Less Alphabet Soup, Maybe, but Less Transparency

Back in January we wrote about the pending new rules for federal agencies for control of information considered sensitive but not classified.  We were told that the purpose of the new policy was to ease information-sharing between agencies, most particularly information related to terrorism.  Some of our brethren were perhaps over-optimistic in hoping the new rules would make more info available to the press and public.

Yes, we admit that even we briefly dared to hope.  But our cranky skepticism seems to have been justified.  Now the blogger smintheus  has called to our attention the White House memo to all heads of agencies and departments on the designation and sharing of what had previously been called SBU for Sensitive But Unclassified Information.  The new rules were finally issued on Friday while most of the White House was giddy with wedding doin's down at the ranch.

What's disappointing, if not entirely surprising, is that the Friday memo does not seem to follow either the letter or the spirit of earlier testimony by the administration's Program Manager for the ODNI Information Sharing Environment, Amb. Ted McNamara.  Calling the current situation "unacceptable," McNamara had pointed out that the category of unclassified but regulated information had grown haphazardly and was treated differently at virtually every federal agency.  He told the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence in April 2007:  "Among the twenty departments and agencies we have surveyed, there are at least 107 unique markings and more than 131 different labeling or handling processes."  McNamara had indicated that he thought a large amount of government information would become releasable.

Clearly something needed to be done to rationalize the situation.  McNamara proposed, and the White House has now accepted, that henceforth all such info will be referred to as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).  As smintheus aptly points out, already we have the presumption that the information will be "controlled."

The definition of CUI could not be more amorphous: info that is "pertinent to the national interests of the United States or to the important interests of entities outside the Federal Government."  You can see that almost any factoid could be massaged to fall into that category.  As smintheus pointed out, what could be more vague than "pertinent"?

Under the memo's taxonomy, CUI would be treated according to the amount of protection and handling needed.  The designations are based on whether it needs "Standard" or "Enhanced" Safeguarding; and "Standard" or "Specified" Dissemination.  That means there will be three categories: Standard/Standard; Standard/Specified; Enhanced/Specified.  (It was determined that Enhanced Safeguarding with Standard Dissemination would violate logic.)

Steve Aftergood points out in his Secrecy News today that "the new policy will do nothing to restore public access to government records that have been improperly withheld…To put it another way, the CUI policy does not exclude anything that is currently controlled as Sensitive But Unclassified.  This is a disappointment in light of previous suggestions that wholesale disclosures of currently controlled unclassified information might ensue."

Although the first paragraph of the White House memo declares that the purpose of the new rules is "to standardize practices and thereby improve the sharing of information, not to classify or declassify new or additional information," we fear the actual practice will be to remove from public view vast new categories of government information.

We are also disappointed because the Open Government community had previously written to the White House, asking for a public comment period, but that has not been provided in this memo.  Again, we know we're old-fashioned, but we think the public should have at least some say in how their information is handled.

-- Beverley Lumpkin

Hey Tipster: Send Us More Details

We received your two anonymous tips last night and today about a federal agency's award of a large contract to a small firm with questionable ties to a former Pentagon official.  You mentioned there was a Pentagon inspector general report on the matter.  Could you give us more details about the name of the company and what the ties between it and the former Pentagon official are? 

-- Nick Schwellenbach

Simplifying the Alphabet Soup

Our friend Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists noted some apparently good news on his Secrecy News blog last week: the government is at long last moving to rationalize the chaos that has long existed in the handling of information deemed sensitive but unclassified--and yes, they call that "SBU."

More than two years ago, President Bush issued a memo ordering a new policy for such information, often marked "For Official Use Only," or "Limited Distribution."  But Aftergood points out that the president's purpose was to promote information sharing among federal agencies, not necessarily to rationalize the system for us outsiders.

The situation has become more absurd through the years as different agencies dreamed up new ways to say "you can't have it!"  In testimony last April before the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Amb. Ted McNamara, Program Manager for the ODNI Information Sharing Environment, testified that without a manageable system for handling SBU, it's impossible for federal agencies to share critical information among themselves, much less with state and local agencies, or the private sector.

McNamara testified that the "lack of a single, rational, standardized, and simplified SBU framework...heightens risk aversion and undermines confidence in the control mechanisms.  This leads to both improper handling and unwillingness to share information....This is a national concern because the terrorist threat to the nation requires that many communities of interest, at different levels of government, share information."  McNamara called the current situation "unacceptable."

Whereas the system for handling classified information is controlled by both law and regulation, unclassified info has grown haphazardly and is treated differently across federal agencies.  McNamara told the committee: "Among the twenty departments and agencies we have surveyed, there are at least 107 unique markings and more than 131 different labeling or handling processes." 

Further confusing matters, some agencies use "SSI" to mean "Sensitive Security Information," while EPA uses it to mean "Source Selection Information."  And "ECI" can mean either "Enforcement Confidential Information" or "Export Controlled Information."  Also, ten different agencies employ the designation "Law Enforcement Sensitive" or "LES," but there is no uniformity of definition or control.  "Thus," said McNamara, "an individual can have access to the information in one agency but be denied access to the same information in another."  McNamara testified that henceforth what has been called SBU will now be dubbed "Controlled Unclassified Information," or CUI.

Sebastian Sprenger at InsideDefense.com reports that McNamara has sent a report to the White House with his recommendations for the new system, which will reduce the hundred-plus markings to only three.  Sprenger writes that McNamara found there are two central criteria for controlling CUI: the amount of safeguarding needed, and the breadth of its dissemination.  Safeguarding would be either "standard" or "enhanced," and dissemination would be either "standard" or "specified."  The three new markings--for which the White House has yet to select the new names--would correspond to: Standard/Standard, Standard/Specified, and Enhanced/Specified (officials thought that "Enhanced/Standard" doesn't make much sense).

Both Aftergood and Sprenger report optimism that the new system will allow for more public access to government information.  In support, Aftergood quoted 2006 testimony from McNamara that "the great majority of the information which is now controlled can be put in a simple unclassified, uncontrolled category, it seems to me."  Later in the hearing, McNamara expanded on the need for no more than about six CUI categories: "but then inserting those categories that definitely require under legislation or government-wide regulation, require controls, that they be put in the proper category of control.  And that the rest of it I would think would just become unclassified, with no control mechanism."  Of course, McNamara's main concern was to simplify the sharing of necessary information among various government actors and their private-sector partners, not to release more information to the public.

