Livermore Lab Fails Recent Security Test

We hate to say, 'We told you so,' but when POGO released U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Livermore Homes and Plutonium Make Bad Neighbors just two months ago, we recommended that the one ton of weapons-grade and weapons-quantity of plutonium and highly enriched uranium be removed from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore Lab) within the next year because it cannot be adequately protected. Suicidal terrorists would not need to steal the material, DOE's most dangerous and expensive-to-guard special nuclear material (SNM); they simply could detonate it into an Improvised Nuclear Device on the spot. Roughly seven million people live within a 50 mile radius of Livermore Lab, a nuclear weapons facility located in the greater metropolis of San Francisco, CA, which poses the most significant security threat of any such facility in the U.S.

Now, TIME Magazine is reporting that in late April 2008, government mock terrorists tested Livermore Lab's security, and were able to defeat the protective force and gain access to their target-simulated SNM. After speaking with our sources on the ground at Livermore Lab, as well as at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), POGO has heard some of what happened. We are not that surprised by what we learned. 

One reason the Lab's protective guard force was not able to defend the bomb-making material is because the hydraulic lift on the vehicles used to deploy the Lab's Dillon Aero M134D guns, popularly known as the Gatling gun, did not work. Faced with pressure to demonstrate that the Lab could fend off a terrorist attack, in 2006 NNSA announced the deployment of this enormously lethal weapon capable of firing 4,000 rounds a minute with a military "kill-range" of one mile, but with an ability to kill up to two miles. Within the one-mile range of the Lab are two elementary schools, a pre-school, a middle school, a senior center, and athletic fields. This risk to the population, combined with analysis from Army Special Operations experts, underlies POGO's position that the Gatling is the wrong weapon for the site.

Another reason that the Lab's security was penetrated is that members of the Lab's SWAT team, known as a Special Response Team (SRT), have not trained together as a "team" for years. This goes against law enforcement best practices--guards need opportunities to see how their teammates actually communicate and respond during an emergency.   

POGO is pleased that NNSA Principal Deputy Bill Ostendorff seems to be taking this recent security lapse quite seriously, including raising "a number of areas that require immediate attention," with the Board of Governors of Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS),the private contractor who manages the Lab. However, additional training or gadgetry will not change the fact that the Lab is located in a growing residential community-there are now housing developments that sit only 300 yards from Building 332 (the Superblock), which houses the Lab's plutonium and highly enriched uranium.  Livermore Lab can never be a safe place to store SNM for the weapons complex.

We hope that this incident sounds a loud warning bell on Capitol Hill about the need to include language in upcoming appropriations bills that pressures NNSA to remove SNM from Livermore Lab by March 2009, a date that POGO determined after researching whether NNSA has adequate containers, transport, and space at other sites. After releasing our report in March, POGO has been disappointed to learn during meetings with congressional staffers that they are comfortable with NNSA's commitment to remove the material by the end of 2012.  Now is the time to secure this large homeland security vulnerability.

Be sure to check out our press alert and YouTube video (see below) on the security weaknesses at Livermore.

-- Ingrid Drake and Peter Stockton

POGO Report Calls for No More Delays Removing Plutonium from Neighborhood

After several months of investigation, POGO has determined that weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium, DOE's most dangerous and expensive-to-guard special nuclear material (SNM), can be safely removed from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore Lab), three years sooner than the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) timetable of 2012.

Why did we focus a report on Livermore Lab? It is the only remaining nuclear facility with weapons-grade material located in a residential community--seven million people live within a 50-mile radius of the Lab, located in the greater metropolis of San Francisco, CA.

As soon as the report was released, NNSA said it could not make the moves before 2012. (Suspecting this response, POGO made sure to check that there is empty and secure space at another NNSA site to store Livermore Lab's material, as well as secure and available Department of Energy 18-wheel trucks to move the material.)

Now is the time for Congress to get details from NNSA about why they can't move the material by early 2009, saving taxpayers $160 million and eliminating a huge homeland security vulnerability--if terrorists gained access to this material, they could detonate them, devastating the San Francisco Bay Area and inland regions. (POGO learned NNSA gave Livermore Lab a waiver so that it does not have to meet the current security requirements devised by the intelligence community.) It's actually a win-win: if NNSA removes the material sooner, it can direct the security funds to bolster the security at its other sites.

In responding to our investigation, NNSA director Thomas D'Agostino confirmed another of our concerns. Livermore Lab is engaged in pursuing new research with plutonium, which may delay de-inventorying efforts. The Contra Costa Times reports that NNSA Director Thomas D'Agostino said there is "ongoing research on plutonium at the lab." Congressional staff with oversight of DOE/NNSA need to find out if this research has a national security mission. If so, when is it scheduled to end? And, can't it happen at the remote, more secure NNSA facility at the Nevada Test Site that would only be a one-hour flight for Livermore scientists?

It's not only congressional staff who have the responsibility to get this information; so does the public, which can use NNSA's upcoming public hearings to find out why an agency that just removed weapons-grade materials from the Sandia National Laboratories seven months ahead of schedule can't apply the same resources to Livermore Lab.

It's also important to note that media coverage of our report has not mentioned POGO's recommendation that NNSA make the security officers who protect Livermore Lab, and other NNSA nuclear weapons sites, federal employees. Right now, they are private security guards. That's right: those who guard the materials to make nuclear weapons are not sworn law enforcement officers, thus lacking the benefits, training and supplies that would help them better do their job.

-- Ingrid Drake

UPDATE: Click here to watch a video of POGO's Peter Stockton and Ingrid Drake discussing their investigation into Livermore Lab.

Line Up: DOE Hearings in a Town Near You

Thanks to our friends at the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) for reminding us to spread the word that throughout March, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)--will be holding public hearings across the U.S. on the Draft Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Draft Complex Transformation SPEIS, DOE/EIS-0236-S4).

Now is the time to speak up if you are concerned by the expense and risk represented by the draft plan, because NNSA really needs some nudging.

With this quote, NRDC shows how little transformation NNSA is willing to make when it comes to its nuclear sites:

"In 1995, five years after the Cold War ended, NNSA's operational nuclear weapons complex consisted of eight sites in seven states.  Under its proposed plan, by 2020--25 years later--NNSA's operational nuclear weapons complex will still consist of the same eight sites in the same seven states, but it will be maintaining a weapons stockpile that is likely to be 1/10 - 1/20 the size."

While the draft plan promises to remove weapons-grade Special Nuclear Material (SNM) from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), as POGO, Congress, government officials and community groups have been demanding for years, there are still a lot of reasons for the public to comment.

