The Project On Government Oversight (POGO) Blog

Nuke Weapons Site Deploys Grenade Launcher without Night Vision, Training

According to a draft Department of Energy Inspector General (DOE IG) report (pdf) released today, the contractor managing Pantex nuclear weapons plant has required security officers to use a powerful military grenade launcher at night without proper training or “reduced visibility sighting systems.”  The report was made publicly available by the Project On Government Oversight (POGO).

This is the third DOE IG report made public in the past week about security troubles involving the contractor, BWXT Pantex LLC. A report from last week found “unacceptable” delays in fielding M-4 carbine rifles needed to protect the facility and high false alarm rates for the Aircraft Detection System. A second report from last week found cheating on security tests by contingency forces brought in to protect Pantex during a strike of BWXT’s security officers. DOE’s Office of Health, Safety and Security is conducting a more in-depth investigation of the cheating which should be out shortly.

POGO has previously raised concerns about security and safety at Pantex in letters to Secretary of Energy Bodman, including a May 2007 letter which revealed that the number of security officers protecting the site had plummeted during the union strike from 537 to roughly 200. Pantex was among those sites described in POGO’s 2005 report U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland Security Opportunities.

Pantex plant which is located 17 miles from Amarillo, TX, is the U.S. government’s assembly/disassembly facility for nuclear weapons. It stores thousands of plutonium pits, some from 40-50 year old weapons, in World War II era bunkers. 

According to GlobalSecurity.org, “The MK19 firing rate is over 350 grenades per minute and it is effective to ranges of over 2200 meters.”

Among the key findings from the report released today:

MK-19 Grenade Launcher was deployed without ability to target at night: “it was deployed without a reduced-visibility sighting system that would effectively direct the weapon’s fire under such conditions…protective force officers were expected to use the weapon on a ‘24/7’ basis including hours of darkness…Several protective force personnel assigned to use the MK-19 told us they could not effectively engage a target in darkness with the unaided eye.” (pg 3)

Contractor admits stop gap measure on reduced-visibility fails to meet security requirements: “When questioned about this situation, one contractor official said that this manner of target acquisition did not allow the facility to meet site protection requirements.” (pg 3)

Contractor was canceling order for reduced-visibility sights: “The official also said that the order for this equipment ‘was in the process of being cancelled and the need for such equipment was not a factor at this time.’” (pg 4)

BWXT official admits training is faulty: “a knowledgeable BWXT official said that the training and qualification program was not appropriate.” (pg 4)

Training happened on the least likely and easiest scenarios for an attack: “the weapon training program only provided for basic operator training at a firing range under favorable daylight and limited distance conditions. The training course did not address engaging an adversary under reduced visibility conditions or provide training at extended distances or against a maneuvering adversary.” (pg 4) “Our review revealed that protective force personnel were rated as qualified on the MK-19 after firing during daylight hours at a stationary target positioned at approximately 10 percent of the distance that an adversary was expected to be engaged and neutralized.” (pg 6)

The other two DOE IG reports are:

Letter Report on “Alleged Unnecessary Protective Force Equipment Purchases at Pantex,” July 11, 2007.

Memo on SUMMARY: Investigation of Alleged False Certifications Relating to Testing of the Contingency Protective Force at the Pantex Plant, July 12, 2007.

-- Peter Stockton and Beth Daley

POGO Launches new Federal Contractor Misconduct Database

Today, POGO will officially release its revamped Federal Contractor Misconduct Database (FCMD). The database features the top 50 federal government contractors (according to OMB Watch's fiscal year 2005 ranking), and details instances of misconduct or alleged misconduct from 1995 to the present. Our records indicate that the top 50 contractors have received in excess of $177 billion in government contracts in fiscal year 2005, and have accumulated $12.5 billion in fines, penalties, restitution, or civil settlements since January 1, 1995. 

The improved database will include a company profile for each of the top 50 federal contractors, as well as contact information and links to their website, ethics page, SEC filings, and political activities. For each instance of misconduct, there is a summary describing the occurrence, as well as links to POGO’s sources of information. Additionally, the database features a list of helpful contracting resources, as well as a new, user-friendly sorting mechanism that will allow users to refine their searches by items like contractor name, misconduct type, date, and dollar amount. 

