POGO's V-22 Concerns

It can’t autorotate to a safe landing, has no defensive gun, lacks the ability to perform quick evasive combat maneuvers under fire, and can’t descend too quickly or it will go into a dangerous roll. Nonetheless, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) approved the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft for full rate production on Wednesday.

The DAB’s decision comes on the heels of the latest phase of operational testing by the Pentagon’s top independent testing office, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. DOT&E’s acting director, David Duma, who said the V-22 is operationally "suitable" and "effective." Plans are to purchase 459 V-22's at a cost of more than $50 billion, according to recent estimates.

POGO is concerned that the Pentagon is sending a dangerous aircraft into battle. Although in past tests the V-22 was only considered survivable in a low-threat combat environment, Duma said the V-22 is survivable in up to a medium-threat environment. He upgraded that category because he said the aircraft was quiet and fast in approaching a combat zone, and had a number of modern defensive threat detection systems on board.

However, Duma called for further testing on the aircraft’s ability to maneuver in the heat of battle. "Further testing and tactics development is needed to expand the maneuvering flight envelop as much as possible, and to determine whether there is operational utility in the use of more extreme helicopter-style maneuvering in a high-threat environment," his report said. Although a specific threat level is not noted in the aircraft's formal requirements document, it does say the V-22 "must be capable of performing air combat maneuvers."

The V-22 has a number of challenges and limitations:

• The Deadly Vortex Ring State (VRS). Because it has two large propellers on each side of the aircraft's wings, the V-22 has a unique design challenge unlike other helicopters. When it descends too fast in helicopter mode at a low rate of speed, the aircraft is vulnerable to "VRS-induced power settling," which can result in an "asymmetric loss of lift" that causes the aircraft to roll to one side. When this happens at a low altitude the pilot is unable to recover before ground impact. VRS was determined to have caused an April 2000 crash that killed a four-man aircrew and 15 Marines being transported aboard the aircraft. A subsequent April 2001 review of the V-22 Program by a specially-appointed Blue Ribbon Panel concluded that while VRS is not a "basic flaw" of the V-22, "such a configuration does tend to be unforgiving because of its propensity to roll when certain malfunctions (other than engine failure) occur that affect one side of the propulsion system and not the other."

• Can't Autorotate. One of the more significant formal V-22 military requirements was that the aircraft be able to land safely in helicopter mode without power, a procedure known as autorotation. But after the Marines discovered that the aircraft can not autorotate like most helicopters, it dropped this requirement, claiming such an emergency had a "low probability of occurrence." The autorotation or soft-landing requirement is one that helicopter pilots claim has saved lives on numerous occasions. But even on those rare occasions when power is lost, the new DOT&E report flatly concludes "emergency landings after sudden dual engine failure in the conversion/VTOL (vertical short takeoff and landing) mode below 1,600 feet above the ground are not likely to be survivable."

• No Effective Defensive Weapon System. The V-22 has a formal requirement that it have a defensive gun to protect its crew and occupants. Although there are plans to add a small tail gun – untested so far – at some point in the production process, so far, engineers have been unable to come up with any forward or side window defensive weapon. Many V-22 critics say a tail gun is not widely considered to be an effective weapon for an aircraft landing in a combat zone in helicopter mode.

• No Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Protection. In May 2001, Marines General James Jones told Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that the V-22 "has an NBC capability that helicopters do not have. In other words, it's survivable in a nuclear chemical or chemical and biological environment." This requirement also has since been dropped, however, after the Marines claimed cost, operational problems, and weight limitations prevented the NBC protection. Now, troops will be forced to wear special NBC suits for protection.

• Other challenges. The DOT&E report also notes that other system performance shortfalls remain, including the lack of weather radar and a personnel hoist commonly used during rescue operations. The report also points out that there has only been "limited testing at night of in severe brownout conditions" – swirling dirt, debris, and dust commonly created by the aircraft's two large propellers.

