With all eight directors of the nuclear weapons facilities testifying before it yesterday, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee missed a golden opportunity to surface vital information on the nuclear weapons complex.
The Members of the Subcommittee should have asked the following questions:
To Dr. Michael Anastasio, Laboratory Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory:
Was there a study conducted of whether the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) could be expanded to accommodate the stated activities of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) program, instead of constructing a new building?
To Greg Meyer, President and General Manager, Babcock and Wilcox Technical Services Pantex, LLC:
Could more bays and cells be opened to increase the disassembly rate?
To Thomas P. D'Agostino, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration:
Why has NNSA only downblended less than 87 metric tons of highly enriched uranium since 1994, and continued to store it a vulnerable wooden facility, when Russia has downblended about 500 metric tons?
How much space is reserved at the state-of-the-art Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility at Y-12 for storing excess highly enriched uranium?
Could the planned functions of the $3.5 billion Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) take place within the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF), if the 300-400 metric tons of excess highly enriched uranium was downblended?
And did we hear it right that D'Agostino told the Committee that if the House did not come to "consensus" by fully funding the CMRR Nuclear Facility, NNSA would put on hold de-inventorying Special Nuclear Material at Livermore Lab? Why didn't any of the Members ask NNSA to explain the rationale for keeping weapons-grade weapons-quantity in a growing residential community?
Also, while Chairwoman Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) did ask D'Agostino about lay-offs, she did not ask him or Dr. George Miller, Director of Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, why Livermore Laboratory laid off many of the key staff that are trained to package Special Nuclear Material, which is supposed to be NNSA's priority to remove from the Lab by 2012.
Since they didn't press Miller for details on why the Lab failed two security tests in April that demonstrated how intruders could create an Improvised Nuclear Device and escape with weapons-grade weapons-quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the Committee Members were unable to learn whether or not training of the protective guard force has been inadequate--a charge made by sources on the ground. Instead, Members talked about how wonderful science is at the Lab! This was not the Science Committee, but the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which has a duty to determine if Livermore Lab is improving its security to protect the weapons-grade weapons-quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium that it will house for the next four years.
Perhaps some of these questions would have been raised if the Committee had followed a best practice of congressional oversight: have the government witness panel follow the expert witness panel. That way the government has to respond to the comments raised by public interest groups, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), etc.
Instead, Members reserved their only tough questioning for Marylia Kelley, a Livermore resident activist and Executive Director of Tri-Valley CAREs, who advocated for the Curatorship Model of securing, consolidating and cost saving of the nuclear weapons complex.
-- Ingrid Drake
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