that reports in the media have suggested that there were significant problems with the laboratory’s security systems. He sought to provide some context for these reports, noting that, as the systems are highly classified, the information that may be disclosed in an open meeting is limited.

Mr. Darling reported that the federal audit team spent seven weeks at the laboratory. It reviewed everything from cyber security to the effectiveness of the protective force as well as physical information and personnel security. The purpose of the reviews was to test the systems to failure. At no time were nuclear or sensitive information at risk. The auditors reviewed eight areas; four were rated as achieving effective performance, and four were rated as needing improvement. As part of the effort, the auditors included a force-on-force simulation in which federal security forces conducted an exercise to attack the laboratory as though they were invaders. The attackers in such exercises, however, are given advantages in order to stress the system and identify any vulnerabilities. In this case, they were given insider knowledge, access to the inner perimeter of the site, facilities information, and communications and personnel advantages to which, in a real-world scenario, it is highly improbable most attacking forces would have access. The initial report from the DOE is still in draft form. It identified many positive findings as well as areas needing immediate attention. The laboratory, working with the four corporate partners – the University, BWXT, the Washington Group, and Bechtel – took immediate actions to ensure that any special nuclear materials at the laboratory were safe and secure and to begin to implement any corrective actions that are needed.

UC Committee Chair Pattiz emphasized the importance of recognizing that two years ago at the Los Alamos laboratory and nearly a year ago at the Livermore laboratory the University was responsible for safety and security. These are now the responsibility of the Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) now running the labs. Within the LLCs, the University’s principal focus is on science, as well as oversight and management as members of the governing board. Those members of the LLC with expertise in safety and security have brought many of their individual business resources to bear on improving these operations. The testing is a part of the system and occurs in all the laboratories in order to make sure that security and safety systems are meeting the necessary standards. He believed that the LLC structure had freed the University to focus on the science and technology, which are its strengths, and brought the expertise of the University’s partners in other areas to handle matters such as safety and security.

Mr. Darling reported that the Livermore laboratory is facing a $280 million funding shortfall this fiscal year resulting from a variety of components. These include a $50 million increase in inflationary costs, a $100 million reduction in federal funding due to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s budget reductions for Livermore, and items associated with the awarding of the new contract, the first of which is $86 million in increases mainly for retirement and health benefits compared to the costs the laboratory would have absorbed if it had remained part of the University. The second is $44 million in increased management fees and expenses that DOE agreed to provide to the winning contractor. To accommodate the shortfall, the laboratory is reducing both its operational and labor costs, but as the majority of its budget is related to its employees, the laboratory is being compelled to reduce its workforce by 2,000 employees over a two-year period.