First, POGO believes the SNM can be removed sooner than the NNSA's 2012 deadline--more details with our forthcoming report.

Second, tritium (radioactive hydrogen) research will continue, as will contamination risks to the 7 million people living within the 50-mile radius of LLNL.  Tri-Valley CAREs is advising that people speak up for a "green lab" and civilian science missions at Livermore lab.

For sample language on submitting written comments--the public comment period ends on April 10, 2008--see the action alert from NRDC.

Community groups are also mobilizing events to prepare the public for the hearings.  The City of Santa Fe--whose City Council recently passed a resolution opposing the expansion of nuclear weapons production at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)--Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, Faithful Security, the New Mexico Conference of Churches, and Nuclear Watch New Mexico are having an event on March 1st to raise awareness about how the draft plan expands LANL's mission of producing plutonium pit "triggers" for nuclear warheads from 20 pits per year (ppy) to up to 80--which could lead to a 28% increase of airborne pollutants.

-- Ingrid Drake

POGO Calling on Nuclear Power Plant Security Officers to Share Overtime Experiences

For several years, POGO has been concerned about security officers at nuclear power plants being worked 60-72 hours per week to save money for the utility companies.  This overwork can lead to sleeping guards and serious security lapses at the plants.  A number of security officers at Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Plant are working close to 72 hours a week.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has finalized Fitness-for-Duty rulemaking that prohibits this practice.  The problem is that the rulemaking does not take effect for nearly two years.

The NRC has told POGO that if there is evidence that this practice is widespread in the industry--beyond Peach Bottom--it would consider accelerating the implementation of the rulemaking requirements.  We have some examples, but we need more.

POGO would appreciate if security officers at nuclear power plants would contact us if there is evidence of 60-72 hour work weeks.  POGO will not reveal the names of anyone who contacts us.

POGO can be contacted at 202-347-1122 or idrake@pogo.org.

-- Peter Stockton and Ingrid Drake

For Five Months, Livermore Workers Not Notified About Possible Beryllium Exposure

POGO is horrified to read in the Bay Area news that the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) did not immediately notify contract construction workers that they were working in a machine room that contained unacceptable safety levels of beryllium, which can lead to the incurable beryllium disease.

Longer exposure to beryllium is known to increase a person's sensitivity to the potentially fatal lung disease.  Yet even after a second set of tests pointed to the substance's presence in the building, LLNL let workers continue their earthquake safety upgrades for two months without informing them of their exposure to risk.

This abysmal prioritization of worker safety raises another red flag concerning the level of safety oversight at a facility that also houses radioactive plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the subject of an upcoming POGO report.

-- Ingrid Drake

Weapons Cache Reminds POGO of Weak Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Security Requirements

Hundreds of hand grenades, grenade launchers, .50 caliber sniper and assault rifles, and body armor were discovered in two Mexico City mansions during a bust on drug cartels last month, as reported in the Washington Post.  What is particularly relevant in this story for the U.S. is that federal nuclear regulators believe these items are too difficult for terrorists to access and use for attacking U.S. nuclear sites.

The NRC's Design Basis Threat (DBT) establishes the number of adversaries, the weapons they are likely to use, and the size of the truck bomb against which a nuclear power plant must defend.  The DBT is alleged not to include many of the weapons in the above picture, even though many security experts believe they would be used by adversaries in the event of an attack on a nuclear facility.  For example, insiders tell POGO that the NRC's security staff themselves recommended to the Commissioners that nuclear power plants be prepared to protect against Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) attacks and a series of other lethal weapons--but the Commission voted against this sensible security requirement in a 3-1 vote.  Their reasoning?  Terrorists would have a hard time purchasing or stealing these lethal weapons.  However, one of the deadliest of these weapons is the .50 caliber sniper rifle with armor-piercing incendiary ammunition, and it can be purchased at local gun stores around the country.

If nuclear power plants are not already required to defend against these weapons, they should be.  DOE nuclear weapons facilities are already expected to protect against these lethal weapons.  POGO and the GAO have repeatedly stated that NRC should get its DBT in-line with that of the weapons facilities.  We hope NRC regulators read this blog and do something about it.

-- Ingrid Drake

NNSA Giving Out Too Many Last Chances

While there is a time and place for playing nice and trying to develop a working relationship with the sites it oversees, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should show no tolerance for amateur hour when there is an extended record of poor performance at nuclear weapons facilities.  This unfortunately was the case with Los Alamos, as outlined by Georg Lobsenz in “NNSA Defers Penalty for ‘Serious’ Exposure incident At Los Alamos,” published in The Energy Daily. [subscription only]

After a report surfaced in November 2006 documenting the lax safety practices of lab employees working with radioactive plutonium, Los Alamos National Security LLC (LANS) did not take corrective action.  LANS still did not take action when a similar problem—improper placement of the gloves in the gloveboxes—was reported in December 2006.  A month later, in January 2007, two workers got exposed to plutonium in two separate incidents, one serious.  Both exposures were likely preventable if LANS, the company hired in 2006 to improve safety at Los Alamos for up to $79 million a year, had taken action.  In fact, Los Alamos has the worst record of all the NNSA sites working with gloveboxes, with approximately 50 reported accidents a year.

An internal review at Los Alamos concluded that LANS is treating the high rate of glovebox incidents as routine--the “high cost of doing business.”  NNSA should make it clear that there is a high cost of doing shoddy business, and take a significant percentage of the $79 million back.  Also, shouldn’t LANS’ callous dismissal of the deadly risks to workers’ health be of concern to NNSA?

Yet, last month, NNSA head D’Agostino decided not to levy a fine on LANS, so that the management could focus on combating the “broad deficiencies” in lab safety, instead of fighting the fine as the University of California had done.

NNSA’s decision not to make an example out of LANS for its failure to aggressively prevent safety violations strikes POGO as particularly strange given that NNSA’s parent agency, the Department of Energy (DOE), decided in December to ask a New Mexico judge to fine Jessica Quintana, a fired Los Alamos subcontract employee, $384,150 after classified material was found in her trailer during a drug bust of her roommate.  The NNSA should not tolerate any more excuses and incompetence.

-- Ingrid Drake and Peter Stockton

POGO Agrees with Activists: No Testing of Live Pathogens at Livermore

There are numerous problems with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore,
California beginning work with deadly airborne pathogens such as anthrax, bird flu and West Nile virus in a new Biosafety Level 3 lab to test detection devices.

