The Project On Government Oversight (POGO) Blog

Old Reliable

Yesterday, Rep. Tom Davis announced he's "taking a sabbatical from public life" and will not be seeking reelection. I had to laugh when he put it that way, as whatever his intentions, few Members of Congress have worked harder against the public interest and for the interests of contractors than Davis. Who wants to start a pool guessing where he's going to land? Will it be one of those on POGO's Federal Contractor Misconduct Database?   Or will it be an association that represents a gaggle of contactors?

-- Danielle Brian

While Fear of Retaliation Alive and Well, Bush Administration Puts Kibosh on Whistleblower Protections

The Washington Post reported yesterday on a new study from the Ethics Resource Center which offers up a rare glimpse into how often government employees witnessed misconduct and what they did about it.  According to the report, "Just over half of federal employees observed misconduct in the past year. In the past twelve months, 52 percent of federal government employees observed at least one type of misconduct. Of this 52 percent of employees, 70 percent observed more than one type of misconduct."

In addition, "Many of those who reported the misconduct they observed were retaliated against. This is troubling on two fronts: reporters are punished for their responsible, courageous decision at the same time that future reporting is discouraged.

• More than one out of ten (11 percent) of federal government employees who reported their observations of misconduct have experienced retaliation as a result of their reports.
• Almost a quarter (24 percent) of federal government employees who observed misconduct but chose not to report it feared retaliation from management.
• Also, 16 percent of non-reporters within the federal government feared retaliation from their peers."

These findings aren't terribly surprising, given the frayed state of affairs when it comes to protecting whistleblowers from retaliation.  Still, the Executive Branch continues to object to whistleblower protections. Earlier this week, President Bush issued his most recent Presidential signing statement in which he unilaterally notified the Congress that he wouldn't necessarily implement several provisions of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, including one supported by POGO which provides whistleblower protections for defense contractors. According to President Bush's signing statement:

Provisions of the Act, including sections 841, 846 [the provision protecting contractor whistleblowers], 1079, and 1222, purport to impose requirements that could inhibit the President's ability to carry out his constitutional obligations to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, to protect national security, to supervise the executive branch, and to execute his authority as Commander in Chief. The executive branch shall construe such provisions in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President.

Also yesterday, whistleblower champion Senator Charles Grassley chastised members of the Administration who have objected to whistleblower protection legislation during a hearing with Attorney General Mukasey:

One of the most difficult issues in whistleblowing is that of national security whistleblowers.  These individuals have security clearances that prevent the disclosure of our Nation's closest held secrets.  I understand that a security clearance is a privilege and not a right.

However, individuals with security clearances who witness wrongdoing often face a catch-22.  They can either report the wrongdoing to supervisors who may retaliate against them, or they can sit silent and let the wrongdoing continue.  Either situation is unacceptable.

As a solution, the Senate unanimously passed S.274, the Federal Employee Protection Act of 2007.  This bill attempts to strike a balance.  It allows individuals who know of wrongdoing in classified matters to come forward and report that wrongdoing to Congress.  BUT, it only allows disclosure to specific persons cleared to hear classified information.

This bi-partisan legislation would ensure that national security information remains secret, while allowing Congress to conduct oversight required under the Constitution.

On January 22, 2008, you along with Director of National Intelligence McConnell, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Chertoff, signed a letter objecting to S.274.  I am concerned by statements in this letter which claim that secure reporting mechanisms for whistleblowers are somehow unconstitutional or jeopardize national security.  While I agree that this information needs to be secure, Congress must be able to conduct oversight of the Executive Branch on matters involving National Security.

While both the House and Senate have passed whistleblower protection legislation with veto-proof majorities, the different bills still need to be reconciled and sent to the President to sign. Of course, once it reaches his desk, we can only speculate about what overreaching interpretations he'll choose to include in his signing statement for that law.

-- Beth Daley

POGO Agrees with Activists: No Testing of Live Pathogens at Livermore

There are numerous problems with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore,
California beginning work with deadly airborne pathogens such as anthrax, bird flu and West Nile virus in a new Biosafety Level 3 lab to test detection devices.