We at POGO are crossing all our fingers and toes, but we are concerned that some agency-specific markings will apparently remain, even with the new policy.  They include several that pertain to homeland security issues and would otherwise be thought of as information that should be shared: SGI for "Safeguards Information," which relates to nuclear security; PCII for "Protected Critical Infrastructure Information;" SSI for "Sensitive Security Information," used in the transportation sector; and CVI for "Chemical Vulnerability Information."

We are even more concerned that the final word on this policy will come from a White House that has hitherto shown no aptitude or inclination for sharing public information with the public, that has rather than decreasing secrecy, steadily increased it throughout its term.  But we will keep those fingers and toes crossed.

-- Beverley Lumpkin

Congress Still Largely Uninformed on Israeli Strike on Syria

Despite several congressional requests to the executive branch for briefings on Israel's air strike on Syria in September, Congress still remains largely in the dark, POGO learned yesterday.  On October 20, Reps. Pete Hoekstra (R-MI) and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), respectively the ranking members of the House intelligence and foreign relations committees, published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal charging that:

We regret that the administration has ignored numerous letters from Congress asking that all members be briefed on the Israeli airstrike. Failing to disclose the details of this incident to the legislative branch, preventing due diligence and oversight -- but talking to the press about it -- is not the way to win support for complex and difficult diplomatic efforts to combat proliferation by rogue nations. [emphasis added]

The Senate intelligence committee officially told me "no comment" yesterday.  However, a congressional staffer told me that "the issue has been closely held. The leadership of the defense committees and Intel committees have been briefed, but not the general membership of the Congress as you correctly noted in Ros-Lethinen’s OpEd."  Other sources told me that they were not aware of their full committees being briefed yet either.

Perhaps of greater practical concern for congressional oversight is, though a few select members have been briefed, none of their staff, which members depend upon for their expertise and knowledge, have not been allowed to accompany them, POGO has been told.

Though the Senate intelligence committee would not speak about the issue, its chairman, Senator John Rockefeller (D-WV), then the ranking Democrat on the committee:

... complained in a 2003 letter to Vice President Cheney that his briefing on the NSA eavesdropping was unsatisfactory. "Given the security restrictions associated with this information, and my inability to consult staff or counsel on my own, I feel unable to fully evaluate, much less endorse, these activities," he wrote. [link]

-- Nick Schwellenbach

Secret Briefing to House Intel on the CIA IG Today

The House intelligence committee is holding a closed door meeting on the CIA's Inspector General today, presumably to figure out if its independence is being threatened by the actions of CIA chief Michael Hayden and his subordinates.

Though there may be some anonymice going to some of the major papers, the House intelligence committee should make transcripts of this hearing available, consistent with the needs of national security.  Which means if there is information that is truly sensitive (it should go without saying that embarrassing information is not sensitive), redact it, but the blanket cloak of secrecy itself may undermine the full effectiveness of congressional oversight.

-- Nick Schwellenbach

Get My FBI File

This past June, we blogged about the website “Get Grandpa’s File,” which is an attempt to aid the masses in requesting documents that the FBI kept about their deceased grandparent(s), through the Freedom of Information Act.  Although a useful website for those who are interested in their no longer living grandparent(s) documented activism or tomfoolery, it is not very useful beyond that . . . until now.   

“Get Grandpa’s File” has expanded to include a sister site, entitled “Get My FBI File.”  This site aids people in requesting documents about themselves held by the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, the Secret Service, and the Army Criminal Investigative Command. 

Just like “Get Grandpa’s file,” this new addition aids you in receiving information through the Freedom of Information Act.  Although you certainly have the option of requesting documents about yourself through the FOIA office of any government agency that strikes your fancy, “Get My FBI File” claims their  “...site is a little easier to use and may be more likely to get the records you seek.”

“Get My FBI File” makes the process easier by using software that allows you to simply fill in a few slots with suggested information.  The software subsequently converts that information into a letter addressed to the proper FOIA office.  Of course, if you are worried about your privacy, you can choose which slots you want to leave empty.  The software will then create a letter with blank spaces available for you to handwrite the rest of the information needed to have a successful FOIA request.

Obviously, you may not receive any information about yourself.  Not everyone has a file at the FBI or CIA, but wouldn’t you sleep easier at night if you knew?  All it takes is 5 minutes of filling out slots on a website, a photocopy of your driver license, and postage.  Who wouldn’t sacrifice 5 minutes of their time and some postage to find out what kind of dirt the government has on them?  I know I would.

-- Jake Wiens
   

The CIA IG's Independence Threatened

In an unusual and highly troubling move, CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden has ordered an internal investigation of the CIA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) after that internal watchdog issued numerous critical reports which have bred resentment among the secretive agency's operatives, in particular those involved in the CIA's secret prisons program, the Los Angeles Times and New York Times report.

This is an unprecedented instance of an agency or department head beginning their own investigation into their own inspector general.  Usually when there are allegations of wrongdoing by a presidentially-appointed inspector general or senior OIG staff, the matter is turned over to the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE)--an association of all of the government's presidentially-appointed IGs (agency head-appointed IGs, which tend to exist at smaller agencies, are part of the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency).  By turning to a body outside of the IG's agency or department, the independence of the IG is not undermined.  Compounding the institutional conflict of interest of an agency investigation into its own watchdog, is the important detail that the internal investigation is headed by someone long close to Hayden, attorney Robert Dietz, who was the National Security Agency's general counsel under Hayden in the 1990s.  Hayden's move is highly troubling and violates the spirit of the IG Act, as well as the independence of the CIA IG.

The LA Times quotes Frederick P. Hitz, who served as the CIA's inspector general from 1990 to 1998, who told them that Hayden was sending a signal to John Helgerson, the CIA IG, "to call off the dogs."

"What it would lead to is an undercutting of the inspector general's authority and his ability to investigate allegations of wrongdoing," Hitz told the LA Times. "The rank and file will become aware of it, and it will undercut the inspector general's ability to get the truth from them."

