DOE Closes Door to Journalists, not Lobbyists, at Recent Event

The June 29, 2009 issue of the Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor has a very disturbing article, “DOE's New Transparency Policy--A Closed Door,” about how journalists were told to leave the room when a senior level DOE official spoke to a group of lobbyists and private interests. Below is a summary of the article:

Raising questions about the Department of Energy's committed to its oft-stated pledges of openness and transparency, journalists were told to leave the room shortly before new Deputy Energy Secretary Dan Poneman was to speak at this year's Energy Facility Contractors Group meeting in Washington last week. While no explanation was given at the time, according to those present, the move was apparently intended to ensure that journalists not only didn't cover, but couldn't even hear, a routine address on DOE's priorities under the Obama Administration and efforts to address climate change. In what one can only hope was meant with a sense of irony, Poneman reportedly also stressed the need for improved transparency at DOE in a speech closed to the news media. Poneman was the only DOE official whose remarks journalists were not allowed to cover at last week's meeting, which was also attended by Under Secretary for Science Steven Koonin, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management Ines Triay and other DOE officials....Last week's incident seems to run in the face of DOE's efforts to be more transparent, which have gone into overdrive since the Department received billions of dollars in additional funds through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. To ensure that the funds are used without suspicion, DOE has flooded its Web sites with reports on how the money will be used, has posted accounts of every meeting between officials and lobbyists concerning the stimulus funds and even, on occasion, instructed lobbyists to leave public meetings when the Recovery Act was to be discussed. It is the latter that heightens the irony of last week's incident, given that a number of lobbyists representing DOE contractors were allowed to hear Poneman's remarks, while members of the media, who would disseminate them to a wider audience, were pushed away.

-- Ingrid Drake

New Administration, Time for New Downblending Plans

Yesterday, NNSA announced that it has selected a contractor team--WesDyne International, LLC and Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.--to downblend 12 metric tons (MT) of surplus highly enriched uranium (HEU) into a safer form of uranium, referred to as low enriched uranium (LEU). Frank Munger's Atomic City Underground reports that most of the material is coming from the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee. We are pleased to see that a contractor has been selected, as this particular downblending effort has suffered delays.

However, we would challenge the NNSA's assertion that this contract "is a clear demonstration of our leadership of nuclear nonproliferation efforts." These 12 MT of HEU were actually in the pipeline for downblending before the Obama Administration took office.

If the NNSA really wants to demonstrate "President Obama's unprecedented commitment to strengthening and leading international nuclear nonproliferation efforts," it should immediately designate the approximately 300 MT of HEU at Y-12 excess to defense needs so it can be downblended by 2012.

-- Ingrid Drake

False Choices at the Nuclear Weapons Complex: We Don't Have to Accept Lies and Shoddy Work in Order to Have a Reliable Stockpile

Today, the Los Angeles Times published a story about how the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced that the "first refurbished W76 nuclear warhead had been accepted into the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile by the Navy," when in fact no delivery was ever made to the Navy.

POGO alerted the Times about the story because the NNSA was (mis)using the example of the W76 to promote itself. In March of this year, NNSA's Deputy Administrator boasted of the refurbished W76: "This is another great example of the unsurpassed expertise throughout NNSA's national security enterprise." In fact, it was the NNSA's mismanagement of the refurbishment process that led to the serious technical problems that resulted in the warheads' status--currently in pieces inside a production cell at the Energy Department's Pantex plant. The Navy told the Times, "We have not received delivery of any refurbished W76 warheads. The answer is none."

Those who believe in the refurbishment process, also known as the Life Extension Program (LEP), are outraged at how the process has been devalued by senior Lab management. For example, Roger Logan, a former Livermore Lab weapons designer and certifier, told POGO:

"LLNS&LANS [the contractors running Livermore and Los Alamos]...did everything they could to chase away W76 (and B61) expertise at both Livermore and Los Alamos. I was alarmed when my colleagues at Los Alamos sent me the long string of names of experts on these systems that LANS...chased out of the weapons program. Why? Because these people were honest and therefore a threat to the LLNS&LANS profiteering agenda.