Comments

[John Kantor]

It's laughably easy to criticize anything revolutionary and undergoing development - and usually more about self-promotion than concern. With this mentality, t's amazing that we ever progressed beyond throwing rocks. After all, sharp pointy sticks are obviously just inherently dangerous.

[John Kantor]

It's laughably easy to criticize anything revolutionary and undergoing development - and usually more about self-promotion than concern. With this mentality, t's amazing that we ever progressed beyond throwing rocks. After all, sharp pointy sticks are obviously just inherently dangerous.

[John]

A V-22 undergoing icing testing at Nova Scotia lost about 12 inches of blade due to an ice strike. Other than some vibration, the aircraft was totally controllable and landed without incident.

[Allen B. Reeves]

What I wrote on May 2nd, 2005 at ~0950
Suggest you consider challenging the physics and engineering community to prove that the V-22 Osprey is not inherently a death trap because of the error in accounting for the large angular momentum of the huge 38ft proprotors on this aircraft. The angular moment and gyroscopic effect IMHO is a key to its future metal fatique and instability problems particularly in combat situations. There is also the stability problem of what happens when a proportor is perturbated by small damage and/or partially imbalanced due to damage from debrie or bullets. The Lockheed Electra (Navy P3) had a similar problem with its heavy propellors when it was first introduced over 35 years ago or so. Many people were killed until this oversight was discovered. They fixed the problem I think(?), however, the V-22 has a much more significant engineering angular momentum control problem if you take the 3 props at about 2 slugs each and consider their angluar momentum forces at the max blade speed of ~660ft/sec. It is a huge amount of gyroscopic force to have to control if you were to be in a hazardous weather or a combat situation where the aircraft is being battered about causing large torques to be produced by these props on the superstructure. Even the Russians when they made a large turboprop bomber in the 70's & 80's used dual propellors spinning in opposite directions on a common shaft to counter the large gyroscopic torque problems. They also use counter-rotating props on a common shaft for there advance military heliocopters eliminating the need for countertorque prop in the tail of their machines.

[john]

Thats great Dennis, so you want to spend millions of dollars to outfit about 25 aircraft that will only ever be used to train pilots in basic flight training to be equipted with a gun. Hey, why don't we outfit the aircraft at flight school with weapons as well. Like it or not, Spiral Developement is the way that business is being done. As per calling me a French soldier, I am a U.S. Marine. I love America and am willing to lay my life down for even you. And yes, I am a V-22 pilot. I see day in and day out the advantages to operation this aircraft. I have seen over and over again, armchair decision making from that only read articles like this one on the internet and take it for gospel. Everyone will believe what they read on G2mil but will almost always discount what the experts say.

[Dennis]

Sorry, I hate to post twice on one board! It's not my fault, it is the stupidty of the other posters.

"Sometimes you;ve got to break some apples so we can kick ass over seas."

"APPLES" Is that what you think of the man next to you? A fruit? Something that can be wasted, because there is a whole tree full? God bless you! God will appeciate all the good men you think should be sent to them.

[Dennis]

'Why spend all of the extra money to outfit aircraft that are used for training to have a gun'

That's a great idea! God, I wish I had thought of that! Think of the tremedous savings of money! Recuits in all forces should train without rifles, pistols, grenades, rocket launcers, hummers, trucks, etc! If they want equipment for the job, then they have to buy their own! Great ideas JOHN! When the troops are landed at the LZ, they are handed that day's weapon, with the manual of course! Your not a French soldier are you?

[Larry Oleffsen]

Sometimes you;ve got to break some apples so we can kick ass over seas.