In terms of cost and safety, the fewer facilities in the world with these pathogens on-site the better. Because each pathogen has a distinct footprint that marks its origins, one problem with setting up another lab to work with these deadly pathogens is that it becomes harder to trace the source if one escaped, or is stolen.

Another reason for concern is that LLNL doesn’t have the best track record; the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services fined LLNL last year for releasing anthrax during a 2005 shipment.

POGO is currently working on a report on LLNL’s difficulty guarding its stash of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, the most dangerous and expensive Special Nuclear Materials to protect from terrorists and thieves.

Also, it is a far from ideal location for such highly sensitive research projects. When the Livermore lab was established in 1952 it was out in the middle of nowhere. Today, due to sprawl from the Bay Area, 7 million people live within a 50 mile radius of the Lab, and with them senior centers, schools, and parks.

With homes only 300 yards from the fence line, some residents have been organizing against the introduction of hazardous and dangerous materials at the lab. "In the event of an accident, leak, spill or terrorist attack, this facility puts our lives at risk," said Marylia Kelley, executive director of lab watchdog group Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment (CARE), as reported in the Daily Californian.

Despite losing one lawsuit in court, Tri-Valley CAREs will file another injunction to block the Level 3 lab. Tri-Valley CAREs’ position is that the pathogens should stay at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and scientists should fly there to study them, as reported in The Oakland Tribune.

This “porkfest” of jobs and federal dollars for lab construction is symptomatic of what’s happening across the country, notes Edward Hammond with the nonprofit Sunshine Project. Yet with government handouts for construction – 36 WalMart-sized labs have been built since 2001 with 15,000 people authorized to handle the bioweapons - there are not similar handouts to protect the facilities. “I have a long-term fear that there will be an inadequate safety and security situation,” warns Hammond.

POGO recognizes that these pathogens need to be researched, BUT there are much better locales for this work to take place... like the already established Dugway Proving Ground in the middle of nowhere, Utah.  Where, drum roll please, the US military already does testing on chem/bio defense.  Why blow more funds in a densely populated area when you've already got a great place to do this work?

– Ingrid Drake & Nick Schwellenbach

News Story Points to Need for Better Oversight on Plutonium Pits

Associated Press (AP) writer Josef Hebert did an excellent job on a complicated subject with his January 20 story, “Quality of Nuclear Devices Questioned.” It’s also a good thing the story was picked up by well over 100 newspapers because these plutonium pits cost $130 million to be manufactured and the DOE plans to produce between 10-50 pits annually over the next four years.

POGO is still deeply concerned about the viability and safety of these pricey little plutonium globes being made at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

When questioned by Hebert about the impact of the 72 waivers for the pits manufacturing specifications, LANL claims everything is fine because the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) accepted all of the 72 proposed changes. Yet, sources have told POGO that NNSA has no capability to independently evaluate the impact of each of the 72 waivers on the eventual reliability of the pits. For its assessment, NNSA is totally dependent on the design lab - LANL.

The AP story did not include POGO’s recommendation for fixing the problem, as outlined in a January 18, 2008 letter from POGO’s Executive Director Danielle Brian to Samuel W. Bodman, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy:

The solution to this dilemma, however, is not the current reckless path: throwing billions of dollars at high-risk programs to provide on-the-job training for the contractor workforce of an agency with a long history of failed program management.  The solution is to minimize the possible risk to the stockpile, to the taxpayers, and to international arms control efforts by focusing on Life Extension Programs and continuing to accelerate the dismantlement of excess warheads.

-- Peter Stockton and Ingrid Drake

Wackenhut CEO Resigns Amid Security Problems

As reported today in the Washington Post, the CEO of Wackenhut, Gary Sanders, has resigned amidst serious allegations of security lapses at nuclear plants around the country.  Until recently, the company held a virtual monopoly on security contracts.  Exelon, the largest U.S. private nuclear power generator, terminated Wackenhut’s contract last month at its ten nuclear plants.

Sanders’ resignation is directly related to an incident last year in which a security guard, Kerry Beal, videotaped fellow guards sleeping on the job at Peachbottom power plant in Pennsylvania. After his attempts to alert supervisors resulted in inaction, he shared the tapes with CBS News as a last resort. Unfortunately, when the plant managers finally took action it was only Mr. Beal who found himself out of a job. The House Energy and Commerce Committee plans to conduct a hearing on the security lapses at Peachbottom.

Despite Sanders departure and Exelon's termination of the Wackenhut contract, the underlying issue has yet to be corrected. POGO noted in a letter sent last October to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Chairman Dale Klein that the NRC has the ultimate authority to determine Exelon's security requirements:

It is time for the NRC to take responsibility for the excessive hours and fatigue of the security forces. The utilities are cutting costs by hiring as few security officers as possible, and working those officers 60 to 72 hours a week—that’s 12-hour shifts every day for five or six days every week.

The long history of this problem clearly shows that the NRC will get only what it demands, and that nuclear utilities will spend as little as possible to meet the NRC's requirements. Security expenditures come directly out of the utility’s profit margin, so the utility has every incentive to reduce those expenses as much as possible. It is bad enough that the utilities and their security contractors are overworking their security officers, but it is an outrage that the NRC continues to allow them to do so.

POGO's letter presented two options for the NRC to prevent overworked security guards  in the future. The first would require nuclear plants to implement a 48 hours-a-week limit within six months instead of the current 2-year timeline. The second would amend the 2003 Security Work Hour Order to include a "Fatigue Management" provision.

We hope that Mr. Sanders’ resignation will be a wake-up call for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well as all the nuclear plant managers around the country.  The men and women who guard our country’s nuclear plants deserve better working conditions and training. The rest of us would like to believe that the highest standards are being used to safe-guard our nation.

-- Marthena Cowart & Peter Stockton

NRC Sleeping on the Job?

Reposted from The Hill's Congress Blog with a few changes:

Heroes are hard to find these days. On TV, there are made-up ‘heroes’ whose deeds are wrapped up neatly before the last commercial. In real life, it never happens that way. [Ten] months ago, Kerry Beal saw something on his job site that disturbed him greatly. Beal is a security guard at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station in Pennsylvania. His fellow guards were sleeping on the job. He did the right thing by telling his supervisor about it.

He was told not to talk about it, shut up and be a team player. He sought the advice of a friend at church who had been a former Director of Security for Wackenhut. This friend agreed to write a letter asking the NRC to investigate the situation. Beal is a young guy with [four] children. He needed his job and simply wanted the management to do the right thing. [The NRC originally referred Mr. Beal’s allegations to Exelon, who assured the NRC everything was just fine.]