In terms of cost and safety, the fewer facilities in the world with these pathogens on-site the better. Because each pathogen has a distinct footprint that marks its origins, one problem with setting up another lab to work with these deadly pathogens is that it becomes harder to trace the source if one escaped, or is stolen.

Another reason for concern is that LLNL doesn’t have the best track record; the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services fined LLNL last year for releasing anthrax during a 2005 shipment.

POGO is currently working on a report on LLNL’s difficulty guarding its stash of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, the most dangerous and expensive Special Nuclear Materials to protect from terrorists and thieves.

Also, it is a far from ideal location for such highly sensitive research projects. When the Livermore lab was established in 1952 it was out in the middle of nowhere. Today, due to sprawl from the Bay Area, 7 million people live within a 50 mile radius of the Lab, and with them senior centers, schools, and parks.

With homes only 300 yards from the fence line, some residents have been organizing against the introduction of hazardous and dangerous materials at the lab. "In the event of an accident, leak, spill or terrorist attack, this facility puts our lives at risk," said Marylia Kelley, executive director of lab watchdog group Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment (CARE), as reported in the Daily Californian.

Despite losing one lawsuit in court, Tri-Valley CAREs will file another injunction to block the Level 3 lab. Tri-Valley CAREs’ position is that the pathogens should stay at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and scientists should fly there to study them, as reported in The Oakland Tribune.

This “porkfest” of jobs and federal dollars for lab construction is symptomatic of what’s happening across the country, notes Edward Hammond with the nonprofit Sunshine Project. Yet with government handouts for construction – 36 WalMart-sized labs have been built since 2001 with 15,000 people authorized to handle the bioweapons - there are not similar handouts to protect the facilities. “I have a long-term fear that there will be an inadequate safety and security situation,” warns Hammond.

POGO recognizes that these pathogens need to be researched, BUT there are much better locales for this work to take place... like the already established Dugway Proving Ground in the middle of nowhere, Utah.  Where, drum roll please, the US military already does testing on chem/bio defense.  Why blow more funds in a densely populated area when you've already got a great place to do this work?

– Ingrid Drake & Nick Schwellenbach

Dept. of Interior IG Aims to Increase Mineral Royalties Oversight

The Department of Interior’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has revealed its intentions to create a new division to provide “more oversight of royalties” collected from mineral production on public lands, according to OIG Central Regional Audit Manager Jack Rouch, who will be responsible for the division. Mr. Rouch announced the plans at the most recent meeting of the State and Tribal Royalty Audit Committee on January 16-17 in Sacramento, California.

The new division’s priorities and workload are still being determined, but Mr. Rouch indicated that they would include a balance between additional oversight of royalty collections and auditing of the companies that owe royalties to the government. However, he stated that it’s “not [the OIG’s] intent to duplicate audits already being done” but, instead, to “establish more oversight and dedicate more resources” to the area of royalty management.

The OIG’s current plans place the new division at Mr. Rouch’s Central Region audit office in Lakewood, Colorado. The division will initially include six staff employees. Three of these employees are presently working to complete an OIG study of the Minerals Management Service’s (MMS) royalty-in-kind (RIK) oil program, and the remaining three will be added through a hiring process.

The division’s operating budget has not yet been made public, but this year’s activities will be funded from an FY 2008 congressional appropriations increase of almost $6 million over last year. The appropriations increase amounted to over $2 million more than the President’s budget request for FY 2008 (pdf).

This development comes in the wake of heightened scrutiny of MMS’s royalty management program. Much of the recent scrutiny has been in response to revelations that royalty measures were inappropriately omitted from offshore oil and gas leases. The OIG investigated the issue (pdf) last year. The OIG has also recently reported on problems with MMS’s royalty compliance review process (pdf) and on agency retaliation against whistleblowers (pdf).

Also, last month, an independent subcommittee with Interior’s Royalty Policy Committee (RPC) released an extensive report detailing recommendations for improving royalty management. On January 25, Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne announced that the agency will “immediately” implement the subcommittee’s administrative proposals. POGO’s statement to the RPC addressing the recommendations can be found here.

