Non-Functioning Fire Suppression System at LANL Is Just the Beginning

POGO investigators have learned that the saga of the fire sprinkler system that won’t work in a fire is but the tip of the iceberg at Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) TA-55 plutonium facility. 

It turns out that about 2 years ago, there were roughly 300 modifications to safety systems needed to protect workers and the public at TA-55 that were part of “design change packages,” or DCPs, that were never closed out. What this means is that the safety systems were modified, but were never verified as working after the modification.

Now, about 2 years later, the number of DCPs that have not been closed out has grown to around 600.  One such system, the fire system, turns out to be one of the systems for which DCPs are not closed out and which was recently found not to be working. It is not too much of a stretch to assume that other safety systems necessary to protect the workers and public with open DCPs are also not working. 

There is no incentive for LANL to verify that these safety systems are working because it is not part of the contract incentives (there is no money to be made). The local Department of Energy (DOE) government oversight has evidently not been doing its job for over 15 years since 1994 (which is when the open DCPs on safety systems date back to). The so-called Facility Representative program is a program where DOE federal personnel are supposed to be in the LANL facilities on a daily basis checking for, among other things, fraud, waste, abuse, and safety system operability. 

According to our sources, some personnel at LANL have tried to bring this potentially dangerous safety issue to LANL management attention and have been ignored. It would take money from the LANL operating budget to ensure that safety issues like this are closed and this is evidently not a budgetary priority for LANL or DOE.  Evidently, safety systems potentially not working — which are necessary to protect the public — is another “acceptable risk,” apparently like the 3000 rem radiation dose that the public could be exposed to in the event of an earthquake and fire in which the sprinkler system would not work.

Rather than doing the job that LANL and DOE is paid for, management at LANL has discussed just throwing out the older DCPs which date back more than 15 years to 1994. It is not clear to POGO why DOE oversight management and LANL management is being paid for this unsurpassed level of incompetence.  The Local DOE Site Office manager is a senior SES for which the top salary is about $172K and the LANL Director makes over $800K.  It is unclear why this facility is operating if the safety systems are not known to be working with certainty.

POGO has obtained an email exchange detailing the situation, which can be viewed here.

-- Peter Stockton

Further reading:

• The Taxpayer Shouldn't be Burned Again in LANL's Inadequate Fire Protection Program
• POGO letter to Energy Sec. Chu regarding LANL plutonium facility shutdown due to repeat of fire suppression system failures

The Taxpayer Shouldn't be Burned Again in LANL's Inadequate Fire Protection Program

As usual, last week there was an interesting article in the Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor. In “Pu Work Curtailed Because Of Fire Sprinkler Issues,” the Monitor’s Todd Jacobson reported that “Los Alamos National Laboratory [LANL] curtailed programmatic work in the lab’s Plutonium Facility, putting the facility in 'standby mode' for a month from early October to Nov. 5 because of concerns about the adequacy of fire sprinkler coverage.”

On the bright side, the problem that 13 of 100 areas (130 sprinklers) in the facility were not adequately covered by the sprinkler system was discovered before there was a fire in one of those areas. On the not-so-bright side, two weeks ago, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) found that the facility would be vulnerable to a catastrophic fire in the case of a severe earthquake. However, it does not take an earthquake to start a fire in a glove box that could spread.  

Lifestyles of the Rich and Nuclear

One of the great things about the stimulus bill, or the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), is that it requires the recipients and sub-recipients of federal funds to report the names and compensation levels of their top five officials. This provision is now helping to lift the curtain on the secretive world of contractors who run the labs that make up the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

Last week, John Fleck reported in the Albuquerque Journal that Sandia National Laboratories Director Tom Hunter makes a whopping $1.7 million per year, and that Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Director Michael Anastasio makes $800,348 per year. As Dan Hancock of the Southwest Research and Information Center pointed out, this means that Hunter makes four times as much as the President of the United States, and that Anastasio makes twice as much.

We found Sandia’s defense of the high salaries quite laughable. “They are making complex decisions that are actually affecting the security of the United States,” Sandia spokesman Neal Singer said. “They’re paid for the difficult decisions they make.” Unlike the President??

A disclaimer: a Department of Energy contracting regulation caps the taxpayer-funded portion of the executives’ annual compensation at $684,000. This is still nearly $300,000 more than the President’s salary.

-- Ingrid Drake

UPDATE: NNSA contacted POGO to say that it reimbursed the lab directors at far less than the $684,181 cap, and provided these figures for the amounts that the Department of Energy contributes to certain lab directors salaries (with the rest coming from the private companies that share in the management of the labs): LANL's Michael Anastasio, $397,341; Lawrence Livermore National Lab's George Miller, $348,400; and Sandia's Tom Hunter, $366,119.