POGO expects the FCMD database to emerge as an important resource for the American public and government employees that will help shine a light on contractor misconduct. A recent New York Times article stressed that current misconduct databases have been criticized for being outdated and incomplete, and highlighted POGO’s database as a potential new tool for information. Hopefully, our new resource will be used to ensure that taxpayer funds are allocated to responsible contractors who have intentions of serving the American people honestly and efficiently.  Furthermore, we hope scrutiny generated by the FCMD will provide greater incentives for contractors to prevent misconduct.

POGO's general counsel, Scott Amey, will testify this afternoon before the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement. Scott's testimony will emphasize the need for contracting officers to have comprehensive information on contractors' practices in order to ensure that taxpayer dollars do not go to corporations with a list of past improprieties. It will introduce the FCMD as a means of enhancing accountability of our largest federal contractors.

-- Jesse Ferrantella

Tell Congress to Say Hasta La Vista OSC

Following the House hearing last week which further confirmed the lack of professional acumen of U.S. Special Counsel,  WhistleblowerSupporter blog is encouraging whistleblowers to write their members of Congress to ask that they get rid of the Office of Special Counsel. They've even provided a draft letter which says:

    It would appear there is an extremely poor track record of the OSC and MSPB for about 30 years, and that no reforms or changes made have helped.  It does not appear to me at any time, but particularly now, that these organizations should be under the wing of the Executive branch, where they may be easily prevented from accomplishing their intended mission....The funding currently sent to OSC and MSPB should be dedicated to the new Congressional mission of overseeing the process of whistleblower complaints, and seeing that they are handled in an ethical manner.   I personally have more faith in Congress right now than the other branches, and feel if there is a problem with someone in Congress not doing their job I would have more ability to address that problem, than I do dealing with trying to change the puppeteer masters, from three steps away, the way it is now.

As POGO testimony pointed out last week, the OSC and MSPB have been torturing whistleblowers for years and three efforts by Congress to reform these institutions have failed. If you are a whistleblower, please write to Congress and tell them what you think.

-- Beth Daley

Marine Corps Lied to Senator Levin about MRAP Request?

Marine Corps claims described in congressional correspondence are at odds with the actual text of a February 2005 urgent needs request from Marines in Iraq.

In a letter Senator Carl Levin (D-Michigan), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, wrote to Senator Joe Biden (D-Delaware) on June 26, 2007 (pdf), the following was written:

Press reports about the February 2005 Marine Corps Urgent Operational Needs Statement [pdf] that you referenced in your letter concerned me a great deal as well. Since learning of this needs statement, my Committee staff has met with the Marine Corps multiple times. The Marine Corps' answer to the Committee staff has been two-fold: 1) the Marine Corps has initiated its own internal review of how urgent operational needs statements are handled; and 2) the Marine Corps indicated that the request from theater called for more effective armor materiel, which came in the form of fragmentation kit upgrades, rather than a specialized vehicle like the MRAP. I have directed my Committee staff to continue meeting with the Marine Corps on this matter until the internal review is completed. [Emphasis added]

However, even the briefest look at the February 2005 request (pdf) shows otherwise; that is, that the Marines on the ground, in Iraq, requested MRAPs specifically.  The first lines in that document on the first page, under "Description of Need," are:

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLE. This is a Priority 1 Urgent UNS in support of OIF EDL. Total AO requirement is 1169.
There is an immediate need for an MRAP vehicle capability to increase survivability and mobility of Marines operating in a hazardous fire area against known threats.

On its face, it seems that the Marine Corps engaged in telling the congressional staffers of the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee a bold-faced lie.  The only other possibility is that Senator Levin's staffers misinterpreted or wrongly portrayed the Marine Corps' claims. 

If it's the former, Congress should consider prosecuting the responsible parties for making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  Congress cannot intelligently and adequately perform its legislative and oversight functions if the executive branch is not providing it with truthful information--hence the existence of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  There need to be penalties for willfully misinforming Congress, especially on matters of life and death in wartime.  These requests were not made by bureaucrats at the Pentagon, but by Marines in Iraq regarding a vehicles which, if procured sooner, could possibly have saved the lives of hundreds. 

If Congress never penalizes or threatens to penalize those who lie to it, then it will only invite more dishonesty and a withering of its own stature.

-- Nick Schwellenbach

Mixed Reports on Staffing at Dept. of Homeland Security

A report released today (pdf) by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has added to worries that vacancy and turnover rates at the highest levels of the Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) may impede its ability to protect the nation. Last week, the House Committee on Homeland Security made public its own "majority report" (pdf) containing similar conclusions. Committee Chairman Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.) remarked today in the Washington Post:

It is no wonder that this department is struggling with its integration when its own headquarters has lost half of its senior staff to turnover.