-- John Pruett

Crucial Amendments Fall Prey to Presidential Signing Statement

In an outrageous but all-too-familiar move, President Bush has declared in a signing statement that he is entitled to ignore certain provisions of the FY 2008 Defense Authorization Bill, which he signed into law yesterday. One of these provisions would establish an independent, bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting; another would extend whistleblower protections to employees of defense contractors.

POGO strongly supported both of these provisions (see here and here), and we’re dismayed to learn that the White House now considers them to be optional.

According to the White House press release, the burdensome provisions “purport to impose requirements that could inhibit the President’s ability to carry out his constitutional obligations...The executive branch shall construe such provisions in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President.”

As many reporters have pointed out, the use of presidential signing statements has increased at an alarming rate under the current administration. But should the president be allowed to selectively disregard any part of a bill that he signs into law?  Senator Levin (D-MI), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told CQ Today that “the courts have ruled that the president cannot pick and choose provisions of appropriations bills that [he wants] to comply with.” A blue-ribbon American Bar Association task force also found that these signing statements “undermine the rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of powers.”

-- Michael Smallberg

Simplifying the Alphabet Soup

Our friend Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists noted some apparently good news on his Secrecy News blog last week: the government is at long last moving to rationalize the chaos that has long existed in the handling of information deemed sensitive but unclassified--and yes, they call that "SBU."

More than two years ago, President Bush issued a memo ordering a new policy for such information, often marked "For Official Use Only," or "Limited Distribution."  But Aftergood points out that the president's purpose was to promote information sharing among federal agencies, not necessarily to rationalize the system for us outsiders.

The situation has become more absurd through the years as different agencies dreamed up new ways to say "you can't have it!"  In testimony last April before the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Amb. Ted McNamara, Program Manager for the ODNI Information Sharing Environment, testified that without a manageable system for handling SBU, it's impossible for federal agencies to share critical information among themselves, much less with state and local agencies, or the private sector.

McNamara testified that the "lack of a single, rational, standardized, and simplified SBU framework...heightens risk aversion and undermines confidence in the control mechanisms.  This leads to both improper handling and unwillingness to share information....This is a national concern because the terrorist threat to the nation requires that many communities of interest, at different levels of government, share information."  McNamara called the current situation "unacceptable."

Whereas the system for handling classified information is controlled by both law and regulation, unclassified info has grown haphazardly and is treated differently across federal agencies.  McNamara told the committee: "Among the twenty departments and agencies we have surveyed, there are at least 107 unique markings and more than 131 different labeling or handling processes." 

Oversight Missing at the NIH

You might have missed it over the three-day weekend, but a report just released by the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services reveals that the NIH (National Institutes of Health) is virtually in the dark when it comes to monitoring or regulating financial conflicts of interest among its research grantees.

As the report points out, 80 percent of the NIH's $29 billion budget is awarded to outside (or "extramural") research projects at universities and medical schools, and each of the grantee institutions must have a written conflict of interest policy. Yet the NIH cannot say how many conflicts of interest were reported by its grantee institutions between FY 2004 and 2006.  In 89 percent of the reported cases, the NIH had no information on the nature of the conflicts.

Even more alarming is that NIH officials are doing next to nothing to address the problem.  In fact, the NIH seems perfectly content letting the fox guard the hen house.  Dr. Norka Ruiz Bravo, the NIH's deputy director for extramural research, told the New York Times that the current system is "working to the extent that people are being honest, and I think most people are honest."  And Dr. David Korn, a senior official at the Association of American Medical Colleges, indicates that universities also favor the current practice of keeping detailed information about conflicts of interest under wraps within the walls of academia.  He told Science magazine that if the NIH follows the advice of the IG's report to amend the regulations, "the universities would fight extremely hard to not let that happen."

Some have argued that adding more oversight at the NIH would create an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy. But given the large number of NIH-funded researchers who also accept (and often fail to report) income from pharmaceutical companies and other private interests, it seems irresponsible to rely on grantees to disclose their own conflicts of interest.  As POGO's Ned Feder told The Scientist, "There are too many examples where this self-policing has been abused."  Feder also noted that the recommendations made in the IG report are "the minimum that is needed to deal with conflicts of interest."

Stay tuned over the next few weeks, as POGO will be issuing its own recommendations for strengthening oversight at the NIH.