Protect the labs...and screw the production plants. This theme pervades nearly every study to this day...It is often unintentional -- but fueled by the "Gray Beards", protecting the money at the labs they fondly remember at the expense of the "non-scientists" and production plants. Manufacturing and assembly is just viewed as menial and trivial, often by those who have never done it. The result is that the people at the plants -- and considering such careers -- got the message -- LEAVE. So they did."

NNSA instead promotes unproven, but showy, projects like the National Ignition Facility (NIF) instead of the LEP program and high risk components for a critical weapons system. According to Logan, these more boring, menial (but essential) missions were neglected at the expense of drama, purported science, and profit. The operating costs of refurbishment is about $200 million per year as opposed to the $400 million per year operating costs on NIF alone (if it works).

This story is not to say that the LEP program can not work. In fact, the Knoxville News' Frank Munger reports that the technical problems at Y-12 that had been holding up the completion of the W76 refurbishment were finally resolved in March. So the issue is not that we can't refurbish the warheads, but that NNSA is incredibly sloppy and regularly hides behind national security to avoid accountability, and we've been letting them get away with it for too long. And pretending they are doing a good job when they are not does not provide the confidence necessary for this critical mission. NNSA needs to be held accountable for not maintaining the integrity of one of its most important responsibilities and lying about the status of its programs. Ultimately, what this story shows is that NNSA needs new leadership that will no longer make excuses for its mismanagement, but will instead demand excellence.

-- Ingrid Drake and Peter Stockton

POGO Applauds President Obama's Selection for NRC Chair

POGO is encouraged that President Obama has designated Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Commissioner Gregory Jaczko to serve as the NRC Chair, thus bumping Dale Klein to a Commissioner's seat. In response to the NRC's botched handling of allegations of sleeping guards at the Peach Bottom nuclear power plant, Commissioner Jaczko pushed for the NRC to change the way it handles allegations and interacts with allegers and their employers, as well as "broadening [the NRC's and power plants] safety culture to include security issues."

We hope that Chair Jaczko will take action to address many of the security vulnerabilities that have been identified by the security forces that guard the nuclear power plants and other experts. However, it's unlikely that Jaczko can make any real change until President Obama appoints a Commissioner to fill the vacant seat, thus breaking the 2-2 tie vote that has resulted in a rejection of recent staff recommendations to improve security at nuclear power plants. This is an opportunity for President Obama to appoint a Commissioner who is dedicated to improving nuclear security, and to show that he is serious about his commitment to preventing nuclear terrorism.

-- Ingrid Drake

POGO Responds to NIF's Award: Over Budget, Behind Schedule, Undeserving

Last week, POGO sent a letter to Energy Secretary Steven Chu challenging the decision to bestow upon the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) an award for "Project Management Excellence" for the performance of what is ironically one of its most poorly managed projects, the National Ignition Facility (NIF).

In the letter, we highlighted the absurdity of rewarding such a wasteful project with an award for management excellence, pointing out that, among many major clear management failures, NIF is “more than 600 percent over budget and at least 8 years behind schedule.” We also pointed out that, despite some claims that the project has finally been completed, according to NIF's website it will not begin to attempt 'ignition' until next year (and, even by using the most optimistic of predictions, no commercial use will be available through this program for at least twenty years).

The release of POGO's letter garnered some immediate and much-needed media attention. Robert O'Harrow at The Washington Post's "Government Inc." talked to an NNSA spokesman today who said that we were providing misleading information. Here was our response:

"It is misleading for the DOE to give out an award for project excellence before it has been shown that it works. In fact, the Congress recently tasked the GAO with an investigation to determine if the NIF will achieve its goal and timeline for ignition, something that was deemed 'unlikely' by the lead scientific body JASON in 2005. This body found that: 'The NIF Ignition Program has scientific and technical risks that demand involvement by experienced personnel to the greatest extent possible. We are concerned by indications of trends to the contrary.”