Top Five Most Intriguing Quotes from the Merrifield Dossier

POGO has just posted hundreds of pages of interview and memos from an Inspector General investigation of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Commissioner.  As we mentioned yesterday on the blog, the investigation, which we requested two years ago, reveals that former Commissioner Jeffrey Merrifield maintained an uncomfortably cozy relationship with some of the power plant contractors he was tasked to regulate. Merrifield went on to accept a job created for him at Shaw Group, a company that could have benefited financially from votes he cast as Commissioner.

Here, we present the top five most intriguing quotes from the dossier:

1. From a memo on interview with Christopher Crane, CEO of Exelon, the largest nuclear utility in the U.S., May 28, 2008:

"Crane recalled that at one point, Merrifield called him to ask if he could call Shaw and General Electric on his behalf because these companies were not returning Englemeyer's telephone calls. Crane did not recall when Merrifield requested him to contact these companies on his behalf. Crane said he later telephoned Richard Gill, The Shaw Group and Andy White, General Electric and recommended that they consider Merrifield for employment."

Biden's Confidence in Regulatory Capacity of the NRC: "None, none"

A quick addendum to this morning's post about a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Commissioner's all too cozy relationship with companies he was supposed to be regulating: in our letter about the matter to Vice President Biden, we refer to his comments during a December 17, 2007 interview with The Keene Sentinel Editorial Board, in which he shared his level of confidence in the regulatory capacity of the NRC—“none, none.” Thanks to Jim Riccio from Greenpeace for finding the video, which also has the VP saying that the Commission should be filled with “watchdogs” instead of “house dogs” (see 0:45 and 2:22 for the quotes of interest).

-- Ingrid Drake

POGO Not Cheering for Obama's Pick of a Nuclear Power Cheerleader for Vacant NRC Seat

While the halls of government buildings were mostly empty and newsrooms were essentially cleared out, at 5:03 p.m. last Friday, October 9, 2009, at the start of the three-day Columbus Day weekend, the White House announced a nomination to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Despite the attempt of the Obama Administration to not call attention to its pick of William D. Magwood for the post of Commissioner on the NRC, POGO was paying attention and is calling on Congress to do the same, as Magwood will soon be facing confirmation hearings.

In a letter sent yesterday to Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Senators Barbara Boxer and James Inhofe, POGO expressed its opposition to Mr. Magwood’s nomination. Given his more than a dozen years promoting nuclear power, we just don’t think he is cut out to be a regulator of the industry.

He served as the Associate Director of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy, and then, for four years, as the Director. Issues he promoted include the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership and reprocessing of nuclear waste, both programs President Obama canceled because of nuclear proliferation concerns.

Since retiring from government service in 2005, Magwood has been actively involved in efforts to advance nuclear industry business opportunities domestically and abroad. He founded Advanced Energy Strategies which provides “expert advice and analysis of U.S. and international energy policy activities; nuclear industry developments and prospects; and supporting business development efforts.” Magwood has also been an investor in and President of Secure Energy North America Corporation, a company that is “working with industry and investors to develop novel approaches to finance new nuclear power stations in the United States.” There is very little public information on the web about either of these two companies, and the only document POGO could get its hands on provides very little detail. POGO is asking Congress to request all contracts and relevant documentation that will detail exactly what Magwood was advising his clients.

A bit of a history lesson: the NRC was created when the Atomic Energy Commission was abolished in 1974and split into two agencies because its dual missions of promotion and regulation of nuclear power was recognized as an inherent conflict of interest. As a result, DOE was given the role of promoting nuclear power (largely in the office that Magwood ran for seven years), while the NRC was created to regulate, inspect, and enforce regulations of the nuclear power industry. We fear that the appointment of Magwood would be a step back towards the bad government model of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Instead, the American public needs a Commissioner with a demonstrated background that would make them an effective regulator. The most notable lack on the NRC is an expert who specializes in security. The NRC could also benefit from the perspective of an appointee with experience in the nuclear Navy, a state level regulatory body, or a public interest group. Unfortunately, the new nominee does not fit the bill.

-- Ingrid Drake

How To Secure All the World's Vulnerable Nuclear Materials in Four Years Or Less

Yesterday, the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) published its recommendations to help President Obama "secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years."  In a letter accompanying the recommendations, POGO, along with individuals from 22 other groups, wrote: "the continual improvement in nuclear security should be acknowledged to be a global priority and specific steps should be taken to ensure that it is achieved as an international imperative."