Kerry Beal knew better and so he put his family’s security at stake and video-taped 10 guards sleeping in the “ready room.” See, the plant’s security firm is Wackenhut and they allow work schedules that can run to sixty hours a week or more. Overtime is important to men who are not being paid executive-level salaries. The video became the centerpiece of a series produced by WCBS, a New York City affiliate of CBS News.

So what did the NRC and Exelon do to protect the public and institute new work rules? First, they suspended Kerry Beal and then refused to hire him back focusing on his alleged violations of procedures for videotaping the sleeping guards.

The obvious result is a good man takes the fall for irresponsible managers more concerned with their paychecks instead of a conscientious and dutiful employee and the safety of the nuclear power plant’s security. Oh, and by the way, new rules and regulations are being formulated and, according to the NRC, will be implemented in 16 months. We hope young Mr. Beal can find a job in the meantime.

-- Marthena Cowart

Contractor Problems Add to Plutonium Facility Concerns

On Friday, November 30, POGO sent a letter to Dept. of Energy Undersecretary Tom D’Agostino, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), recommending that the NNSA place a “stop work” order on the Los Alamos Chemical and Metallurgical Research Replacement (CMRR) program. POGO offered the recommendation in response to findings that Austin Commercial, Inc., the company tasked with completing the initial CMRR construction phase, has so far failed to meet industry quality standards. There’s also evidence to suggest that the company may have falsified quality assurance documents.

The CMRR program has faced a high level of criticism from Congress and from organizations concerned with nuclear policy. Last year, House appropriators cut funds for CMRR and referred to it as an “irrational” project. Appropriations for FY 2008 may continue to be withheld. The House committee report states:

The recommendation provides no funds for the CMRR project, a decrease of $95,586,000 from the budget request. The Committee direction halts the construction activity at the CMRR facility. Proceeding with the CMRR project as currently designed will strongly prejudice any nuclear complex transformation plan. The CMRR facility has no coherent mission to justify it unless the decision is made to begin an aggressive new nuclear warhead design and pit production mission at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The NNSA is directed to develop a long-term plan to maintain the nation's nuclear stockpile requirements that does not assume an a priori case for the current program. Production capabilities proposed in the CMRR should be located at the future production sites identified in a detailed complex transformation plan that supports the long-term stockpile requirements. The Committee is concerned the NNSA is proceeding with large expenditures for this project while there are significant unresolved issues, and recommends the fiscal year 2007 funding be held in reserve.

Although the Senate committee recommended funds for the project, the amount still falls considerably below the original request. The Senate also pointed to several potential problems with the program as well as the lack of a clear NNSA strategy.

Austin Commercial, Inc. is a division of Austin Industries, a construction company based in Dallas, TX with annual revenues of about $1 billion, mostly from private contracts.

-- John Pruett

David Copperfield at the NRC

In a letter sent today to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regional administrator overseeing Peach Bottom power plant, David Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety Project Director at the Union of Concerned Scientists, derides what the administrator had referred to as "prompt compensatory measures and immediate actions" on the part of Peach Bottom operator Exelon to address the sleeping security guards controversy. Lochbaum then details a timeline of Exelon's consistent refusal to even acknowledge that a problem exists.

POGO has been actively involved with highlighting security concerns at the Peach Bottom facility and has pointed to a plant culture that overworks security employees and punishes anyone that attempts to correct security problems. This culture is evidenced by the recent Exelon firing of employee Kerry Beal, who had videotaped sleeping guards and brought the issue to management's attention. As for the NRC, the agency has reacted by investigating Beal and seizing his computer.

As Lochbaum stresses, the actions we've seen so far have been anything but "immediate" and have failed to correct Peach Bottom's underlying security and management problems.

-- John Pruett

NRC Commissioner Addresses Nuclear Plant Security

Commissioner Greg Jaczko, a top official at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), recently gave an important speech to the government employees charged with enforcing NRC regulations at our nation's nuclear power plants. Unfortunately, the speech took place in the remote Eastern Shores of Maryland on October 30th, so it likely got lost in the media’s Halloween coverage.

I’ll be honest. I especially enjoyed his speech because he echoed points that POGO has been making all along (most recently in a letter sent to NRC Chairman Dale Klein last week).  Nonetheless, Jaczko’s speech needs to be shouted from the mountain tops. First, Jaczko pointed out that the recent instances of sleeping security officers across the country "demonstrate the importance of broadening [the] safety culture to include security issues."

He also announced his intention to change the handling of safety and security allegations in three ways:

1.  Do not refer allegations of weakened security to the utility company which runs the plants over the objection of the whistleblower. It is pathetic that Jaczko even has to say this, but the recent Peach Bottom incident proves that he does.

2.  Refer fewer allegations to the utility companies for investigation in the first place. Currently, forty percent of whistleblower allegations sent to the NRC are turned over to the utilities, which means the industry is investigating itself. From POGO's experience, self-policing is a fine way to make sure the problem is at best minimized, yet it more likely ensures that problems are completely ignored, so any effort to reverse this pattern is a good thing.

3.  Even if the NRC, the utility company, and the whistleblower all agree that the utility should investigate, the NRC should remain actively involved in the investigation.

These recommendations all sound so common sense that those not familiar with nuclear regulatory policy might yawn and ask, "What's the big deal?" However, nuclear power plant security has been so controlled by industry that even these small steps in the right direction, if implemented, will make a big difference.

- Danielle Brian

Nukes on a Plane

Who knew that the threat posed by the American Midwest warranted a nuclear deterrent? Apparently a crew at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota did.

News reports revealed today that, in what can only be described as an unbelievable blunder, Air Force personnel allowed a B-52 bomber to fly from North Dakota to Louisiana last week armed with nuclear cruise missiles. The incident has provoked a massive response from top officials: Defense Secretary Gates and President Bush were notified, an investigation launched, disciplinary action taken against the Air Force personnel involved, an inventory underway of all Air Force nuclear weapons, and a halting of all fighter and bomber flights on Sept. 14.

The incident also raises the question of exactly when, where, and under what conditions US aircraft are allowed to be armed with nuclear weapons. Retired Air Force Major General Don Shepperd remarked in a CNN report on the story that "...the United States had agreed in a Cold War-era treaty not to fly nuclear weapons. 'It appears that what happened was this treaty agreement was violated,' he said."