Former Defense Department IG Eleanor Hill has repeatedly and strongly stressed that the Defense Department intelligence agencies--including notably the National Security Agency, formerly headed by Hayden--do not have statutorily independent IGs.  She has rather scathingly pointed out (pdf) that military service and Defense Department agency IGs often would come to her, since they did not have the clout, independence or resources to fully tackle certain kinds of sensitive investigations themselves:

As Defense IG, I worked closely with the military IGs and oversaw many of their investigations. My work with them - and with many other administrative Defense Agency IGs - reinforced my belief that independence is absolutely essential for federal statutory IGs. Military IGs often requested that our office conduct top-level, particularly sensitive investigations since they did not believe they had the independence needed to conduct an investigation that would both be and appear to be objective. I had similar conversations with some administrative Defense Agency IGs, who are appointed and serve, without the benefit of statutorily-protected independence, at the pleasure of the Directors of their agencies. All of those IGs recognized that in investigations of very senior officials or in audits of programs dear to the agency head, the statutorily protected independence of the Departmental IG was critical to both the integrity of the inquiry and to the credibility of the findings in the Department, on Capitol Hill, and with the American public. I could not help but recall those conversations when I read reports last year that oversight of what has been referred to as NSA’s “terrorist surveillance program” had been handled by the NSA IG, who has limited resources and no statutory independence, and not by the Department of Defense IG. In my view, that is exactly the kind of program where the oversight should have been conducted, from the very beginning, by the independent Defense Department IG.

Perhaps Hayden, due to his years at NSA, was accustomed to IGs who have less independence and latitude, and thus he wasn’t ready for an independent and assertive IG at the CIA.  Unfortunately for Hayden, Helgerson has the law behind him and Hayden should back off.  If there is indeed a problem with the CIA IG, the investigation should be placed in the hands of an entity outside of the CIA--the PCIE or a congressional intelligence committee (but definitely not the Office of Special Counsel).

-- Nick Schwellenbach and Beverley Lumpkin

Air Force No-Work Contract

Something's shady about a non-profit in Pennsylvania and its relationship with the Pentagon, The Washington Post's Robert O'Harrow discovers in a front page article today.  An intelligence contractor as well as non-profit, Commonwealth Research Institute, one of several subsidiaries of Concurrent Technologies Corporation, hired Charles D. Riechers as a "senior technical advisor" while Riechers was out of work and awaiting confirmation to become a senior Air Force acquisition official.  According to O'Harrow, Riechers' job at Commonwealth did not require him to do any work for the company, instead he worked for Sue C. Payton, assistant Air Force secretary for acquisition. 

Commonwealth Research's president, Frank W. Cooper "acknowledged that he hired Riechers at the request of the Air Force. Cooper said he did not know precisely what Riechers did for the government, saying he did not ask because he assumed such information was available only on a 'need-to-know' basis," O'Harrow wrote.

It seems that the Air Force simply backdoored Riechers into either his current job or some other kind of position by using Commonwealth while he waited for confirmation.  Experts say this deal doesn't wash:

Specialists in federal contracting law said Commonwealth Research's arrangement with Riechers may have violated regulations governing how the Air Force is permitted to hire and use contractors, including a prohibition on certain uses of consultants to augment the federal workforce. The prohibition is designed in part to ensure that employees in sensitive government jobs serve the public and not corporate or other outside interests.

This company is getting big, fast.  For example, just "[l]ast year, Commonwealth Research got a $45 million sole-source arrangement to provide reports to the National Security Agency, CIA and other intelligence agencies."  Remember MZM Inc.?  That was another company that blew up in size with intelligence contracts, a fast growing part of the budget.  Another similarity?  Both companies had as their umbilical cords a relationship with a powerful member of Congress sitting on an appropriations committee.  MZM had its Randy "Duke" Cunningham (R-CA), Commonwealth Research and its parent company Concurrent Technologies has Rep. John Murtha (D-PA), chair of the House defense appropriations subcommittee.  Concurrent Technologies is among the largest recipients of congressional earmarks.

Also, besides operating behind a veil of secrecy, Commonwealth Research and Concurrent Technologies get to evade one of the only two sure things most of us can expect in life:

Commonwealth Research and its parent company, Concurrent Technologies, are registered with the Internal Revenue Service as tax-exempt charities, even though their primary work is for the Pentagon and other government agencies. In a recent report Concurrent, also based in Johnstown, Pa., said it was among the Defense Department's top 200 contractors, with a focus on intelligence, surveillance, force readiness and advanced materials.

-- Nick Schwellenbach

What a tangled web we weave

Yesterday, we wrote about the letter House Government Reform and Oversight committee Chairman Henry Waxman (D-CA) sent (pdf) to State Department Inspector General Howard J. Krongard, detailing numerous alleged improprieties committed by him.  Among these is the assertion that:

You impeded efforts by your investigators to cooperate with a Justice Department probe into allegations that a large private security contractor was smuggling weapons into lraq. (page 2 of this pdf)

This morning, the AP's Richard Lardner moved the ball forward a bit by identifying that company--Blackwater:

Although the security company was not named in the letter, several senior administration officials confirmed it was Blackwater.

Blackwater is a very politically-connected company, as several have detailed.  More specifically though, the State Dep. IG Howard Krongard's brother is A.B. "Buzzy" Krongard, who formerly was the executive director at the CIA (its number three position--he was replaced with the infamous Dusty Foggo). 

In an article on the revolving door between Blackwater and the revolving door, Harper's Ken Silverstein noted:

Robert Young Pelton, author of the new book,  Licensed to Kill  , says that an early Blackwater contract—a secret no-bid $5.4 million deal with the CIA—came in 2002 after Prince placed a call to Buzzy Krongard, who was then the CIA's executive director.

Buzzy Krongard worked alongside Cofer Black, now Blackwater's vice chairman, who was director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center until 2002.  After his tenure at the CIA, Cofer Black worked at the State Department as its Ambassador-at-Large — a roving ambassador — for counterterrorism, before going to work at Blackwater in February 2005.

In addition to that, the parent company of Blackwater, the Prince Group, hired former Defense Department Inspector General Joseph E. Schmitz as its chief operating officer and general counsel in 2005 as he was coming under suspicion for also engaging in inappropriate acts that compromised the integrity and independence of the Pentagon Office of Inspector General.   Schmitz was investigated by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency's Integrity Committee and exonerated, though questions remain about the PCIE investigation, one source tells POGO (more on this hopefully to come).

So, Blackwater's Joseph Schmitz, who knows the ins and outs of IG investigations, works with Blackwater's Cofer Black, who worked with the brother (Buzzy Krongard)--who may have helped Blackwater out early on himself--of the Inspector General (Howard Krongard) responsible for investigating Blackwater.  It's a small world indeed.

Stay tuned.