-- Michael Smallberg

News Story Points to Need for Better Oversight on Plutonium Pits

Associated Press (AP) writer Josef Hebert did an excellent job on a complicated subject with his January 20 story, “Quality of Nuclear Devices Questioned.” It’s also a good thing the story was picked up by well over 100 newspapers because these plutonium pits cost $130 million to be manufactured and the DOE plans to produce between 10-50 pits annually over the next four years.

POGO is still deeply concerned about the viability and safety of these pricey little plutonium globes being made at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

When questioned by Hebert about the impact of the 72 waivers for the pits manufacturing specifications, LANL claims everything is fine because the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) accepted all of the 72 proposed changes. Yet, sources have told POGO that NNSA has no capability to independently evaluate the impact of each of the 72 waivers on the eventual reliability of the pits. For its assessment, NNSA is totally dependent on the design lab - LANL.

The AP story did not include POGO’s recommendation for fixing the problem, as outlined in a January 18, 2008 letter from POGO’s Executive Director Danielle Brian to Samuel W. Bodman, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy:

The solution to this dilemma, however, is not the current reckless path: throwing billions of dollars at high-risk programs to provide on-the-job training for the contractor workforce of an agency with a long history of failed program management.  The solution is to minimize the possible risk to the stockpile, to the taxpayers, and to international arms control efforts by focusing on Life Extension Programs and continuing to accelerate the dismantlement of excess warheads.

-- Peter Stockton and Ingrid Drake

DoD Report: Pentagon Test and Evaluation Office Needs More Personnel

Inside the Pentagon (paid subscription req'd; Fawzia Sheikh, "REPORT: DOD OPERATIONAL TESTING FORCE UNDERMANNED FOR MISSION," Inside the Pentagon, January 17, 2008.) reports that the director of operational test and evaluation (DOT&E), Charles McQueary, in his office’s fiscal year 2007 annual report, recommends a staff increase to counter the increasing workload his office faces:

 Although the number of action officers in McQueary’s shop has remained essentially the same since its creation in 1983, statutory changes and acquisition initiatives have nearly doubled the workload, according to the report.

 The manpower study contained in the report concludes DOT&E lacks the professional staff to carry out the duties and responsibilities prescribed by statute or to support several department initiatives.

 McQueary recommends boosting his staff by one senior executive, three military and 18 civilian billets, the study notes.
...

DOT&E needs a senior executive to serve as the deputy director for net-centric and space systems; additional action officers, including two military and seven civilians, to support oversight of operational and live-fire test and evaluation programs; and a civilian employee to serve as the special access program control officer to free up an existing military action officer currently filling this position as a collateral duty in addition to oversight of operational test and evaluation programs.

In addition, DOT&E needs four civilian action officers to support the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and DOD acquisition-process initiatives; two action officers (one military and one civilian) to support information assurance and interoperability evaluations of fielded systems; and five civilian program management specialists to manage joint test and evaluation efforts.

The DOT&E will need those additional resources to even attempt to implement the new memo emphasizing a more robust testing and evaluation regime at the DoD.

POGO is trying to procure a copy of the manpower study, but the most official government publicly-available compilation of Pentagon Operational Test and Evaluation office staffing information lies in a Government Accountability Office report from 1998 (pdf); this data is ten years old.  It shows that despite a significant uptick in the number of DoD programs under the oversight of the DOT&E, the staffing levels of that office were in slight decline.

The fiscal year 2001 annual DOT&E report reported the following about declines among the various parts of the broader test and evaluation workforce (which includes staffing levels outside of the Operational Test and Evaluation office):

WORKFORCE REDUCTIONS ARE ADVERSELY AFFECTING WEAPON SYSTEM TESTING

The [Testing and Evaluation] workforce has declined by approximately one-third during the last decade despite a relatively constant workload. With few exceptions, [Major Range and Test Facility Base] manpower has fallen steadily since FY90. Figure 5 displays the developmental test workforce. As is evident, all elements of this workforce are substantially smaller than they were a decade ago. Of particular concern is the dramatic decrease in the number of military personnel. Not having military personnel involved in early developmental testing results in missed opportunities to identify issues of military suitability and effectiveness.