The CNN report isn't clear on what "Cold War-era treaty" he's referencing. However, an article from the Global Security Newswire provides a more in-depth and convincing explanation:

The risk of flying accidents, however, led the United States to abandon all nuclear-armed bomber flights in 1968, according to Hans Kristensen, a nuclear weapons expert with the Federation of American Scientists.

Until then, the Air Force kept about 12 strategic bombers in the air at all times, with each one usually carrying two to four nuclear gravity bombs. Several accidents occurred (see GSN, June 20, 2005), including a crash in Spain in 1966 and then a crash at an air base in Greenland on Jan. 21, 1968.  The plane’s nuclear weapons did not explode in the latter incident, but their radioactive fissile material was dispersed at the crash site.

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that day ordered the grounding of all nuclear-armed aircraft, a policy that has continued for four decades.  Instead of flying with nuclear weapons, armed bombers were kept on alert on the ground with flight crews nearby to enable the planes to take off within minutes, if necessary.

In 1991, President George H.W. Bush reduced the bomber alert status further by ordering nuclear weapons to be removed from the aircraft and kept in nearby storage facilities.

The GSN description seems to indicate that the ban on flying nuclear-armed aircraft was the result of a DoD Directive or Executive Order. It's worth noting that a separate GSN article from March reported that the US will soon end its use of nuclear cruise missiles pursuant to the 2002 Moscow Treaty. Perhaps this is the "Cold War-era treaty" mentioned by Shepperd.

-- John Pruett

New Security Breach at Los Alamos

The security problems at Los Alamos National Laboratory just keep piling up. Today, POGO issued a press release confirming another breach involving "unauthorized release of classified data via email" that occured last week. The Lab has officially designated the incident an Impact Measurement Index-1 (IMI-1), the highest threat level, despite an attempt to downgrade it to a lower level.

Despite recent congressional investigations, Dept. of Energy chastisement, and promises of improving, the Lab's frequency of security failures appears to be actually increasing over previous years - this latest one being the fourth so far this year. The vast majority of these failures have been in the area of cybersecurity, including today's revelation.

POGO Executive Director Danielle Brian stated in testimony earlier this year before a House Energy and Commerce subcommittee hearing that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), designed to improve security, shares a large part of the blame (pdf) for recent problems at Los Alamos. Not only has the NNSA often failed to take action, but it went so far as to transfer its oversight responsibilities to the Lab's contractor.

This latest failure further highlights the serious need for "independent federal oversight from the Dept. of Energy" and a stronger commitment to cybersecurity on the part of the Lab.

-- John Pruett

A Little Nuclear Freaky in Tennessee

Following last week’s news that a contractor walked out the front door of another nuclear facility in Tennessee with nuclear enrichment pipes, here’s today’s news below: It looks like the driver of a stolen car crashed into the gate of the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant and ran away on foot. Why was he not pursued? We’ve run across situations at other facilities where guards at nuclear weapons sites are not allowed to pursue an intruder if they leave the premises. Of course, wouldn’t want guards to abandon the front gate, but by the time the police arrive, an intruder could be gone. Not sure yet if that is what happened here.

-- Beth Daley

Man crashes car into nuclear weapons plant barrier, flees
Posted by Associated Press July 30, 2007 9:54 AM

OAK RIDGE, Tenn. -- A man crashed a car into a barrier outside the nuclear weapons plant in Oak Ridge early Monday and fled on foot, authorities said.

The driver was stopped at a security checkpoint near the rear entrance to the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant around 5 a.m. EDT, Y-12 spokesman Bill Wilburn said. Guards reported "he appeared to be impaired in some way."

Asked for identification, the man drove through the check point and crashed into deployed security barriers a short distance away, Wilburn said.

"When he hit that, he jumped out of the car and ran away. He left the car there with the engine still running. According to what they told me, the car had been hot-wired," Wilburn said.

Oak Ridge police were searching for the man, who appeared to be running toward town.

Wilburn had no other details about the car or its driver.

Steve Wyatt, spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Administration in Oak Ridge, which oversees the Y-12 plant, downplayed the significance of the event. "Next to nothing," he said.

The Y-12 plant makes and dismantles uranium parts in nuclear warheads. It also is the government's primary storehouse for bomb-grade uranium.

Contract Employee Arrested in Security Breach at Nuke Site

Agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested an employee at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (see update below) earlier today for trying to sell classified uranium enrichment materials to what he thought was a “foreign country.” The employee has been identified as Roy Lynn Oakley of Roane County, a former contract worker with Bechtel Jacobs at the East Tennessee Technology Park.

Today’s arrest was part of an FBI sting operation that began after agents raided a house in January searching for stolen materials from the lab. ABC News reports that another arrest was supposedly made several months ago. An AP source has stated that Oakley does not appear to be connected to any terrorist organizations and, according to NBC sources, he was primarily motivated by money.

POGO released a report last year which determined that Oak Ridge National Laboratory [update: again the arrest actually occurred at the nearby East Tennessee Technology Park] lacked some of the most basic security measures and also lacked a clear plan for strengthening security. In 2005, as part of a broader nuclear reorganization proposal, POGO recommended that Oak Ridge should be “de-inventoried of all Special Nuclear Materials.

Oakley’s breach of security is only the latest in a long series of lapses at the nation’s nuclear laboratories. You can read a list of past security issues since the Wen Ho Lee incident below the fold.

-- John Pruett

Update: Roy Lynn Oakley was an employee with Bechtel Jacobs and had worked at the East Tennessee Technology Park until earlier this year. The Park is located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee but is not a part of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. It was formerly named the K-25 site and was used during the Manhattan Project to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Since then, it served as a nuclear power center and was shut down in 1987. A process of "reindustrialization" began in 1996 to clean up the site and transform it into a new uranium enrichment facility and business park for private industry.

Update 2: Frank Munger with the Knoxville News Sentinel has reported new information on the case. A US District Court document obtained by the Sentinel reveals that Roy Oakley had been a maintenance worker for Bechtel Jacobs until caught in the FBI sting operation on January 26. According to the article:

“Mr. Oakley was assigned to break up rods with his hands into small sections to be thrown away,” the document filed in U.S. District Court said. “The rods were not radioactive and, broken into pieces, had no apparent use except to be disposed.”

The rods were associated with the former uranium-enrichment operations at the plant, and Oakley took three to five of the broken rods to his home and later decided they might be of interest to another country.

The French Embassy in Washington, D.C., reportedly turned down Oakley’s offer, but at some point later Oakley got a call from someone purported to be an official at the embassy. It turned out to be an FBI agent, the document said.