UPDATE: TPM Muckraker Spencer Ackerman flags us and adds more to the story on Blackwater's influence.

-- Nick Schwellenbach

FISA Fest at Georgetown Law

A symposium held at Georgetown University’s Law Center on Sept. 10th was a veritable FISA fest for those interested in the complicated issues involving the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  Hosted by the Law Center's new National Security Center, the symposium was organized by two of the most knowledgeable people on the planet in the arcane world of FISA law:  James A. Baker, Lecturer at Harvard Law and still titular head of the Justice Dept's office that presents requests for warrants to the secret court that okays electronic surveillance and searches of those suspected of espionage, terrorism, or other acts of foreign intelligence; and David S. Kris, a former Associate Deputy Attorney General who was most responsible for tearing down "The Wall" between national security and criminal investigations, and who is the co-author of a weighty new tome, National Security Investigations and Prosecutions, destined to become the Bible for FISA nerds.

Most of those nerds were gathered at the Georgetown symposium, where the audience members were often as erudite on the law's intricacies as the panel members.  Unfortunately for non-attendees, all the discussions were off the record, although the AP wrote a brief story about Sen. Kit Bond's drop-by in which the senior Republican on Senate Intelligence indicated he still wants to change the law to grant immunity to telecoms and ISPs that cooperated with the administration's so-called Terrorist Surveillance Program (aka 450warrantless wiretapping) prior to January 2007.

These are all live issues, because changes in the law rammed through by the administration in August as the "Protect America Act" will sunset after six months.  (Some panelists complained that most commentary on those amendments has been inaccurate, both from the left and the right.)  There will doubtless be many Congressional hearings in coming months as the different actors seek their own versions of the necessary balance between security and liberty.

In the meantime, David Kris has produced the single most valuable document ever created for the FISA nerd:  a copy of the law as originally written in 1978, with all the changes enacted since Sept. 11, 2001, with each change helpfully color-coded (in SIX different colors!) so that you can keep track of what was added or subtracted when.  I have been wallowing in it for the past 24 hours and highly recommend it.

-- Beverley Lumpkin

Feith's Earmark?

The third largest defense earmark in fiscal year 2005, according to POGO's analysis of the White House's 2005 earmark database, is a classified earmark for $90 million (listed in the unclassifed FY2005 Defense Appropriations report (page 351, line 116)) which went to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's office, which was headed by Douglas Feith at the time. 

We have no idea what the earmark is for, though it seems odd that a Pentagon policy office would need an earmark.  If Feith's shop wanted more appropriations, the logical and most appropriate place to request funding would be in the President's budget request which is submitted to Congress, one would think.  Perhaps a member of Congress foisted this classified funding onto Feith's office.  We do not know.  Nor do we know what the earmark was for.  We do know that someone in the House of Representative rather than the Senate, originated the earmark for $85 million, but it was later bumped up to $90 million in conference.

I think it's worth noting the questionable involvement of Feith in some other matters.

The New York Times reported last week that "a spokeswoman for SAIC said the company was told to contract with Ms. Riza [Wolfowitz's girlfriend from the World Bank] by an official in the office of the under secretary of defense for policy, then headed by Douglas J. Feith."

Also, reported in 2004:

TIME has obtained an internal Pentagon e-mail sent by an Army Corps of Engineers official—whose name was blacked out by the Pentagon—that raises questions about Cheney's arm's-length policy toward his old employer. Dated March 5, 2003, the e-mail says "action" on a multibillion-dollar Halliburton contract was "coordinated" with Cheney's office. The e-mail says Douglas Feith, a high-ranking Pentagon hawk, got the "authority to execute RIO," or Restore Iraqi Oil, from his boss, who is Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. RIO is one of several large contracts the U.S. awarded to Halliburton last year.

Then there's the imbroglio with the Office of Special Plans.

Feith left in the summer of 2005, but during 2004 someone in the House of Representatives thought his office was deserving of some extra cash for the next fiscal year.  But for what?

-- Nick Schwellenbach

Administration Submits FISA "Modernization" Proposals

Well over a year after the New York Times exposed the warrantless National Security Agency (NSA) domestic eavesdropping program, the Justice Department and the Intelligence Community have submitted their proposed changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  The NSA program circumvented the FISA and the FISA court from 2001 until earlier this year, when some sort of accomodation was made allowing the FISA to approve of monitoring.

Posted on Secrecy News yesterday:

"Today, following over a year of coordinated effort among the Intelligence Community and the Department of Justice a bill is being submitted to Congress to request long overdue changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act," according to an April 13 fact sheet (pdf) on the proposed changes issued by the Justice Department and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The text of the proposed legislative changes to FISA, with a section by section analysis, may be obtained here (pdf).

POGO has not made an analysis of the Administration's proposal, but the American Civil Liberties Union said in a statement that the proposal is an "attempt to erode the Fourth Amendment and its protections."

-- Nick Schwellenbach

Past as Prologue: GAO Access and the FBI

Some Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) documents from 1993 and 1994 (pdf) documents were obtained courtesy of Michael Ravnitzky.  In August 1994, FBI Director Louis Freeh, reiterating directions sent out during his predecessor Acting Director Floyd Clarke's tenure the year before, tells his field office Special-Agents-in-Charge and Legal Attachés to control and reduce GAO access to FBI documents (pdf):

In the past, GAO [Government Accountability Office] has attempted to make direct contact with various Field Office, Legat [Legal Attachés], and FBIHQ [FBI Headquarter] personnel without coordination or approval of FBIHQ.  Interviews of personnel, disclosure of information, or dissemination of documentation should not take place until the proper notification from GAO has been submitted to and coordinated by OPCA [Office of Public and Congressional Affairs] at FBIHQ.

GAO is presently conducting several different audits that directly or indirectly involve the FBI.  While each of these audits has been approved and coordinated by FBIHQ, each subsequent audit must also be approved and coordinated by OPCA, even if the same GAO staff and FBI personnel are involved in the new audit.  No documentation or additional interviews are to be given to GAO without coordination and authorization by FBIHQ.

Despite instructions from FBIHQ, GAO often will ask for documentation and more information than they are authorized to receive.  For example, there have been a number of requests from GAO for information relating to pending investigations.  As a matter of longstanding policy, FBIHQ will continue to deny GAO access to any information that will identify pending cases.  GAO is not to be given direct and unlimited access to our files...

This might as well have been written yesterday. 