POGO recommends that DOE take a second look at this award, review the evidence, realize their mistake, and rescind the award. For the sake of protecting taxpayers' dollars, for the sake of good governance, for the sake of guarding against waste, and for the sake of distinguishing between project excellence and project mismanagement, we hope that happens as soon as possible.

-- Jerry Dunleavy

DOE Budget Update

My enthusiasm yesterday about the release of the Department of Energy's (DOE) FY 2010 budget request may have been a little premature. Turns out the reason for the big jump in funding for “Fissile materials disposition” is that the line item now includes at least $500 million for the MOX facility at Savannah River Site (a facility that has been plagued by a lack of oversight and Quality Assurance failures), as well as $70 million for the Waste Solidification Building construction.

But we're not giving up: we'll soon be releasing an investigative report on downblending that will hopefully convince Congress to provide guidance to DOE about how much HEU it should downblend and by when.

-- Ingrid Drake

Big Money for Safely Disposing of Nuclear Materials

The Obama Administration has released its FY 2010 budget for the Department of Energy (DOE). The budget substantially increases funds for “Fissile materials disposition,” from $168 million in 2008 and $41 million in 2009 (est.) to $702 million for 2009, which includes “efforts to down blend surplus U.S. highly enriched uranium.”

Did the White House get our message? In February, we suggested that the U.S. downblend at least 300 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) into low-enriched uranium (LEU). Not only does this reduce a significant homeland security vulnerability, as the dangerous material is very expensive to store and secure, but the U.S. could also sell the LEU as reactor fuel for nuclear power plants, which would result in gross revenue of $21.6 billion.

However, the devil will be in the details of how much HEU the DOE will consider “surplus,” (and not give to the Navy for reactor fuel), and what timeline the DOE will establish for this downblending--in the past, it has used language such as "gradually over several decades."

-- Ingrid Drake

Security Down, Profits Up?

Despite a disastrous security test at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) last April, one of the lead contractors who manages the Lab, Bechtel National, Inc., reported record-breaking revenues on Monday. Although information on net profits was not available, they were likely higher than ever, as Bechtel's 2008 revenue was $31.4 billion, up from $27 billion in 2007 and $20.5 billion in 2006.

While Bechtel boasted in its Annual Report that they “helped cut costs and increase efficiency at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California,” it did not mention recent Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) weaknesses identified at Los Alamos, or the security vulnerabilities at Livermore, which is the subject of a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report made public yesterday.

The GAO's report points to significant lapses in management at the Lab regarding its security program. For example:

"LLNL had not conducted an annual force-on-force exercise, as required by DOE Manual 470-4.3, Protective Force....

In several instances, LLNL security officials knew of the deficiencies identified by the Office of Independent Oversight before the April 2008 inspection, but had not committed to corrective actions."

It is somewhat ironic that while Bechtel is experiencing record growth, “LLNL identified resource allocation as the single largest root cause of the security deficiencies.” DOE's Office of Independent Oversight didn't buy this, and took the position that “LLNL had sufficient financial and human resources to meet applicable protection requirements.”

Not only did GAO identify weaknesses in the performance of the contractor, but also in the DOE's Livermore Site Office (LSO):

"LSO's annual security survey failed to identify numerous security deficiencies before DOE's Office of Independent Oversight conducted its inspection....

LSO's September 2007 security survey gave LLNL 100-percent satisfactory ratings in its security performance--differing markedly from the security performance DOE observed during its inspection a short time later."

The GAO does conclude that some offices were doing their job: namely DOE's Office of Independent Oversight. POGO has met with the leadership and staff of this office, and have been impressed by their dedication.

In classic GAO-speak, the report also makes note of how DOE's policy of repeatedly changing the Design Basis Threat (DBT) “affected the analytical process that underpins security planning.” (POGO would also add that security planning was negatively impacted by DOE granting the Labs waivers to the DBT, and most recently replacing it with a new acronym and policy--it's now called Graded Security Protection, or GSP, which POGO believes effectively weakens the DBT.)