When senior leadership doesn't stick around long enough for their coffee to get cold, the nation's security suffers.

Nevertheless, the GAO’s findings aren’t all negative. The Transportation Security Administration had the highest levels of turnover due to loss of screeners in 2005, but after factoring TSA out of the agency-wide results, DHS turnover rates have actually been lower than those of other agencies. Furthermore, DHS met four out of five of the GAO’s management criteria for compliance with the Vacancies Reform Act. These include reporting, responsibility, and communication factors.

Yet DHS did not meet the fifth criteria of having a documented and formal set of policies and procedures for complying with the Vacancies Reform Act. Instead, the agency relied on an “informal outline” to convey policy from one attorney to the next. This is a particular cause for concern since former-DHS General Counsel Philip Perry (VP Cheney’s son-in-law) left earlier this year and the position is now occupied by an acting general counsel. The GAO report doesn’t detail whether or not there have been problems with the transition.

Finally, it’s especially troubling that many of the DHS components listed as having the highest percentage of senior-level vacancies are also the same ones in charge of oversight functions and large contract programs – e.g. the Asst. Sec. for Policy’s office, the Inspector General’s office, the General Counsel, FEMA, and the Coast Guard. The numbers for these components (contained in the House Committee report) all exceed the agency-wide average.

-- John Pruett

MRAP Pleas Made Earlier than Feb. 2005

A team of excellent USA Today reporters broke an important story this morning -- highly-survivable vehicles that could have saved the lives of hundreds of U.S. Marines and soldiers were requested much earlier than was previously publicly known. 

Known as MRAPs (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles), these vehicles, originally developed in southern Africa in the 1970s, thousands are being ordered and are the Pentagon's number one acquisition priority (last week we wrote on questions a Defense Department Inspector General audit raised about some of these contracts). 

News accounts over the last two months have narrowed in on a Marine Corps Unmet Urgent Needs Request (UUNS) for 1169 MRAPs from February 2005 (pdf).  However, USA Today found that MRAPs were being singled out as potential solutions to the problem of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as early as 2004:

•April 28-29, 2004: Duncan Lang, a Pentagon analyst who worked in acquisition and technology, suggested purchasing the Wer'Wolf, the MRAP put before the Joint Chiefs in December 2003. In an e-mail to colleagues and supervisors, Lang said "a number could be sent to Iraq "as quickly as, or even more quickly than, additional armored Humvees." He called it "frustrating to see the pictures of burning Humvees while knowing that there are other vehicles out there that would provide more protection."

•April 30, 2004: Another Pentagon analyst, Air Force Lt. Col. Bob Harris, forwarded details about MRAP options to a member of the IED task force. The list included a variety of MRAPs, among them the Wer'Wolf and Force Protection's Cougar. "There was no great clarity as to why they didn't pursue these options," Harris says. "I saw it as my job to educate." Harris is now an acquisition officer at Hanscom Air Force Base in Massachusetts.

...

A PowerPoint presentation, dated Aug. 25, 2004, shows wounded troops lying in hospital beds. Most are bandaged. One is bloody. His left eye is barely open, his injured right is covered by a patch. Each was maimed by an IED. Each, save one, was in a Humvee.

On another slide: "Numerous vehicles on the market provide far superior ballistic protection" than the Humvee, wrote then-lieutenant colonel Jim Hampton, the man who prepared the presentation for the operations staff of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Baghdad.

Safety is a passion for Hampton. He's so concerned with security that he asks his wife, Kate, to take her pistol when she goes for walks on their 80 acres in rural Mississippi. When he got to Iraq in early 2004, he was tasked with looking at armor options to protect the Corps of Engineers, the agency sent to help with rebuilding efforts. For weeks, he studied armor options. His conclusion: The corps should get MRAPs to protect its people, specifically Wer'Wolves. Hampton says he asked for 53 Wer'Wolves. The corps got four.

Tellingly, the U.S. was involved in procuring MRAPs for the Iraqi Army:

Even as the Pentagon balked at buying MRAPs for U.S. troops, USA TODAY found that the military pushed to buy them for a different fighting force: the Iraqi army.