Ironically, in 1997, it was Freeh who called the FBI "potentially the most dangerous agency in the country" if it is "not scrutinized carefully." Freeh also called for more congressional oversight.

Months before the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the FBI entitled "Oversight of the FBI" (pdf).  One of the witnesses, Norman Rabkin of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congress' investigative arm, testified that:

While things go smoothly on occasion, on many other occasions our access at the FBI has been difficult, resulting in us having to follow cumbersome procedures to meet with Bureau officials and get basic information about their programs and activities.  We have had access issues in a number of agencies over the years.  However, across law enforcement-related agencies, FBI access issues have been the most sustained and intractable.

Rabkin also remarked that the last time the GAO testified on access problems at the FBI and Justice Department was in 1991 (pdf).

A month later in July 2001, two House Government Reform subcommittees held a joint hearing entitled, "Is the CIA's Refusal to Cooperate with Congressional Inquiries a Threat to Effective Oversight of the Operations of the Federal Government?"

There the GAO's Henry L. Hinton, Jr. stated:

We have broad authority to evaluate CIA programs. In reality, however, we face both legal and practical limitations on our ability to review these programs. For example, we have no access to certain CIA “unvouchered” accounts and cannot compel our access to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information. In addition, as a practical matter, we are limited by the CIA’s level of cooperation, which has varied through the years. We have not actively audited the CIA since the early 1960s. (emphasis POGO's)

Then 9/11 occurred and though there were important exceptions, Congress as an institution did not express much interest in the decades-long issue.  In fact, GAO access took some big hits over the course of 2001 and into 2002, especially in regards to the battle it lost over access to Vice President Dick Cheney's Energy Task Force records, partly because its main Congressional support was in the minority at the time.

Whistleblowers and the families of 9/11 victims need to be given particular credit for what was done in those years.  But finally, as can be seen in the muscle flexing of House Government Reform Chairman Henry Waxman (D-CA) (pdf) in the U.S. Attorney firing investigation, though this battle is about Congressional access more generally, Congress is coming back.

GAO access at the FBI and CIA are still problems however.  Though Congressional committee staff can provide a great deal of oversight firepower, Congress' large and professional investigative arm, the GAO, needs access to information.  As Hinton stated, the GAO has not "actively audited the CIA since the early 1960s."  And the problem with the FBI goes back to at least 1941, when then-Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, representing J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, wrote in an opinion that:

It is the position of the Department of Justice, restated now with the approval and at the direction of the President, that all investigative reports are confidential documents of the executive department and that congressional or public access thereto would not be in the public interest.

Though it still had not been named as "Executive Privilege," Jackson was relying on the same concept, which would not become a mature concept until the Cold War:

This accords with the conclusions reached by a long line of predecessors in the office of Attorney General and with the position taken by the President from time to time since Washington's administration; and this discretion in the executive branch has been upheld and respected by the judiciary.

As recent developments have made clear, we need more oversight of the FBI and other national security agencies.  The GAO serves the Congress, but it needs Congress' support too.

-- Nick Schwellenbach

CREM de Meth: the DOE Inspector General’s Report

In response to a FOIA filed by POGO, the Department of Energy Inspector General released a redacted report to us titled “Selected Controls Over Classified Information at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (pdf).” The report details the IG’s investigation into the infamous CREM de Meth incident where hundreds of pages of classified documents from Los Alamos National Laboratory were discovered in a methamphetamine drug raid. Here is the full length version of the report. National Nuclear Security Administration head Linton Brooks lost his job yesterday, probably over this incident which is the latest in a long string of classified information security breaches at Los Alamos.

-- Beth Daley

Congressional Access to Secrets Showdown

The Executive branch has always argued that it can deny Congress access to secret national security information, but the Bush administration has been particularly adept at flouting Congressional requests.  The latest example is the denial of a request by Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) for policy documents on the detention and interrogation of suspected terrorists.  Expect this to be one of many showdowns over Congressional access to classified information between a Congress, where newly-in-charge Democrats and many Republicans alike are ready to assert their constitutional perogative of oversight, and the hyper-secretive Bush administration. 

Congressional Quarterly reports:

The Justice Department has rebuffed a Senate request for documents related to the Bush administration's policy on the detention and interrogation of suspected terrorists, particularly those held by the CIA.

Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., soon to take the helm of the Senate Judiciary Committee, requested the documents from Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales on Nov. 16, after the CIA acknowledged the existence of two of them in the course of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought by the American Civil Liberties Union.

The Executive branch is wrong to argue that Congress can't see classified information.  To start, there seems to be an assumption that disclosure to Congress is the same as public disclosure.  That is why acting Assistant Attorney General James H. Clinger said, in his denial to Senator Leahy, that, "Al Qaeda seeks information on our interrogation techniques — their methods and their limits — and trains its operatives to resist them."  Now there may be information that the American government or most of of the public may not want Al Qaeda or other terrorists to know.  However, neither the public or terrorists will know this information unless it is declassified or leaked.  Many have noted that much more leaking comes from the Executive branch rather than Congress.   Senator Richard Shelby (R-Alabama) stated in 1998, "As CIA Director Tenet told this [Senate Intelligence] Committee last week, Congress has a better record at keeping secrets than does the executive branch, which he said, quote, leaks like a sieve, end of quote." (see page 45 of this pdf)

And Congress has never used its own rules to declassify documents on its own, but has relied on the Executive to declassify documents when it believes the public should see them.   The rules are: Senate Resolution 400, section 8, agreed to May 19, 1976 (94th Congress, 2nd Session) and Rules of the 109th Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Rule X.

Documents can remain classified and kept from the public, yet still be shared with Congress for purposes of oversight. Congress, by and large, has been good at keeping secrets and its Members, Senators and cleared staffers have the authority to receive them.

Also to keep in mind, the Executive branch is denying Congress policy documents, not detailed information on what we actually know about Al Qaeda that could tip them off--again, if they were publicly disclosed.  If the Executive gets away with keeping these documents from Congress, then our constitutional system of separation of powers will have totally failed because Congress cannot oversee without basic information such as the policies of the Executive.  Leahy, Congress and the American public should fight for these documents.  This is a clear case where the War on Terrorism has wrongly skewed us away from one of the most fundamental principles of our constitutional Republic.

-- Nick Schwellenbach 

Exposing the Truth: Joe Darby

Few people know Joe Darby by name, but you can bet millions of Americans know the results of what he did. Darby is the whistleblower who came forward about the Abu Ghraib atrocities and gave authorities the pictures of U.S. soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners.

