That's the way one longtime Inspector General (IG) described his job--the fact that an IG has a dual responsibility, to report both to his agency head and also to Congress, can frequently put him in an uncomfortable position. Then-State Department IG Sherman Funk told Congress in 1988 that's the way he felt, and it seems not much has changed since. Another IG told POGO that whenever he walks into a meeting at his agency, everybody groans, because they know they're going to hear some bad news.
As if it isn't bad enough being the proverbial skunk at the picnic, IGs also are forced to accomplish their near-impossible missions with few of the tools they need to get the job done. That's the basic conclusion of a new report from POGO, part one of a major study of the federal Inspector General system. This first report--which has been covered in Government Executive and the Washington Post--focuses on issues of independence, and what happens when IGs don't have it. A second, later report will address questions of IG accountability, performance and effectiveness.
This first part points out that an IG without independence is an impostor: "Calling someone who lacks independence of agency leadership an 'Inspector General' not only confuses the press and public, but can also create pitfalls for potential whistleblowers. The sincere…whistleblower may believe he or she is approaching an independent arbiter and end up sadly mistaken."
POGO began its project with a questionnaire to all the IGs who fall under the 30-year-old Inspector General law, and received responses from 49 of the 64. Those replies form the backbone of POGO's report, and they reveal sometimes surprising information and insight.
One issue that POGO finds troubling is the non-statutory IGs--those not covered by the law--who have the title but not the independence. These so-called IGs can be found at the military service agencies, like the Army, Air Force or Navy; on military posts and bases; and at the Defense Department's intelligence agencies, like NSA, NRO and DIA. Again, a sincere whistleblower may be misled and not understand that these IGs report only to their agency chiefs.
Of the 64 statutory IGs, 30 are presidentially-appointed and 34 are appointed by the heads of their agency. The latter group of IGs, who mainly serve at the smaller agencies or commissions, are often grotesquely under-resourced, and they have a difficult time even having their voices heard. One of those IGs said, "We're a little like the step-child of the IG community."
It's not just that many of these IGs don't get enough resources to do their jobs properly; they can't even get their foot in the door, because they don't have a separate budget account in their agency's budget. So they are very much at the mercy of their agency heads when budget time rolls around. They have trouble getting the staffing they need, and sometimes even when they've been granted funds by Congress, their agencies deny approval for the IGs to spend that money. Some IGs--and not just the smaller ones--have also run into problems trying to control their own web pages on the agency's websites. Agencies like to think of their websites as places for the agencies to shine, and they hate having to post IG reports that tend to focus on the agencies' failings. Some IGs--even including the Defense Department--also don't have their own legal counsel, which means they don't get legal advice dedicated to their own mission. Some of these IGs are forced to rely on advice from their agencies' general counsels--a situation POGO considers a clear conflict of interest.
POGO has made a number of recommendations that it believes will assist the IGs in accomplishing their mission. Among them:
- Create a resource pool of trained professionals--lawyers, auditors, investigators, IT experts, etc.--to assist IG offices on a temporary basis
- Revive the long-lost practice of choosing IGs from a slate of qualified candidates submitted by a committee of IGs
- Establish separate budget authority and transparent public budgets for all IGs
- Clarify that once an IG's budget is approved, expenditures can be made without further approval
- Require IG offices either to have their own counsel or to consult with another IG's counsel--but in any case not to rely on agency general counsel
- Require each agency to establish a clear and direct link to the IG's page from the agency home page, and provide IGs autonomy over their own content
Legislation that has passed the House and is currently pending in the Senate would address some, but not all, of the problems POGO has highlighted.
-- Beverley Lumpkin
Danielle,
While several conclusions and recommendations in part 1 of POGO's IG review have merit, others fall so wide of the mark as to be laughable. Unfortunately, the essence of the report seems heavily premised on deceptive and self interested data gleaned from Semi-Annual IG reports to congress and from IG responses to POGO questionaires. No less than Rep. John Conyers told a PCIE conference in 1993 that no one on the Hill understands or cares about those semi-annual reports. That's good since neither congress or POGO should put much stock in their thoroughness or veracity - it's simply a checkoff item. Hopefully, part 2 of the POGO study which purportedly examines IG "accountability, performance, and effectiveness" will clarify the basis for recommending that IG independence (and pay?) be enhanced - particularly at a time of glaring ineptitude throughout the IG community. By the way, does POGO want iincreases in IG pay linked to what IGs say they accomplish or to what IGs actually accomplish? Would you like IG pay equivalent to cabinet members and Supreme Court judges or is that too low? Should congress perhaps add statutory language requiring IG conduct to be "legal and ethical"? This might at least prompt some PCIE IG's to have their personal legal counsel look up definitions for legal and ethical. The IGs can ask their personal legal counsel to read and explain the definitions. Then it's lunch time.
Posted by: Ken Huffman | Mar 01, 2008 at 01:51 AM