Negotiations over a plea agreement subsequently failed and the US attorney's office secured an indictment. When Oakley arrived at the US Probation Office in Knoxville today, the news media was already waiting for him, which led Oakley's attorney, Herbert Moncier, to accuse the Justice Department of leaking the story.

Update 3: The Justice Department has issued a press release (pdf) announcing that, following Oakley's arrest today, he  has been formally charged by a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Tennessee with two counts of violating federal law. Oakley is scheduled to appear before a US Magistrate Judge in Knoxville on July 19.

Nuclear Weapons Follies:

Major Security and Safety Failures of the Nuclear Weapons Complex since Wen Ho Lee

July, 2007 - Los Alamos lab worker with “highest possible security clearance” arrested in cocaine drug bust. July 6, 2007. SOURCE: AP

June, 2007 - Los Alamos board member sends highly classified email message unsecured, compromising “the most serious breach of U.S. national security. SOURCE: Time Magazine

May, 2007 – POGO notifies DOE Secretary Bodman that Pantex nuclear weapons plant has roughly 200 security officers protecting its facility during a union strike even though it normally has 537. SOURCE: POGO

October 20, 2006 - Los Alamos National Laboratory classified information found in a meth lab drug bust in a trailer park. The incident, in part, causes the resignation of National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Linton Brooks in January, 2007.  The DOE IG finds that the Lab still lacks adequate safeguards for approving clearances and handling classified information, despite years of foibles. SOURCES: POGO, the House Energy Commerce Committee, and Time Magazine

June, 2006 - NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks informs Congress that computer hackers got access to detailed personal information, including Social Security numbers for about 1,500 DOE contract workers in September, 2005. Yet neither the workers whose personal information was compromised, nor the DOE's cyber-security head were notified about the incident.  SOURCE: AP

May, 2006 -- A former Los Alamos employee files suit, saying "she was forced to resign from the lab in January because she refused to keep quiet about a work accident that damaged her lungs." SOURCE: Albuquerque Journal

August, 2005 - Two employees are exposed to hazardous chemical fumes at Los Alamos. One employee who was contaminated was told to keep working even though she complained of feeling dizzy. She then went on vacation and experienced severe respiratory problems. As a result, she had to be hospitalized for six days. SOURCES: POGO and DOE Occurrence report

July, 2005 - According to a search warrant issued by the U.S. District Court of New Mexico, a Sandia employee has stolen iPods, computers and a robotic dog and sold them on Ebay. SOURCE: POGO

July 14, 2005 - A worker contaminated with deadly Americium-241 at Los Alamos goes undetected for 11 days. As a result, contamination is spread from New Mexico to Kansas and Colorado, and later to Pennsylvania when contamination was then shipped through Federal Express. DOE subsequently notes that the University of California which managed Los Alamos would have been fined $1.1 million for the incident (LANL as a nonprofit was exempted from paying), the highest civil penalty ever under its nuclear enforcement program. SOURCES: POGO and DOE Occurrence reports

February, 2005 - A December, 2004 report finds serious deficiencies in protecting workers and the community from a nuclear release or accident by the Sandia National Laboratory. SOURCES: POGO and DOE report

September 2004 -- Wackenhut guard fired a weapon accidentally loaded with live ammunition (instead of the dummy rounds that were supposed to be used) during a training exercise in Y-12's cafeteria. The bullet went through a refrigerator and a wall, and ended up hitting a filing cabinet in the next room. SOURCE: POGO

 September 2, 2004 - Y-12 security guards almost shoot each other in a force-on-force exercise after managers fail to follow proper security protocols. SOURCE: New York Times

July 18, 2004 - POGO release exposes there were 17 incidents involving classified information sent over an unclassified email system at Los Alamos. SOURCE: POGO

May 20, 2004 - Los Alamos confirms that classified computer media can not be accounted for. On July 23, 2004, the Department of Energy shuts down operations involving Classified Removable Electronic Media (CREM) across the entire nuclear weapons complex. SOURCES: DOE,  POGO, and Govexec.com

December 9, 2003 - Los Alamos confirms that computer disks were identified as lost during an "inventory of classified computer media." In total ten disks were lost. SOURCES: LANL, and POGO

November, 2003 - DOE IG confirms that, in multiple incidents, Lawrence Livermore National Lab lost nine sets of master keys and three magnetic cards, causing it to replace 100,000 locks on 526 buildings at a cost of $1.7 million to the taxpayer. SOURCE: Washington Post

June 20, 2003 -- LANL admits losing plutonium. SOURCE: POGO

June, 2003 - In a letter to DOE Secretary Abraham, Senator Charles Grassley complains that security investigators at Sandia National Lab are retaliated against and confirms the theft of a Verizon van at the Lab noting: "The van was stolen from inside a classified area and crashed undetected through perimeter fences at 5 a.m. in what is described as a `high risk' exit maneuver.It was discovered a day and a half later in a local department store parking lot." SOURCE: New York Times

April, 2003 - William Cleveland, Jr., head of Lawrence Livermore's security office resigns after acknowledging he had an affair with Chinese double agent Katrina Leung, who later pled guilty to lying to the FBI. SOURCES: CNN/AP, and Washington Times

March, 20, 2003 - Sandia National Laboratory President announces an investigation finding a variety of security breakdowns including: "security police officers observed eating, watching TV, and sleeping on duty, to theft of government-owned computer parts and software, to disappearance and reappearance of a set of keys to Sandia buildings." SOURCE: Sandia

January 27, 2003 - DOE IG finds that security contractor Wackenhut has been cheating on security tests at the Y-12 nuclear facility for two decades. SOURCE: Associated Press

January 15, 2003 -- A computer hard drive that contains classified data has been missing from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) since October 2002, but top officials at the Department of Energy (DOE) have failed to investigate the loss. On January 16, 2003, DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham issues a statement saying: "I am deeply troubled that Los Alamos National Laboratory is unable to account for computer equipment and other materials as part of lab management's inventory control and audit program," SOURCES: DOE & POGO

 November, 2002 -- Memo from the Los Alamos Office of Security finds more than 200 missing computers, including from classified black programs. A January 2003 report by the DOE IG later corroborates the memo, scolds Los Alamos for firing the officers who wrote the memo and details security weaknesses. SOURCES: POGO and DOE IG

June, 2000 -Two hard drives containing nuclear weapons secrets disappear at Los Alamos. They are mysteriously found several weeks later behind a copy machine. SOURCES: U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee and LANL

May, 2000 - A Department of Energy report states officials at Los Alamos pressured employees to say security at the facility is better than it really is.