[Carlton Meyer]

V-22 Fails OPEVAL and Approved for Production

Here are my comments on the September 2005 DOT&E report on the V-22 Osprey. Note that a KPP is a Key Performance Parameter. If an aircraft is unable to meet it's KPPs, it is considered a failure. KPPs are not dreamed up by evil critics, but by Marine aviators who expected the aircraft to easily meet that minimal standard. I'd love to watch a mythical congressional hearing like this:

CONGRESSMEN: Welcome Mr. Duma, we have read you September 2005 V-22 OPEVAL report and have several questions.  As you know, there has always been concern that the V-22 is so complex that it will break down often. Your reports notes the V-22 passed only 3 or 5 reliability tests. It took too much time to put V-22's back into the air after a mission abort (MRT). It also failed the projected mission capable rate of 82% for the V-22 when the entire fleet accumulates 60,000 hours; your OPEVAL team calculated only an average of 78% would be mission capable each day based on its record thus far. This is on page 29 in case you didn't read this part.
These brand new V-22s used during OPEVAL had a mission capable rate of only 86% (completed 157 of 182 flights). However, on page 29 it says someone in your office not part of the OPEVAL team developed his own model that showed a projected 88% rate. So rather than report a KPP failure of 78% provided by your OPEVAL team, you included this outsider's 88% as fact. I also understand a member of your staff who help prepared this report is good buddies with several senior Bell-Boeing reps.
DUMA: Blah, blah, aborts only disrupted a few missions.
CONGRESSMEN: But then on page 12 you describe one important test where two of the five V-22s aborted because of maintenance problems.
DUMA: Blah, blah
CONGRESSMEN: An OPEVAL is supposed to be a realistic test. However, a "Fleet Support Team" of V-22 contractor personnel augmented the Marine maintenance personnel. This support will not routinely be available to deployed Marine V-22 squadrons, and yet it still had high mission abort rates and a poor mission capable rate for new aircraft. Why was this team of contractor maintenance experts allowed to improve the results of this supposedly realistic test of an all-Marine squadron?
DUMA: Blah, blah
CONGRESSMEN: Finally, one of the three measures which the V-22 passed (MFHBF) the V-22 managed 1.4 hours while the threshold was at least .09 hours. This means something broke down in a new V-22 every 1.4 hours of flight time. If something in my new car broke every 1.4 hours, I would take it back for refund. Anyway, that is considered a success in your report, however, you should have noted that the MFHBF threshold was 1.4 hours until the program cut that goal almost in half to .09 hours in 2002 because of dismal performance during the last OPEVAL.
DUMA: Blah, blah, I didn't know that.
CONGRESSMEN: The OPEVAL praises the V-22's 255 knot cruising speed in the airplane mode is much better than helicopters cruising speed of around 150 knots which is measured at 300 feet. However, a USAF study last year says the V-22 conducting helicopter type missions flying at 300 feet can only cruise at 185 knots because of the thicker air. What did your OPEVAL show?
DUMA: Blah, blah, we didn't test it's cruise speed at normal helicopter altitudes.
CONGRESSMEN: The last V-22 OPEVAL focused on the 171 hydraulic leaks, which is why it failed the last OPEVAL in 2000, just before a hydraulic leak caused another V-22 to crash. Your OPEVAL report mentions none, and doesn't say how frequently they occurred. It just noted the current configuration is "safe." How many hydraulic leaks occurred during this OPEVAL?
DUMA: Blah, blah, it wasn't measured this time.
CONGRESSMEN: My reading the OPEVAL is that the V-22 is not shipboard compatible. Unlike helicopters with their blades folded, the V-22 must be unfolded to work on the engines. There is only enough room in the hangar deck to work on one V-22 at a time, and even then the blades cannot be unfolded. Therefore, most engine maintenance must be performed on the flight deck. That means it can only be performed in good weather, during the daytime, and when their are no flight operations. Wouldn't you consider that a major problem? Have you conferred with any Navy ship captains on what this means?
DUMA: Blah, blah it's a problem.
CONGRESSMEN: Your report also notes that when the V-22s engines are up and it sits on deck for a few minutes, the deck begins to "buckle" as it blows extremely hot engine exhaust directly on the deck. These decks are made of steel, don't you mean melt?