On Dec. 22, 2004 — two weeks after President Bush told families of servicemembers that "we're doing everything we possibly can to protect your loved ones" — a U.S. Army general solicited ideas for an armored vehicle for the Iraqis. The Army had an "extreme interest" in getting troops better armor, then-brigadier general Roger Nadeau told a subordinate looking at foreign technology, in an e-mail obtained by USA TODAY.

In a follow-up message, Nadeau clarified his request: "What I failed to point out in my first message to you folks is that the US Govt is interested not for US use, but for possible use in fielding assets to the Iraqi military forces."

In response, Lt. Col. Clay Brown, based in Australia, sent information on two types of MRAPs manufactured overseas. "By all accounts, these are some of the best in the world," he wrote. "If I were fitting out the Iraqi Army, this is where I'd look (wish we had some!)" [emphasis POGO's]

The failure to procure MRAPs reflects not just the failure of rapidly acquiring needed and proven equipment in the middle of a war, but of anticipating threats that should be obvious in dealing with 4th generation warfare.  Lt. Col. Roy McGriff III wrote a Marine Corps University paper [word doc] arguing that the USMC needs to acquire MRAPs:

According to the Marine Corps, the most likely threat STOM’s [Ship to Objective Manuever] vehicles will face, are a combination of mines and ambushes employed in offensive, unconventional mine warfare throughout the battlespace.   Currently, STOM’s ground tactical vehicle fleet does not possess mine resistant armor protected (MRAP) vehicles.  Incredibly, the bulk of STOM’s ground weapon platforms, sustainment, and transportation assets are not designed and built to survive their most likely enemy threat.

...
To date, the Department of Defense has never attempted to field a MRAP vehicle fleet.  Instead, the U.S. has chosen to concentrate the bulk of its countermine efforts on “silver-bullet” technonologies: prediction, detection and neutralization, while virtually ignoring simple and robust survivability measures.  Since WWII, this policy has cost the U.S. over 20 light infantry divisions’ worth of people and more than six armored divisions in tanks.   Alarmingly, the percentage of mine casualties as a percentage of total combat losses has risen dramatically from less than 6 percent in WWII and Korea to 33 percent in Vietnam and stands at over 50 percent of the total casualties today in Iraq.    The abrupt and sustained increase in mine casualties between Korea and Vietnam represents our adversary’s shift from conventional to unconventional mine warfare as they attempt to overcome our technological advantages. [emphasis POGO's]

-- Nick Schwellenbach

DoD IG Report Leaves Unanswered Questions

A Dept. of Defense IG report dated June 27 and subsequent news articles have raised serious questions about Army and Marine Corps contracts with Force Protection Inc. and Armor Holdings Inc. totaling $2.2 billion. The contracts were intended to supply troops in Iraq with new mine-resistant, armored vehicles and armor kits for older vehicles already in use. However, the IG report details repeated delays in production and suspect procurement practices, possibly endangering combat troops.

The contracts with Force Protection Inc. were awarded on a non-competitive, sole-source basis despite disagreement with some Marine officials. Furthermore, WaPo reports:

The contracts continued even though Force Protection "did not perform as a responsible contractor and repeatedly failed to meet contractual delivery schedules for getting vehicles to the theater," the report said. Under one contract issued in 2005, Force Protection failed to deliver 98 percent of 122 mine-resistant vehicles on time despite getting $6.7 million from the Marines to upgrade its production facilities.

The two companies’ relationships with BAE Systems – currently under investigation by the Justice Dept. for allegedly bribing the Saudi Arabian government – also add to suspicions raised by the IG report. BAE Systems has greatly expanded its armored vehicle interests in recent years and is now seeking to acquire Armor Holdings Inc. Likewise, Force Protection Inc. has partnered with BAE Systems to provide Iraqi Light Armored Vehicles (ILAVs) for the Iraqi police.

Spencer Ackerman at TPM Muckraker addresses the IG report’s limitations:

One thing the report doesn't establish is why these two companies got such lucrative contracts when they were both so clearly sub-par and competing suppliers existed. But Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-NY), who ordered the IG report, said today that she still needs to know "why military officials who were aware of other competitors were overruled," and she's calling on the Oversight and Armed Services committees in the House to hold hearings on the contracts.

If one considers Force Protection Inc. from an investor’s standpoint, it’s quickly obvious that the company has historically performed far worse than “sub-par.” As recently as FY 2005, Force Protection Inc. stated under “Risk Factors” on their amended 10K filing with the SEC, “We had losses since our inception and expect losses to continue in the future. We may never become profitable.” Also, the company’s share price had been virtually flat, hovering around $2 per share since 2002.