March, 1999 - Wen Ho Lee, a Los Alamos nuclear weapons scientist, is investigated by the FBI for allegedly downloading nuclear secrets onto his hard drive.

Nuke Weapons Site Deploys Grenade Launcher without Night Vision, Training

According to a draft Department of Energy Inspector General (DOE IG) report (pdf) released today, the contractor managing Pantex nuclear weapons plant has required security officers to use a powerful military grenade launcher at night without proper training or “reduced visibility sighting systems.”  The report was made publicly available by the Project On Government Oversight (POGO).

This is the third DOE IG report made public in the past week about security troubles involving the contractor, BWXT Pantex LLC. A report from last week found “unacceptable” delays in fielding M-4 carbine rifles needed to protect the facility and high false alarm rates for the Aircraft Detection System. A second report from last week found cheating on security tests by contingency forces brought in to protect Pantex during a strike of BWXT’s security officers. DOE’s Office of Health, Safety and Security is conducting a more in-depth investigation of the cheating which should be out shortly.

POGO has previously raised concerns about security and safety at Pantex in letters to Secretary of Energy Bodman, including a May 2007 letter which revealed that the number of security officers protecting the site had plummeted during the union strike from 537 to roughly 200. Pantex was among those sites described in POGO’s 2005 report U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland Security Opportunities.

Pantex plant which is located 17 miles from Amarillo, TX, is the U.S. government’s assembly/disassembly facility for nuclear weapons. It stores thousands of plutonium pits, some from 40-50 year old weapons, in World War II era bunkers. 

According to GlobalSecurity.org, “The MK19 firing rate is over 350 grenades per minute and it is effective to ranges of over 2200 meters.”

Among the key findings from the report released today:

MK-19 Grenade Launcher was deployed without ability to target at night: “it was deployed without a reduced-visibility sighting system that would effectively direct the weapon’s fire under such conditions…protective force officers were expected to use the weapon on a ‘24/7’ basis including hours of darkness…Several protective force personnel assigned to use the MK-19 told us they could not effectively engage a target in darkness with the unaided eye.” (pg 3)

Contractor admits stop gap measure on reduced-visibility fails to meet security requirements: “When questioned about this situation, one contractor official said that this manner of target acquisition did not allow the facility to meet site protection requirements.” (pg 3)

Contractor was canceling order for reduced-visibility sights: “The official also said that the order for this equipment ‘was in the process of being cancelled and the need for such equipment was not a factor at this time.’” (pg 4)

BWXT official admits training is faulty: “a knowledgeable BWXT official said that the training and qualification program was not appropriate.” (pg 4)

Training happened on the least likely and easiest scenarios for an attack: “the weapon training program only provided for basic operator training at a firing range under favorable daylight and limited distance conditions. The training course did not address engaging an adversary under reduced visibility conditions or provide training at extended distances or against a maneuvering adversary.” (pg 4) “Our review revealed that protective force personnel were rated as qualified on the MK-19 after firing during daylight hours at a stationary target positioned at approximately 10 percent of the distance that an adversary was expected to be engaged and neutralized.” (pg 6)

The other two DOE IG reports are:

Letter Report on “Alleged Unnecessary Protective Force Equipment Purchases at Pantex,” July 11, 2007.

Memo on SUMMARY: Investigation of Alleged False Certifications Relating to Testing of the Contingency Protective Force at the Pantex Plant, July 12, 2007.

-- Peter Stockton and Beth Daley

Bar Low for Whistleblower Protection

A story in Saturday's Washington Post illustrates the absolute inadequacy of whistleblower protections.  In 1989, Richard Barlow was fired after raising objections inside the Office of the Secretary about senior Pentagon officials lying to Congress concerning Pakistan's emerging nuclear weapons program and the threat of AQ Khan.  Since then, the State Department Inspector General and the GAO have both largely vindicated Barlow and found that he was retaliated against.  Barlow's security clearances were restored, but he could not get rehired by the government due to the incident; as a result, he could not get the annual pension and health insurance that he deserves.

Twenty Senators and eight legislative committees have looked at Barlow's case, only to discover that there isn't any avenue to compensate whistleblowers fired from the intelligence field.  "There just isn't a venue for someone like him," said POGO Executive Director Danielle Brian to the Post. "He was trying to prevent lies to Congress about something of global importance. And he didn't even go to Congress -- all he did was suggest that Congress not be lied to."  When Barlow tried to find a venue in the court system, government officials used the "state secrets privilege" to quash his case.

As reprehensible as it is that Barlow was retaliated for doing his job, the real failure is that his concerns about AQ Khan--an individual whose impact Congress is still examining--were not heard, and as a result, the United States missed an opportunity to stop Khan from building "the world's largest atomic black market."  The specter of the AQ Khans of the world may not go away any time soon, but Congress can correct the harm done to Richard Barlow by passing legislation to compensate for Barlow's loss of his pension and fixing the whistleblower protection system to make sure that this kind of mistake will never happen again.

-- Mandy Smithberger

Congress Accuses DOE of Los Alamos Security Breach Cover-Up

TIME magazine has reported on yet another major security breach at the Los Alamos nuclear weapons lab – this one considered an Impact Measurement Index 1 reportable incident which “poses the most serious threats to national security interests and/or DOE critical assets or creates serious security situations.”

In a letter sent (pdf) to Department of Energy Secretary Bodman yesterday, members of Congress spank DOE for keeping the January 2007 breach under wraps while testifying before the Committee twice in recent months concerning the infamous meth lab drug bust where hundreds of pages of classified Los Alamos National Lab documents were discovered.

In the most recent event, a classified email with information about the “characteristics of nuclear material in nuclear weapons” was sent over unsecured networks to the board of Los Alamos, snagging the highest levels of the organization in its security failures.

-- Beth Daley

Nuclear War on Drugs

According to a recent Los Alamos Monitor article, approximately 200 employees at Los Alamos National Laboratory have been called in for random drug testing as part of a new policy implemented on March 5 of this year.  While this number is statistically viable as a sample of the workforce, the results are a cause for concern.  Of these 200 people, “fewer than 10” have either failed testing or refused to submit to be tested, then opted to resign to avoid termination.  If this number, which theoretically is an accurate sample, is representative of the Los Alamos workforce, that would suggest that as many as 5% of the 9,635 employees are afraid of what their drug tests might reveal.  Now that’s a scary thought.