In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that test centers are scheduling workload in a fashion that stabilizes the workforce at current levels. Such a practice adversely affects responsiveness to the needs of customers. This is a natural consequence of a smaller workforce. Also, because of limited resources for testing, emphasis is usually placed on minimizing test costs rather than minimizing the cost and schedule impacts on the weapon system acquisition program. This results in avoidable schedule delays and unnecessary program costs. [emphasis added]

-- Nick Schwellenbach

Corporate Monitor Investigation Picks Up Steam

If a tree falls in the forest and the New York Times doesn’t report it, does it make a sound?

POGO ponders this in light of the recent brouhaha over deferred prosecution agreements, specifically the one implemented in New Jersey by U.S. Attorney Christopher Christie, in which his former boss, John Ashcroft, was awarded a multi-million dollar corporate monitor contract. Readers of this blog might remember POGO weighing in on this last month, but it was this January 10 article in the “Gray Lady” that really kicked up the dust and brought this issue to the forefront.

Last September, Christie appointed his ex-boss, former Attorney General John Ashcroft, to be the corporate monitor of a company involved in a deferred prosecution agreement with Christie’s office. Ashcroft’s consulting firm stands to earn up to $52 million on what essentially amounts to a sole source contract drawn up entirely at Christie’s discretion. The company, Zimmer Holdings, must pay for Ashcroft’s services or else face prosecution. The public might not have learned about the fee arrangement (and the entire matter might have gone largely unnoticed in the first place) had Zimmer Holdings not disclosed it in an SEC filing.

On Wednesday, the chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees – Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.) – requested a GAO inquiry into deferred prosecution agreements and corporate monitor appointments. This action follows letters of inquiry Conyers and other lawmakers sent to Attorney General Michael Mukasey on these issues. According to the Times article, the Department of Justice is conducting its own investigation in order to come up with formal procedures for the selection of corporate monitors.

POGO supports efforts to add more transparency and oversight to these relatively new prosecutorial tools. However, we hope one especially important issue does not get overlooked. According to the Newark Star-Ledger, Christie did not impose criminal fines on Zimmer Holdings because he knew it would be paying substantial monitoring fees. The company is still being punished, but is the public getting short-changed if ill-gotten gains go to a corporate monitor – especially one who has connections to the prosecutor – instead of the government?

– Neil Gordon

The GAO's Pemco Protest Decision Finally Released

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) finally released its full (albeit redacted) decision sustaining part of Pemco Aviation's protest of the Air Force's award of a KC-135 maintanence contract to Boeing.  What's really interesting are the parts of the protest the GAO did not sustain.  And even more interesting is what the GAO said (or really did not say) in its press release on this decision last month, just days before the New Year.

Pemco argued that "the agency’s evaluation of proposals was flawed with regard to past performance, mission capability, and cost/price, and that the agency failed to properly consider alleged organizational conflicts of interest (OCI) and an alleged violation of the procurement integrity provisions of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, 41 U.S.C. sect. 423 (2000)," the GAO decision states.

The GAO sustained "the protest with regard to the agency’s evaluation of cost/price, but we deny the challenges to the agency’s evaluation of past performance and mission capability, as well as to alleged OCIs and the alleged violation of procurement integrity provisions."

The reader's digest of the juiciest parts of Pemco's protest--which were not sustained by the GAO--and the GAO bid protest analysis of them is as follows:

1) Alleged Organizational Conflicts of Interest (OCI): Pemco alleges that Boeing was a consultant to the Air Force on the KC-135 maintanence contract, Air Force denies that Boeing was used as a consultant (though Boeing was listed as "non-government advisor support" in the Request For Proposals), Pemco then says one of its employees heard from a Boeing employee that the Air Force was lying to the GAO on this point, but offers no evidence beyond that.  GAO dismissed this because it was deemed untimely and there was a lack of evidence; and

2) Alleged Violation of the Procurement Integrity Provisions of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act: Because Pemco and Boeing were formerly teammates in planning for a bid, Pemco argued that Boeing inappropriately used Pemco proprietary information to develop its independent bid when they split.  GAO said that because a government employee didn't give Boeing Pemco's info and Boeing did not wrongly obtain the data that point of Pemco's protests couldn't be sustained given the language of the Procurement Integrity Act.