Part of the reason for Force Protection operating in the red could have been “Corporate Governance Issues” as chronicled by 10Q Detective, specifically the actions of CEO Gordon McGilton. This reason is supported by a news article from 2003 pointing to consulting costs.

At any rate, Force Protection’s share price, revenues, and assets all skyrocketed in 2006, thus making the company’s balance sheet positive for the first time in its history. As mentioned earlier, the IG report still doesn’t explain how Force Protection and Armor Holdings managed to receive the armored vehicle contracts despite the existence of other competitive companies. Rep. Slaughter also seemed dissatisfied:

"It's been business as usual," Slaughter said Wednesday after reviewing the report. "The lives of our soldiers took a back seat to who got the contracts."

Slaughter said the report raises more questions than answers and that she wants to know if the awards were the result of "influence peddling or insider connections."

-- John Pruett

NTSB Releases Critical Report on "Big Dig" Failures

Yesterday the NTSB released its findings on the Big Dig tunnel collapse in Boston, one year after the collapse killed a passenger in a car. In its report, the NTSB identified the lack of creep-resistance in the epoxy used in the ceiling of the tunnel as the main culprit. The NTSB will release the final report pending further review and final editing.

The collapse of the ceiling in the Big Dig is the culmination of a long series of failures in the nation's biggest and most expensive public works project, including outrageous cost overruns, incompetent engineering, and alleged contractor fraud. (the Boston Globe requires a one-time free registration to access its stories online). None of this is new--POGO has been investigating and exposing problems with Big Dig since 1995 (see our first report on the Big Dig).

The NTSB report largely points its finger at the private contractors (Bechtel, Parsons Brinkckerhoff, and Gannet Fleming, Inc) and Massachusetts Turnpike Authority for failing to identify the lack of creep-resistance in the epoxy prior to the accident. Although the report did not point a finger to the role of inadequate federal oversight, the report called for greater involvement from the Federal Highway Authority (FHWA), asking the FHWA to develop new safety standards and a tunnel inspection program. After all, the Big Dig was a federal project, and 85 percent of its funding came from the federal government. It was only after the cost of the project had ballooned to an estimated $14 billion dollars that Congress finally decided to cap federal funds at $8.5 billion dollars.

Federal oversight has been insufficient even in the early stages of the project. Our own past investigations revealed that the Federal Highway Authority rubber-stamped  the Massachusetts operation, which was itself largely controlled by Bechtel to begin with. There was even less of an incentive to oversee the Big Dig project after the federal government capped its funding, but even after the cap was in effect, the Big Dig remained a federal project and should have received meaningful oversight from the federal government. It might not be inconceivable to think that after it was cut off from federal money, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts might have resorted to cutting corners in order to curb expenses.

But now the public will never know, because little federal oversight has occurred.

-- Michael Zhou

WaPo's "Government Inc." Blog Debuts

We wanted to send a warm welcome from the blogosphere to Robert O’Harrow, Jr. of the Washington Post who today launched his blog "Government Inc." In the past few years, O’Harrow and his partner Scott Higham have been reporting some of the biggest and most important stories about government contracting including the adventures of the General Services Administration’s Lurita Doan and the ballooning cost of contracts at the Department of Homeland Security. The first installment concerns Sun Microsystems overcharging the government millions of dollars. We are fans.

-- Beth Daley

Bar Low for Whistleblower Protection

A story in Saturday's Washington Post illustrates the absolute inadequacy of whistleblower protections.  In 1989, Richard Barlow was fired after raising objections inside the Office of the Secretary about senior Pentagon officials lying to Congress concerning Pakistan's emerging nuclear weapons program and the threat of AQ Khan.  Since then, the State Department Inspector General and the GAO have both largely vindicated Barlow and found that he was retaliated against.  Barlow's security clearances were restored, but he could not get rehired by the government due to the incident; as a result, he could not get the annual pension and health insurance that he deserves.

Twenty Senators and eight legislative committees have looked at Barlow's case, only to discover that there isn't any avenue to compensate whistleblowers fired from the intelligence field.  "There just isn't a venue for someone like him," said POGO Executive Director Danielle Brian to the Post. "He was trying to prevent lies to Congress about something of global importance. And he didn't even go to Congress -- all he did was suggest that Congress not be lied to."  When Barlow tried to find a venue in the court system, government officials used the "state secrets privilege" to quash his case.