-- Caleb Rowe

TIME Reports New CREM de Meth Revelations

You may remember that Jessica Quintana was the former Los Alamos National Laboratory contractor who brought hundreds of pages highly classified documents to her home where they were found in a methamphetamine drug lab bust. As if this wasn’t bad enough, we had been hearing on the grape vine that during her security clearance interview Quintana admitted that she had been using drugs within weeks before seeking the clearance. Today TIME Magazine has a blockbuster report on their website on this (she was doing drugs during the security screening) and a much more damaging revelation: namely that since 2001 some “35 cases involved drug use within the year prior to requesting a security clearance” and two other cases involved “indications of prior drug use within the month prior to the clearance being granted.”  According to TIME, those cases are not limited to Los Alamos, but extend to other Department of Energy locations.

Energy Secretary Sam Bodman testifies today (pdf) before the House Energy and Commerce Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee where he will undoubtedly have to answer for this. (Link to live hearing; Windows Media Player req'd)

By comparison, consider that my son had to take a drug test before he got a job to straighten ketchup bottles on the shelves at Target.

-- Danielle Brian

DOE Employees Request Congressional Investigation

The Project On Government Oversight (POGO) has received a letter addressed to Congress from “current and former DOE employees” (pdf) calling for an investigation into persistent mismanagement at the NNSA’s Los Alamos Site Office (LASO). Their concerns include understaffing, cronyism, constant and haphazard reorganizations, and inadequate training of employees. The letter draws from a wealth of knowledge and experience, and the issues raised deserve to be taken seriously:

The "we" who have authored this letter constitute a group of current and former employees of the Los Alamos Site Office (LASO) and the New Mexico DOE Complex. As a group our personnel have a sum of more that 100 years of experience. We can say with confidence that we have never in our careers, either in public service or the private sector witnessed such gross mismanagement as seen at the Los Alamos Site Office.

Last year, the University of California won, along with Bechtel, a questionable competition to continue their mismanagement of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with the stated purpose of correcting the problems that they, in part, created. The NNSA initiated a “pilot program” shortly thereafter that handed over contract oversight responsibility to the contractor itself. This program rendered the Site Office virtually powerless to correct problems and it’s at the root of many of the issues discussed in the letter to Congress.

The "pilot program" makes little sense considering the track records of the contractors. The University of California already had a proven history of mismanagement at Los Alamos before the DOE decided to open their contract to competitive bidding. Bechtel, UC’s current partner, not only has its own checkered contract history, but has often used its political clout to actively dodge accountability.

Thus it's no surprise that safety and security debacles continue unabated:  the partial blinding of an employee with a laser, incidents of losing classified information (e.g., CREM DE METH), americium contamination in four states that cost the governement $1 million in clean-up costs, and a nine-month shutdown of the lab due to lax security and safety that cost taxpayers roughly $500 million.

The employee letter states:

Given past problems, one must question why the LASO was thought to be the appropriate site for implementation of a pilot of reduced contractor oversight as a way of doing business. Why select a site that is-known to have had a history of serious management problems and serious problems with business systems. Audits and review of other documentation will verify the lack of a viable business system at LANL.

In a letter to Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman last fall, POGO also addressed the Site Office’s “pilot program.”

The problem is clear: the lack of qualified safety basis experts in the Site Offices; the fact that DOE does not verify whether the safety directions created by the federal DOE overseers have been implemented by the contractor; and the decision-makers at DOE Headquarters do not support their people in the field when there is a conflict between the contractor and DOE. For instance, Headquarters assured the Los Alamos site office that it would get additional staff to work on safety verification.  However, that additional staff was never provided. Furthermore, former Los Alamos safety director Chris Steele was transferred because of complaints from the contractor, who said he was being too tough on them. The solution is not self-policing by the contractor: it is to have a sufficient number of adequately-qualified safety experts, and the support for those experts from DOE Headquarters. Oversight of contractors is an inherently governmental function.

On January 30 of this year, POGO Executive Director Danielle Brian testified before a House subcommittee once again reiterating that the situation has yet to improve. She stated, “In fact, I fear things may actually be getting worse. Not only has NNSA has failed to correct security issues, but the agency has determined that it wants even less oversight of Los Alamos and has implemented a new pilot program in which oversight has been handed over to the contractor itself.”

Many of the DOE employees’ concerns are widely known and pre-date the “pilot program.” Retired Admiral Henry Chiles, presiding over a Security Workforce Panel, released a report in 2004 (pdf) that documented personnel problems within NNSA, particularly those related to understaffing. The following year, retired Admiral Richard Mies led an independent review of NNSA security operations at the national laboratories. His subsequent report (pdf) also detailed an extensive lack of proper training, oversight, and accountability.

Yet while paying lip-service to these and other reports’ recommendations, the DOE and NNSA have failed to correct the underlying problems. At the same hearing where POGO’s Brian noted that the situations may be getting worse, NNSA Acting Administrator Thomas D’Agostino persisted in the belief (pdf) that improvements were already underway. His conclusion:

We have received a number of reports from the Government Accountability Office, the DOE Inspector General, and the DOE Office of Independent Oversight. Like the Chiles and Mies studies, we have addressed the recommendations in these reports and have made major improvements.

The recent letter from “current and former DOE employees” proves D’Agostino’s conclusion to be false. POGO supports their request for a congressional investigation into the matter. The “pilot program” has been a disaster and should be terminated immediately. The entire senior management staff should also be held accountable for LANL and LASO's failures.

-- John Pruett

Cyber-security at Risk

A New Mexico jury’s verdict earlier this week in favor of network security analyst Shawn Carpenter reinforces the longstanding conclusion that laboratory and departmental mismanagement has systematically jeopardized our nation’s nuclear security apparatus. Officials at Sandia National Laboratory and the Department of Energy (DoE) had repeatedly reproached and ignored Carpenter’s findings on a series of cyber security breaches by a group dubbed Titan Rain (possibly connected to the Chinese government) that threatened not only Sandia, but other US government, military, and commercial interests as well.

In an interview after the ruling with Computerworld, Carpenter identified the reaction to his findings as “a case of putting the interests of the corporation [Sandia’s manager Lockheed Martin] over those of the country.” This involved far more than turning a blind eye to Carpenter’s concerns. He states:

During my last meeting with Sandia management, a semicircle of management was positioned in chairs around me and Bruce Held [Sandia's chief of counterintelligence]. Mr. Held arrived about five minutes late to the meeting and positioned his chair inches directly in front of mine. Mr. Held is a retired CIA officer, who evidently ran paramilitary operations in Africa,