DUMA: Blah, blah, don't know, experts are looking at the problem.
CONGRESSMEN: These problems arose after just a few days of V-22 shipboard operations, and your report noted they happened during previous shipboard testing with the V-22. I've never heard of melted steel fixing itself. Don't these indentations on the flight deck cause serious safety problems, especially for Harriers that use rolling take-offs?
DUMA: Blah, blah don't know.
CONGRESSMEN: Your OPEVAL noted a failure of a key KPP, but didn't call it a failure. The external lift for a V-22 has a KPP of 10,000 lbs, with a goal of 15,000 lbs. The most it could demonstrate was 7200 lbs. That is less than a light CH-60L can lift! Boeing says the 40-year old CH-46E design can lift 10,000 lbs (see Boeing technical stats) and it is half the size of the V-22. You could also have noted that the newest version of the tandem-rotor CH-46, the CH-47F, can pick up twice as much as the V-22.
Your report included hearsay that the V-22 once picked up 9980 lbs, but I would think that if it could lift up a couple thousand more pounds, they would have demonstrated that during the OPEVAL. Your report also noted that the performance of the upgraded "Block B" V-22s will even be worse since they will include a hoist and defensive gun. So do you agree, the V-22 failed this important KPP?
DUMA: Blah, blah, okay yes it failed to demonstrate that..
CONGRESSMEN: But on page E-1, your Executive Summary, you state the V-22 "satisfied" all KPPs. Another KPP that was not demonstrated, self deployment overseas. The goal of flying 2100 miles in eight hours was demonstrated by flying 1600 miles in one day? However, more hearsay crept into your OPEVAL report. Why did you include the hearsay from contractors that the "Block B" upgrade now in production can achieve this KPP, because of "explorated" performance calculations performed by the contractor. Will you agree this KPP was not demonstrated?
DUMA: Blah, blah, okay that KPP not demonstrated.
CONGRESSMEN: You also seem to have an error on page 1, where it states the V-22 can take-off and land with only one engine. I've been told that has never been done, unlike a helicopter that can flare using autorotation and land with no engine power, a V-22 with payload will suffer serious damage if it must land vertically with one engine inoperative. The 2002 NASA report said testing was needed to see if a V-22 can land safely with one engine inoperative.
DUMA: We didn't test that.
CONGRESSMEN: Then why is it your report! The data on the Page 15 chart was not just results from your OPEVAL, but hearsay from the contractor. For example, your staff didn't observe the V-22 lifting the lightweight howitzer and flying it 69 nm. Your staff didn't observe a V-22 "self-deploy" 2100 miles with one refuel. The chart shows "Block A projection" whose unexplained results are much better than what the Block A demonstrated to your team. Where did all this garbage come from?
DUMA: I'm not sure, the contractor said it can perform better in ideal weather conditions.
CONGRESSMEN: The V-22 flies most efficiently at 18,000 feet, but it is unpressurized and according to a 2002 study by a medical doctor on your own staff, Colonel  Ed Wakayama, the cockpit temperature falls to 14 degrees Fahrenheit . (On the Internet http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2002training/wakayama3.pdf ) Even when bundled up in artic gear and wearing oxygen masks, painful bubbles form in the joints and pilot performance diminishes from the extremely cold. I can only wonder what happens to all the internal electronics over time as they are frozen for several hours during each flight.
DUMA: Blah, blah, I'll check into that. (staff whispers) oh, World War II bombers flew in those conditions.
CONGRESSMEN: Yes, but they wore heated suits, those were very dangerous missions anyway, and crews suffered so much they were limited to 25 missions. Back to 2005, do you have another study to refute Colonel Wakayama's report, if not, why didn't you mention that flying the V-22 over 10,000 feet is unsafe? Is this why self-deployment test were never done, because the V-22 cannot fly that far in denser air under 10,000 feet? Is this why the V-22s you tested could only fly 1600 miles in one day?
DUMA: Blah, blah. I'll have to provide that for the record.