Here are the five recommendations:

• Launch a new “Next-Generation Nuclear Security Initiative” at or before the global nuclear summit that includes a new global nuclear material security roadmap, a plan for broader international scientific cooperation to prevent nuclear theft and terrorism, and a political and technical action plan to achieve the four year goal.

• Accelerate efforts to secure and eliminate global highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, and nuclear weapon stockpiles, including in the U.S., with an immediate focus on minimizing the number of locations at which fissile materials are stored.

• Implement the policy of minimizing HEU use by including in the policy HEU use in all of its manifestations and create a timetable for a ban on the civil use of HEU.

• Request and aggressively pursue sufficient domestic and international funding for removing and securing all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years.

• Extend and expand the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction for another 10 years, reconfiguring it to have a global focus.

Read more details on the recommendations here.  Read the letter that accompanied the recommendations here.  Unfortunately, the U.S. has been painfully slow in these areas, but you can look forward to a forthcoming POGO report on many of these issues.

-- Bryan Rahija

IG Finds Livermore Guards Overeager To Help Police Force

In at least two incidents, guards at one of the nation's nuclear weapons plants, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, CA, voluntarily left their posts to help out the local police force, according to a just released Department of Energy's Inspector General (IG) report.  The report details one example from October 2008:

"Two Livermore uniformed protective force officers driving in a marked patrol car were returning from an evening security check of a Livermore facility located in the city of Livermore when they overheard on their radio a Livermore Police Department officer’s call for emergency assistance related to a domestic disturbance. Driving outside their normal patrol route to a private residence, the protective force officers, while armed and in uniform, assisted the local police officers."

This is a problem for several reasons. For one, the report determined that the  Livermore Lab protective force exceeded its authority in assisting the officers. Secondly, and most importantly, their absence from the facility created an additional security vulnerability at an already extremely vulnerable facility.

DOE Closes Door to Journalists, not Lobbyists, at Recent Event

The June 29, 2009 issue of the Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor has a very disturbing article, “DOE's New Transparency Policy--A Closed Door,” about how journalists were told to leave the room when a senior level DOE official spoke to a group of lobbyists and private interests. Below is a summary of the article:

Raising questions about the Department of Energy's committed to its oft-stated pledges of openness and transparency, journalists were told to leave the room shortly before new Deputy Energy Secretary Dan Poneman was to speak at this year's Energy Facility Contractors Group meeting in Washington last week. While no explanation was given at the time, according to those present, the move was apparently intended to ensure that journalists not only didn't cover, but couldn't even hear, a routine address on DOE's priorities under the Obama Administration and efforts to address climate change. In what one can only hope was meant with a sense of irony, Poneman reportedly also stressed the need for improved transparency at DOE in a speech closed to the news media. Poneman was the only DOE official whose remarks journalists were not allowed to cover at last week's meeting, which was also attended by Under Secretary for Science Steven Koonin, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management Ines Triay and other DOE officials....Last week's incident seems to run in the face of DOE's efforts to be more transparent, which have gone into overdrive since the Department received billions of dollars in additional funds through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. To ensure that the funds are used without suspicion, DOE has flooded its Web sites with reports on how the money will be used, has posted accounts of every meeting between officials and lobbyists concerning the stimulus funds and even, on occasion, instructed lobbyists to leave public meetings when the Recovery Act was to be discussed. It is the latter that heightens the irony of last week's incident, given that a number of lobbyists representing DOE contractors were allowed to hear Poneman's remarks, while members of the media, who would disseminate them to a wider audience, were pushed away.

-- Ingrid Drake

New Administration, Time for New Downblending Plans

Yesterday, NNSA announced that it has selected a contractor team--WesDyne International, LLC and Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.--to downblend 12 metric tons (MT) of surplus highly enriched uranium (HEU) into a safer form of uranium, referred to as low enriched uranium (LEU). Frank Munger's Atomic City Underground reports that most of the material is coming from the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee. We are pleased to see that a contractor has been selected, as this particular downblending effort has suffered delays.

However, we would challenge the NNSA's assertion that this contract "is a clear demonstration of our leadership of nuclear nonproliferation efforts." These 12 MT of HEU were actually in the pipeline for downblending before the Obama Administration took office.

If the NNSA really wants to demonstrate "President Obama's unprecedented commitment to strengthening and leading international nuclear nonproliferation efforts," it should immediately designate the approximately 300 MT of HEU at Y-12 excess to defense needs so it can be downblended by 2012.

-- Ingrid Drake