This Sunday (Dec. 10) in a segment titled “Exposing the Truth,” 60 MINUTES will run a piece on Joe Darby, the Army reserve soldier from Appalachia who ended up exposing what became one of the biggest news stories of the Iraq war. Darby will tell his story to Anderson Cooper on this week’s 60 MINUTES (Sunday, Dec. 10, 7PM ET/PT on CBS).

-- Jennifer Gore

Iraq Study Group: US Gov't Grossly Underreports Iraq Violence

Want to know how bad things are in Iraq?  Don't go the Pentagon for the whole story (as if you didn't know that already). From the section on Intelligence in the Iraq Study Group's report (pdf):

In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq. The standard for
recording attacks acts as a filter to keep events out of reports and databases. A murder of an Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of a sectarian attack, that assault does not make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn’t hurt U.S. personnel doesn’t count. For example, on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals.
(emphasis POGO's)

Jonathan Landay of McClatchy Newspaper's Washington Bureau notes that this:

...confirmed a Sept. 8 McClatchy Newspapers report that U.S. officials excluded scores of people killed in car bombings and mortar attacks from tabulations measuring the results of a drive to reduce violence in Baghdad.

By excluding that data, U.S. officials were able to boast that deaths from sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital had declined by more than 52 percent between July and August, McClatchy newspapers reported.

-- Nick Schwellenbach

Tune in Tonight: Take Action to Help FBI Whistleblower

Last year, the American public was treated to the troubling news that terrorism expertise was not a priority for FBI managers in hiring for their counterterrorism efforts. Tonight NBC News will feature the whistleblower who brought that troubling news to light -- FBI Supervisory Special Agent Bassem Youssef. Our colleagues at the National Whistleblower Center are asking the public to help Mr. Youssef by writing to FBI Director Robert Mueller urging the agency not to retaliate against Youssef for his public appearance this evening. To write a letter of support – go here.

Concern about retaliation for FBI whistleblowers is well-placed given that they have virtually no protections against retaliation and the FBI has been particularly aggressive. For example, according to the public interest group Judicial Watch, FBI Agent Robert Wright has been subjected to at least four retaliatory investigations for speaking out about FBI failures to track down terrorists. An unusually telling set of documents disclosed to Senators Grassley and Leahy revealed internal FBI officials discussing their plan to “take him out,” for Wright’s “public appearance and comments on a network television news program.”

-- Beth Daley

Dems: Well, Maybe Not All the 9/11 Commission Recs

The rumors on the Hill suggest that the Democrats plan to reject the 9/11 panel's recommendation for Congress to improve oversight of the nation's intelligence agencies.

Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important," the panel wrote. "So long as oversight is governed by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need."

Although no political observer takes campaign promises at face value, the overwhelming mantra of Democratic candidates in this election was to implement ALL of the remaining 9/11 reforms.  Rejecting the most essential reform is a complete rejection of the spirit of the Democrats' campaign promise. Rigorous intelligence oversight is a vital change needed to improve our national security.  It is challenging to figure out which changes should be made, though some strongly argue that the tools already exist for oversight, just the intelligence committees are not picking them up and using them (pdf).

The main debate over restructuring intelligence oversight is over whether there should be greater centralization of Congressional jurisdiction, decentralization, or whether the fundamental structure and delegation of jurisdiction is sound.  It's clear that there needs to be plenty of expertise and more bi-partisanship, though not at the expense of legitimate, thoughtful oversight.

One of the alternatives considered by the 9/11 Commission is the creation of a Joint Senate/House intelligence committee modeled on the old Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE).  The JCAE was a powerful committee and has even been called "probably the most powerful Congressional committee in the history of the nation."  According to the chapter "Congressional Oversight of the [Nuclear] Bomb," in Stephen I. Schwartz's landmark book, Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940:

To ensure a strong congressional role in overseeing the program [on atomic energy], the [Atomic Energy Act of 1946] created the JCAE, the only committee to be brought into being by an act of legislation (and thus held to have rights under that law) and the only joint committee to have full legislative powers.  Not only could the JCAE hold investigative hearings and undertake studies of issues, all bills, or other matters pertaining to atomic energy in both the House and the Senate had to be referred to the JCAE. 

In 1954 the JCAE gained the power to authorize funds for the Atomic Energy Commission.  Its joint nature was especially important, as it helped to minimize differences between the House and the Senate and bolstered its authority with the executive branch, which could not pit one committee against the other in an effort to either kill or delay undesirable legislation or achieve an agreeable compromise.
...
The [Atomic Energy Commission, then-the federal entity in charge of the U.S. nuclear weapons and energy complex] was explicitly required to keep the JCAE "fully and currently informed with respect to all od the Commission's activities," giving the JCAE "a unique capacity for legislative surveillance."

However, the JCAE often functioned as the Atomic Energy Commission's biggest promoter and protector from outside criticism.  Also, the JCAE, though it could be critical, often pumped funds into programs that the AEC or the Bureau of the Budget (the predecessor to the Office of Management and Budget) opposed.  The JCAE shaped the nuclear complex for decades, partially by putting it on steroids.  Schwartz elaborates: "For the most part, the programs that the committee had in mind exceeded the bounds of what the Executive 'deemed prudent or economical.'"

Yet such a radical centralization of Congressional jurisdiction--a la JCAE--might not be the best idea.  Earlier this year, Rep. Jeff Flake (R-Arizona) introduced a bill which would improve the sharing of classified information held by the intelligence committees with other committees with jurisdiction.  The rationale here is that the intelligence committees, which are viewed by many as currently ineffective, would no longer have such a monopoly on certain kinds of information, allowing at least effective committees with jurisdiction the ability to conduct oversight.  In fact, the JCAE was dismantled in 1977 partially because the rest of Congress was frustrated by its "stranglehold on nuclear policy matters."

Frank J. Smist Jr., in his book Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994, is not so keen on the idea of joint intelligence committee either, but has some proposals that should be considered:

The Senate and House must maintain separate intelligence committees.  Critics of the present structure frequently have proposed a single joint committee modeled after the old joint committee on atomic energy.  However, the two committees have functions that are not easily blended.  Under the Constitution, the Senate has sole authority to ratify treaties and alone exercises the "advise and consent" power with respect to presidential nominations.  In addition, a joint committee would be in an awkward position in terms of each chamber's consideration of intelligence budgets and intelligence legislation.  He believes the present system of separate committees is both adequate and necessary, but that system also needs some repairs.