As reprehensible as it is that Barlow was retaliated for doing his job, the real failure is that his concerns about AQ Khan--an individual whose impact Congress is still examining--were not heard, and as a result, the United States missed an opportunity to stop Khan from building "the world's largest atomic black market."  The specter of the AQ Khans of the world may not go away any time soon, but Congress can correct the harm done to Richard Barlow by passing legislation to compensate for Barlow's loss of his pension and fixing the whistleblower protection system to make sure that this kind of mistake will never happen again.

-- Mandy Smithberger

Steve Kelman: Obsessed with POGO

I think that POGO should be flattered. It's been brought to our attention that Harvard professor and erstwhile contractor lobbyist Steve Kelman has become obsessed with us. He has written several blog posts directed at us and now a column begging us to pay attention to him. It's kind of weird -- doesn't he realize we're busy?

Anyway, I should let it be known that I cut my teeth in Washington as an intern researching and drafting a response to an article he wrote in the mid-80's entitled "The Myth of the $436 hammer" or something like that. He had come up with this convoluted theory that he called the "equal allocation of overhead" that explained away overpriced spare parts by claiming the hammer was only, say $5, but $431 in overhead had been spread across every part.

So, in other words, according to his theory, a $25,000 jet engine compressor would be priced at $25,431 because it had the "same" $431 in overhead allocated to it. Each item, regardless of its base price – whether it was $5 or $25,000 -- had the exact same dollar amount of overhead added to its price. He argued, then, that there really weren’t any overpriced spare parts, only reasonably-priced parts with big overhead amounts allocated to them.

I guess it would have made sense if it were true. We actually had the pricing sheet that showed the prices of dozens of parts on the C-5 cargo plane -- and a number of bolts and screws were less than $1.  For Kelman's theory to have been correct, the base price before overhead allocation for parts costing less than $431 would have to have been a negative number. I remember checking Kelman’s footnotes and finding that cited himself as his source. Maybe they let you do that at Harvard, but they wouldn't have let me get away with that at my alma mater. The point is, I've always known Kelman to be fast and loose with the facts.

Deepwater: Government is in Deep

Reuters and other outlets report that Deepwater contractors actually had the nerve this week to send a letter (pdf) challenging the Coast Guard’s legal authority to pursue a $100 million refund for the eight patrol boats which have been deemed unsalvageable. Lockheed Martin and Northrop’s primary defense is “I told you so,” saying that it disclosed the “issues” on forms it provided to the government – known as DD250s – when the boats were delivered. Following that logic, contractors can deliver whatever they want to the government, no matter how defective, as long as they note there are a few unresolved “issues” at delivery. That doesn’t pass the laugh test.

Unfortunately, it seems Lockheed Martin and Northrop have the government over a barrel. A move last week in the House to reign in their status as the lead systems integrators on the $24 billion Deepwater contract faltered. Under the lead systems integrator model, contractors manage and oversee themselves, a model which was embraced in the 1990s, and has now led to a string of disastrous contracting failures including Deepwater. In a House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure markup on HR 2722, the Deepwater Integrated Reform Act, Representative Steve LaTourette prevailed on a motion to allow the contractors to keep the contract for as much as another four years. Of course, it is probably just a coincidence that Representative LaTourette’s wife, Jennifer Laptook-Latourette is Vice President of a lobbying firm which represents Lockheed Martin.

Representative LaTourette adopted the industry line that the Coast Guard will not be able to assemble the team it needs to manage the Deepwater contract in a timely way. While the Coast Guard could assume the control of the contract sooner if they are capable, the onus will be on them to wrest the troubled Deepwater contract out of Lockheed and Northrop’s clutches.

-- Beth Daley

 

Update (July 5th):

Former Lockheed Martin employee Michael DeKort who saw the foibles of the Deepwater contract first hand points out that many of the problems were NOT mentioned in the DD-250s as claimed in the letter. According to Mike:

--Low Smoke cables - were mentioned and had a waiver. However, the Coast Guard Inspector General found that the waiver should not have been issued.

--Environmental failures - were never in the DD-250s even though we knew well before delivery of any of the boats. I can prove Lockheed Martin and the Coast Guard knew and kept it out of the DD-250s (I specifically asked for it to be in there). Several years later the Coast Guard drafted a waiver that they still say the Coast Guard should sign.

--TEMPEST - all the failures were not mentioned.

--Cameras - blind spots not mentioned.