The GAO recommends that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) provide “financial incentives to LLNL's contractor to sustain security improvements.” While the GAO is referring to LLNL's annual performance evaluation plans, which has “at-risk” incentive fees associated with its management and operating contract for the laboratory, POGO believes that LLNL should not be getting “incentives” for security, and in fact, should not have gotten the full amount of its fixed fee for managing the Lab, when there's proof that intruders can steal plutonium and HEU to detonate an IND--a clear failure in management. Additionally, we think it's a problem that the incentive fee available for the crucial component of “safe and secure operations” is only 9 percent of the total incentive fee.

There are a few items in the report that we intend to explore further. First, the GAO states that "as of August 2008, LLNL had already decreased its inventory of Category I and II special nuclear material by approximately 33 percent from the laboratory's fiscal year 2006 inventory.” We would like to know if LLNL had added to its supply of plutonium since its 2006 inventory, possibly for its pit production foundry. The second question we have is whether LLNL's performance in deinventorying its site of Category I and II special nuclear materials can be included in its annual performance evaluation. While the GAO found that many of the challenges facing LLNL's deinventory deadline of 2012 are outside of LLNL's control, some of the factors are clearly in LLNL's control, and its contractors should be held accountable for doing its part to ensure a safe and timely deinventory.

-- Ingrid Drake and Peter Stockton

Are Wasteful Nuclear Spending Increases Hiding in Gates' Defense Cuts?

With all of the brouhaha following Defense Secretary Gates' announcement yesterday to scale back on wasteful defense programs, it has not yet been mentioned that Gates also announced an additional budget request of $700 million for "nuclear surety." Surety means making sure nuclear weapons cannot be used by those who did not create them and may have stolen them. But there is much debate over whether or not we even have a surety problem--we've spoken with several insiders who say there isn't one.

While the new funding came up during the Q & A at yesterday's Pentagon press conference as it related to nuclear stewardship across the DOD enterprise based on the non-specific recommendations of the Schlesinger task force's report, it's not exactly clear what DoD will use these funds for.

Surety means different things to different people. For Gates, "surety" has often meant the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), a costly, long-term reinvestment in developing a new nuclear arsenal. But RRW is not needed to improve surety because these improvements can already be made through the Life Extension Program (LEP), as Hans Kristensen from the Federation of American Scientists brilliantly outlines.

We hope Congress is prepared to probe Gates' plans for these funds, since concerns about surety continue to be used as excuses for revitalizing the nuclear mission.

In related news, tomorrow POGO joins Nuclear Watch New Mexico, Tri-Valley CAREs, Natural Resources Defense Council, Physicians for Social Responsibility PSR - Greater Kansas City Chapter, and Just Peace, in releasing Transforming the U.S. Strategic Posture and Weapons Complex For Transition to a Nuclear Weapons-Free World, a major study that takes a comprehensive look at deterrence, nuclear doctrine, force structure, and the supporting complex, and how they inter-relate. You are invited to join us on April 8, 2009 from 9:00 A.M. - 11:00 A.M. EST. at the Root Room of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC). Or check our website for the report tomorrow morning.

-- Ingrid Drake

We May Soon Know What Happened to LANL's Lost Computers

Representatives Joe Barton (R-TX), Ranking Member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and Greg Walden (R-OR), Ranking Member of the House Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, wrote to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) on Friday to get to the bottom of what happened at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and to correct cyber-security and monitoring problems in the wake of reports of at least 67 missing computers at LANL.

While the letter does not mention that POGO released the internal memo that broke the news of the missing computers, or that a LANL BlackBerry was recently lost in a "sensitive foreign country," the Representatives ask some important questions, such as: What is the status of the missing computers and their cyber-security implications?

The questions from the Hill also assess the oversight vigor of the NNSA and its site office over LANL's lost property protocols and cyber-security monitoring. POGO is especially interested in what the Committees find, as we are wondering whether or not LANL should receive significant cuts to its FY09 contract performance fees. (LANL was awarded the full available amounts for security in the FY08 Performance Evaluation Plan, even though it may not have been following lost property and cyber-security protocols for missing computers.)

The Members ask that NNSA furnish the information in four weeks.

-- Ingrid Drake