Finally, there was nothing in this decision which seems, at this point, to shed much light on the GAO's vague statement in its earlier press release (pdf) regarding the supplemental protest Pemco made on the alleged conflict of interest of the late Charles D. Riechers, principal deputy assistant secretary for Air Force acquisition.  The GAO press release states:

Pemco’s protest submissions included allegations of bias with regard to Charles Riechers, the source selection authority for this procurement. In mid-October, Mr. Riechers was found dead, an apparent suicide. The Air Force subsequently advised our Office that both local law enforcement and federal government investigative authorities are conducting an ongoing investigation into “the root cause” of Mr. Riecher’s death; it is our understanding that this investigation will encompass matters that may have a bearing on Pemco’s allegations of bias. In light of the ongoing investigation, and consistent with this Office’s past practice, our decision does not express any opinion regarding Pemco’s bias allegations. [italics added]

Riechers is believed to have committed suicide after Pemco made its supplemental protest arguing that his short-lived tenure at Commonwealth Research Institute (CRI), which had done subcontract work for Boeing, created a conflict of interest which may have affected or could have the appearance of affecting Riecher's Air Force work on the KC-135 maintanence contract, which fell under his purview.

Reuters reported that in a letter to Sue Payton, head of Air Force acquisition, Riechers "expressed remorse at having created a new acquisition scandal for the Air Force reminiscent of the earlier one involving Darleen Druyun," according to a source, who spoke on condition of anonymity to Reuters.

The Washington Post first reported on Riecher's job at CRI, which was for work related to his future position at the Air Force, while he was waiting for the White House to confirm him for the position.  There is debate over the appropriateness of that arrangement.  The New York Times reported that privately, "officials acknowledged that the inquiries surrounding Mr. Riechers had uncovered questionable practices in a proliferating and poorly regulated side of Pentagon procurement that involves contracting for temporary consultants," often known as science, engineering and technical assistance contracts for individuals who work in the private sector.

Riechers also presided over Air Force acquisition of its KC-X future tanker and CSAR-X combat search and rescue replacement helicopter programs which have both been controversial.

Riechers was known as a straight shooter and for his integrity, numerous media outlets have reported.

-- Nick Schwellenbach

Congress on REAL ID: Stop us Before we Legislate Again!

Members of Congress are piling on the Homeland Security Department again, railing against its final rule, released on Friday, for implementing the REAL ID Act of 2005. House Homeland Security Chairman Bennie Thompson is peeved that details were leaked before he could peruse it, he complained in a letter to Chertoff. Governors, state legislatures, state DMVs, have all weighed in and pronounce themselves cautiously satisfied that many of their objections to earlier proposed rules have now been met.  Privacy and civil liberties groups are still vehemently opposed. Senators Leahy, Akaka, Sununu and others are still worried about privacy and concerned about unfunded mandates.

But let’s get real here.  All but one of the 9/11 hijackers used some form of government-issued ID, mostly driver’s licenses, to board aircraft or stay in this country.  One of the major recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in 2004 was to increase the security of driver’s licenses.  In response, Congress passed the Real ID Act in 2005 – yes, folks, we’re going on three years ago – but every time the Homeland Security Department has attempted to issue the rules that would carry out the law, it has been met with furious outcries from not only the states and privacy and civil liberties people, but also from the very Members of Congress who mandated those very rules. About 20 states have passed legislation opposing REAL ID, and six states have passed laws expressly prohibiting compliance.  As the department moves to implement the law, some in Congress are talking repeal.

As Chertoff explained on Friday, in an at-times contentious press conference, in order to reach the goal of uniform security standards for all states’ driver’s licenses, all persons seeking a driver’s license must provide their DMV office with documents that prove who they are and that they are in this country legally – generally a passport or birth certificate, or a Social Security card plus a utility bill should suffice.  The next step is that the state must verify that the documents presented are legitimate, and must take active steps to secure its own records and databases.  Third, the states must issue licenses that meet new tougher standards for being tamper-proof; and finally, the states must work together to ensure that individuals don’t try to obtain licenses from multiple states.  Chertoff also said that foreign nationals entering the country on legal visas will be able to obtain driver’s licenses that expire when their visas expire.