CONGRESSMEN: On some missions, the V-22s carried "ballast" e.g. sandbags rather than Marines to prove KPPs. Page 12 notes the ballast used weighed 4760 lbs. Doing some basic math, that is only 198 lbs per Marine. Marines carry at least 40 lbs of gear into combat. The standard Marine planning guidance is 240 lbs per Marine, that is in the KPP. Therefore, wouldn't you agree this KPP to fly 24 Marines 200 miles was not demonstrated and requires retesting with 5760 lbs of ballast, plus several hundred pounds added to represent the missing defensive gun and hoist?
DUMA: Blah, blah, perhaps.
CONGRESSMEN: Or maybe they chose 24 of the shortest, skinniest Marines from the 2nd Marine Division for this test so they would fit in the cabin and weigh 1000 lbs. less. My reading of page 37 is that it is possible to cram 24 Marines into a V-22 cabin, but it is unsafe because of the difficulty in egress and a limited air cooling system. I have also been told that since the V-22 cabin is six inches narrower than the CH-46Es, crew chiefs cannot move about when passengers are seated with knees interlocked. This is shown on page 34. So crew chiefs cannot move about to check things, assist passengers, or extinguish small fires.
DUMA: Blah, blah, they plan to find a solution.
CONGRESSMEN: Why didn't you note that the V-22s cabin is 25% smaller than the CH-46E?
DUMA: Blah, blah, never heard about that.
CONGRESSMEN: I suggest you measure it, and you will find the contractor has lied. There is a footnote on page 12 that the test director decided to end the use of ballast to simulate payload because of "oil leaks". Please explain that bizarre decision?
DUMA: Blah, blah, I'll have to check on that.
CONGRESSMEN: Did the V-22 program team ever explain to you why they have never been able to accomplish simple tasks like adding a personnel hoist and a defensive gun? The Marine Commandant General Mundy told them he wanted one back in 1999. Your report notes the V-22 will not even carry the .50 caliber heavy machine gun, the CH-46E can carry two. The V-22 will only have a hand carried 7.62mm medium machine gun. What did you learn about this during OPEVAL?
DUMA: Blah, blah, we didn't ask.
CONGRESSMEN: You also noted that the composite airframe cannot be repaired if it suffers battle damage. You suggest that if must be sent to a stateside depot for repair. Most all helicopters in Vietnam had patches to repair common bullet holes, but you are saying the V-22 cannot be patched by Marines overseas?
DUMA: Blah, blah, repairs are difficult, probably must be done at depots. Repairs were not demonstrated.
CONGRESSMEN: The V-22 is expected to carry a wheeled vehicle. However, the last OPEVAL discovered that the V-22s composite flooring and ramp were too weak to support a wheeled vehicle unless floor spacers were used. The Marine Corps found that unacceptable as the spacers use up height and no one wants to assemble spacers on a ramp in an LZ. What did your OPEVAL show?
DUMA: Blah, blah, we didn't test that.
CONGRESSMEN: After the loss of two V-22s in 2000, Marine Corps Generals and V-22 program officials repeatedly stated that there was no timeline constraint for fixing the V-22, that it would be fully tested. However, in your report you stated that much testing was not completed. Your report noted only 31 of 131 hours of night flying was done. Wouldn't agree that is a very sorry result?
DUMA: Blah, blah, couldn't find pilots.
CONGRESSMEN: Yes, but this program has existed for over 20 years, don't you think it was odd that they claimed they couldn't find any night qualified pilots to conduct these tests. Why didn't you delay the tests until such pilots were available?
DUMA: Blah, Blah, had other things to do.
CONGRESSMEN: I found it very odd that with all the brilliant people involved, they couldn't coordinate full shipboard testing. Even if a ship was not available, why not conduct tests ashore? There is a simulated ship landing site at Bogue Field near Cherry Point with the outline of an LHA that Marines use all the time. Why wasn't that used?
DUMA: Blah, blah, don't know.
CONGRESSMEN: Mr. Duma, your office is charged with conducting realistic testing in an operational evaluation setting. So why did you refrain from conducting realistic tests, and then recommend that realistic tests be conducted? I find this bizarre and have never read something like this in an operational evaluation which also approves production. The purpose of OPEVAL is to conduct the final testing. Who do you expect to conduct these tests? You are the final okay before full production, and you write in this report that you did not perform realistic "high threat" tests. Why?
DUMA: Blah, blah, contractors say the rotors might break if the V-22 makes sharp turns.