The Senate Intelligence Committee was created in 1976. Unlike other Senate committees, the chairman and vice-chairman positions were structured so as to foster a close partnership between the two party leaders on the committee.  This system has worked well [POGO note--until recently]. In addition, the fact that the majority party has only one seat more than the minority party has tended to foster bipartisanship and consensus-building.  The committee's budget authorization responsibility, however, has not worked well.  The Senate Intelligence Committee has authority only over national foreign intelligence programs, while the Senate Armed Services Committee retains sole control of military intelligence, about 85 percent of the total intelligence budget.  The Senate needs to rethink how budget authorization responsibility is divided in the intelligence area.  To correct a serious deficiency in this area, the model of shared authority between the House Intelligence and Armed Services committees is worth examining and adopting.  Finally, the Senate committee needs to examine the term limits imposed on members who join the committee.
  ...
  The House Intelligence Committee was created in 1977.  Unlike the Senate Intelligence Committee, the House committee was given budget authorization oversight for the entire intelligence community.  In fashioning budgets in the post-Cold War world, such a broad overview is extremely important.  But the House committee has serious deficiencies as well.  The House committee's biggest problem is that members may serve no longer than six years.

Then there is the issue highlighted earlier this year where Russ Tice, a National Security Agency whistleblower and member of the National Security Whistleblowers Coalition, was not able to speak with either intelligence committee, because the Executive branch claimed neither committee had security clearances high enough to be briefed.  Oy vey!

-- Nick Schwellenbach and Mandy Smithberger

A "Rush" for House Intel Chair

House Speaker-elect Nancy Pelosi gave speculators about the next Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence an extension by rejecting bids by Florida Rep. Alcee Hastings and California Rep. Jane Harman for the position.

Well, perhaps the extension will give speculators time to look at the lesser-known possible contenders for the position.  So far, the rumor mill has spit out the names of Georgia Rep. Sanford Bishop (who many say was royally ‘dissed’ some years ago when then-Minority Leader Dick Gephardt gave the spot to Harman), Norman Dicks (D-WA) who is currently the Ranking Member of the House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee—and would probably like to have the chair, but may have taken himself out of the running from what we've heard on the news—and Silvestre Reyes (D-TX), a former border patrol agent who has the backing of the Hispanic Caucus.

However, POGO has noticed a quietly rising star named Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ).  The four-term congressman is a physicist by profession and in one of his former positions was an arms control expert at the U.S. State Department.  His duties included monitoring the nuclear programs of countries such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and the former Soviet Union (handling the “Axis of Evil” and the Great Bear all at the same time).

Full disclosure:  Rep. Holt is a House Co-chair of POGO’s successful Congressional Oversight Training Series.  We asked the congressman to fill this position because he has shown a commitment to strong, accessible government, whistleblower protection, and the government’s need to enforce the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Hell, the man is even a five-time Jeopardy! game show winner.

-- Jennifer Gore

GAO to Congress: "Hey, Oversee This" Part One

There's a lot of substantive overlap between my part-time job with Harvard's Nieman Watchdog Project and my day job here at POGO.  So I don't feel I'm overly self-promotional by linking to my latest Nieman Watchdog piece on the GAO's suggestions for Congressional Oversight.  It's the first in a series, which will include POGO's baker's dozen list of topics we'd like to see Congress dig into.  I've also reposted it here after the jump.

-- Nick Schwellenbach

GAO weighs in with suggestions for congressional oversight
ASK THIS | November 21, 2006

Areas of concern include taxes, government contracting, Defense spending, Homeland Security and intelligence. There’s a lot to be looked at, the question is how probing the Democrats will be.

By Nick Schwellenbach

On November 17, 2006, ten days after the 2006 midterm election, where Democrats took back control of both chambers of Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) sent Congressional leaders its biannual suggestions for Congressional oversight. 

The Democrats have promised a return to renewed Congressional oversight as a check on the Executive branch, though it is not clear that they are united on how far or broad their investigations may go, if at all, into controversial Bush administration policies. Many government insiders and outside experts from across the political spectrum have lamented the demise of oversight and of Congress as a co-equal branch of government.

Moreover, many programs and policies, only some of which are Bush administration initiatives though they have been its responsibilities since 2001, are badly in need of Congressional attention, not to mention the media’s. Even with issues that seem to attract news coverage, there are likely still many more rocks to turn over and a need for constant attention to these evergreens. One example: A line in the GAO summary says “billions of dollars have been wasted annually” by the Defense Department.

GAO broke its oversight suggestions into three broad categories, only a portion of the first of which will be broached in this piece: 1) “Targets for Near-Term Oversight”; 2) “Policies and Programs That Are in Need of Fundamental Reform and Re-Engineering”; and 3) “Governance Issues” that ensure an accountable, effective government.

All these are of great public interest, with questions waiting to be asked by journalists whose work may spark or elucidate Congressional interest in specific areas. After each issue heading, I suggest some questions that could serve as starting points—and I emphasize that they are just that, starting points. I then follow with the GAO summary of the issue.

1. Reduce the Tax Gap

Questions: What is the difference between what the government should be getting from taxpayers and what it does get? What are the consequences? Who gets away with not paying their fair share? How does it affect those who do pay? What are the loopholes and what are strong fixes to them?

GAO summary: “The tax gap—the difference between the amounts taxpayers pay voluntarily and on time and what they should pay under the law—has been a long-standing problem. Most recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimated a gross tax gap for tax year 2001 of $345 billion and, after enforcement efforts and late payments, a net tax gap of $290 billion. When some taxpayers fail to comply, the burden of funding the nation’s commitments falls more heavily on compliant taxpayers. Reducing the tax gap would help improve the nation’s fiscal stability. Based on IRS’s estimate, each 1 percent reduction in the net tax gap would likely yield $3 billion annually. The gap can be reduced, though not eliminated, through a multiprong strategy of better service and enforcement of existing tax laws, plus legislative actions.”

2. Address Government-wide Acquisition and Contracting Issues

Questions: How much does the government contract out? What are the pros and cons to contracting? How do the theoretical benefits of contracting compare to the reality of what those benefits actually cost? What kind of oversight exists for different kinds of contracts? Are taxpayers getting what they pay for? Are there considerations besides cost-effectiveness that should enter in the equation of whether to contract out or not? How extensively do government agencies rely on contractors?

GAO Summary: “The acquisition of products and services from contractors consumes about a quarter of the government’s discretionary spending. In fiscal year 2005, federal agencies spent over $388 billion on such contracts. The work of the government is increasingly being performed by contractors, including emergency and large-scale logistics operations such as hurricane response and recovery and the war in Iraq. Many agencies rely extensively on contractors to carry out their basic missions. At the same time, GAO’s list of government high-risk areas includes acquisition and contract management issues that collectively expose hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars to potential waste and misuse. The Congress should continue to monitor agencies’ efforts to address existing problems, while facilitating a re-examination of the rules and regulations that govern the government-contractor relationship in an increasingly blended workforce.”

3. Transform the Business Operations of the Department of Defense

Questions: How big is the Defense Department budget? Where do our defense dollars go and what do we get? Can the Defense Department account for the hundreds of billions dollars appropriated for it by Congress every year? Who is responsible for spending—and for what—inside the Defense Department? Why do almost all major weapons systems face double-digit price increases and significant schedule delays? How transparent are Defense business decisions?

GAO summary: “Of the 26 areas on GAO’s 2005 high-risk list of federal programs or activities that are at risk for waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement, 8 are Department of Defense (DOD) programs or operations and 6 are government high-risk areas for which DOD shares some responsibility. These high-risk areas relate to DOD’s major business operations intended to support the warfighter, including DOD’s overall management approach to business transformation, business systems modernization, financial management, the personnel security clearance process, supply chain management, support infrastructure management, weapon systems acquisition, and contract management. Billions of dollars have been wasted annually because of the lack of adequate transparency and appropriate accountability across DOD’s business areas. We have consistently reported and testified on the need for DOD to develop an integrated, enterprisewide business transformation plan and establish a chief management official position to lead the department’s overall business transformation efforts. To its credit, DOD has established management structures such as the Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC)—intended by DOD to be its primary transformation leadership and oversight mechanism—and the Business Transformation Agency to support the DBSMC. DOD has also established and updated its Business Enterprise Architecture and Enterprise Transition Plan, as well as a Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan. To date, however, DOD’s primary focus has been on business systems modernization.”

4. Integration and Transformation of the Department of Homeland Security

Questions: Has the creation of the Homeland Security Department improved operations inside and between the 22 agencies that were cobbled together under its umbrella? Has homeland security improved, and if so, in which areas? And how much improvement has there been? Have other activities—not directly connected to homeland security but still the responsibility of agencies inside DHS (e.g. FEMA’s disaster response function)—been given enough attention? Did the rush to create and get DHS started lead to bad decisions or a lack of them and have lessons been learned and acted upon? Are there clear lines of accountability inside DHS? How does DHS prioritize its spending and its attention? Is it spending its time and attention on the “right” things? Are DHS and its agencies coordinating with other federal, state, local, tribal, foreign and private entities?

GAO summary: “After its creation in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had to transform 22 agencies—several with major management challenges—into one department. This is a high-risk endeavor because failure to effectively address its management challenges and program risks could have serious consequences for our national security. The areas GAO identified as at risk include planning and priority setting; accountability and oversight; and a broad array of management, programmatic, and partnering challenges.”

5. Information Sharing, Transformation and Oversight of the Intelligence Community

Questions: Is more information shared within the intelligence community? Has the “need to know” culture given way to more of a “need to share” culture as recommended by the 9/11 Commission? Has increased classification and the proliferation of “sensitive but unclassified” information controls inhibited sharing? Is the Office of the Director of National Intelligence providing a marked improvement over the role of the now-defunct Director of Central Intelligence (who was the same person as CIA director) in coordinating the activities of the entire intelligence community? Are all covert actions—including possible ones by the Defense Department (traditionally the CIA has been the government agency to engage in covert actions, but the Defense Department has greatly increased its intelligence activities)—reported to Congress? Is the Executive branch properly disclosing its other intelligence programs to the full intelligence committees in accordance with National Security Act of 1947? Are the intelligence agencies equipped (e.g. enough foreign language speakers) to deal with the range of threats the United States faces and how well are they doing with what they have?

GAO summary: “Since September 11, 2001, the nation has made some progress in fixing a major vulnerability—intelligence and law enforcement agencies’ failure to “connect the dots” and share information on the terrorists. Key legislation, presidential directives, and several commissions have focused on enhancing the management of the intelligence community’s budgets and activities and information sharing within the community and beyond. But progress has been slow in some key areas, including implementing the policies needed to govern information sharing. The December 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and several presidential directives established the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), which absorbed the functions of the previous Director of Central Intelligence. Following the March 2005 report of the President’s Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction Intelligence Capabilities, the DNI further created numerous offices intended to enhance and transform the intelligence community’s functions and operations through a variety of initiatives throughout the intelligence community. These include improved central oversight of the National and Military Intelligence Program budgets, use of open sources, intelligence fusion centers, human capital policies and practices, and intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting. Moreover, the March 2005 report also recommended improvements in internal and external oversight to make sure reform occurs. Without continued congressional oversight of these issues, the progress and results of the many requirements and initiatives will remain unclear.”

To come in this series: Exploring other GAO near-term oversight suggestions; policies and programs in need of fundamental reform; long-term governance issues and the Project On Government Oversight’s baker’s dozen list of suggested oversight topics.

Public Interest Declassification Board: Who's the Boss?

Although POGO supported the funding of the Public Interest Declassification Board last year, we realize there are some important weaknesses in the legislation. 

Currently, the first real test is underway of the Board's power to review classified documents--and, if it thinks it is in the public interest, recommend declassification.  One weakness had to with confusion over whether or not Congressional committees with jurisdiction can have the Board review classified information without Presidential approval. 

At issue are two parts of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 as amended by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.  Section 703(b)(5)--an insertion from 2004--states that the Board will:

...review and make recommendations to the President in a timely manner with respect to any congressional request, made by the committee of jurisdiction, to declassify certain   records or to reconsider a declination to declassify specific records.

However, a Section 704(e)--also an insertion from the 2004 amendments--expounds upon this and states--note the bolded text:

If requested by the President, the Board shall review in a timely manner certain      records or declinations to declassify specific records, the declassification of which has been the subject of specific congressional request described in section 703(b)(5). (emphasis POGO's)

The Chairman of the Public