CONGRESSMEN: Are you telling me that you chose not to do realistic tests because the contractor told you they were unsafe? So you are testifying that the V-22 has not conducted tests to prove it is safe in a realistic environment.
DUMA: Blah, blah, it's safe, we just couldn't prove it.
CONGRESSMEN: The OPEVAL occurred over a three month period. However, you report that brownout testing was not conducted because no one could find austere landing zones in the USA where they can be conducted. Is that correct?
DUMA: Well it rained at Nellis, then blah, blah.
CONGRESSMEN: Many have stated that V-22's downwash is no worse than a CH-53E. But the V-22 will not replace the CH-53E, which is a cargo helicopter with three times the payload capacity of the V-22. The V-22 will replace the CH-46E as an assault helicopter designed to insert Marines into austere landing zones. Since the V-22 is twice the weight of a CH-46E, many are concerned about its downwash, and we don't know how bad it is because the testing was skipped during OPEVAL. Couldn't you just land on a sandy beach at Camp Lejeune?
DUMA: Blah, blah
CONGRESSMEN: Your report noted that Marines at aviation logistic squadrons can only repair 90 of 590 V-22 parts. All the other parts must be returned to a depot for repairs. That's a remarkably high number and very expensive.
DUMA: Yes, we noted that.
CONGRESSMEN: So Mr. Duma, am I correct when I say that V-22 testing is incomplete, yet Marines in the operating forces will soon begin using V-22 to fly realistic missions? In addition, you only tested the Block A aircraft, no one has tested the Block Bs which are coming off the production line and have several significant changes like wing fuel tanks.
DUMA: Blah, blah, we recommended more testing.
CONGRESSMEN: In summary Mr. Duma, you certified the V-22 as suitable for operational use by the Marines, even though it has failed to demonstrate the minimal performance required by several KPPs, has not been fully tested, failed shipboard compatibility, and is considered too unsafe for realistic tests at this time.
DUMA: Blah, blah. I have to go now.
___________________________________________________________________________
Here is a link to my V-22 article from last year, Why the V-22 is Unsafe http://www.g2mil.com/V-22safety.htm
Feel free to use any of this without permission.
Note: OPEVALs were created with the idea that an independent team of civilians from the Department of Defense should conduct final testing on military equipment to verify that the military services are not lying. It seemed like a good idea, but the problem is they are headed by political appointees who are not technically qualified, do not understand what is going on and really don't care. Duma is expected to understand all the complexities of National Missile Defense, the F-22, the V-22 ect. I couldn't find anything on the Internet about David W. Duma except that he has been with DoD since 2002. His boss Kenneth Krieg joined in 2001, and has a degree in history and a masters in public policy. http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/krieg_bio.html
In addition, military contractors have manage to cozy up to the career civil servants in that office. As a result, their work is poor and it allows the military services and contractors to build junk because when problem arise they can say that DoD okayed it.
Carlton Meyer [email protected]

[Carlton Meyer]

Why the V-22 is Unsafe

http://www.g2mil.com/V-22safety.htm

[John]

This article sounds like it was written by someone who has never talked to the professionals who fly the aircraft. VRS is a situation that is less likely to occure in the V-22. If you look at the limits for the aircraft, you will see that the decent envelope is less restrictive than a helicopter. Because of the small rotor diameter, the velocity of the downwash is greater. In order for VRS to occur, you must decend at a greater rate in order for the rate of decent to equal the rate of downwash. As per the gun, future planned upgrades will have a gun. Why spend all of the extra money to outfit aircraft that are used for training to have a gun. The third point is about less than 10% of flight time is spent in a VTOL situation that would require it to autorotate. There haven't been too many dual engine failures in the USMC rotorcraft industry. Many of those are due to just plain running out of fuel. There are just some emergencies that are unrecoverable. Airbus industries learned that their aircraft cannot fly without a vertical stab. Do you still fly on an airbus?