Livermore Lab Fails Recent Security Test

We hate to say, 'We told you so,' but when POGO released U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Livermore Homes and Plutonium Make Bad Neighbors just two months ago, we recommended that the one ton of weapons-grade and weapons-quantity of plutonium and highly enriched uranium be removed from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore Lab) within the next year because it cannot be adequately protected. Suicidal terrorists would not need to steal the material, DOE's most dangerous and expensive-to-guard special nuclear material (SNM); they simply could detonate it into an Improvised Nuclear Device on the spot. Roughly seven million people live within a 50 mile radius of Livermore Lab, a nuclear weapons facility located in the greater metropolis of San Francisco, CA, which poses the most significant security threat of any such facility in the U.S.

Now, TIME Magazine is reporting that in late April 2008, government mock terrorists tested Livermore Lab's security, and were able to defeat the protective force and gain access to their target-simulated SNM. After speaking with our sources on the ground at Livermore Lab, as well as at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), POGO has heard some of what happened. We are not that surprised by what we learned. 

One reason the Lab's protective guard force was not able to defend the bomb-making material is because the hydraulic lift on the vehicles used to deploy the Lab's Dillon Aero M134D guns, popularly known as the Gatling gun, did not work. Faced with pressure to demonstrate that the Lab could fend off a terrorist attack, in 2006 NNSA announced the deployment of this enormously lethal weapon capable of firing 4,000 rounds a minute with a military "kill-range" of one mile, but with an ability to kill up to two miles. Within the one-mile range of the Lab are two elementary schools, a pre-school, a middle school, a senior center, and athletic fields. This risk to the population, combined with analysis from Army Special Operations experts, underlies POGO's position that the Gatling is the wrong weapon for the site.

Another reason that the Lab's security was penetrated is that members of the Lab's SWAT team, known as a Special Response Team (SRT), have not trained together as a "team" for years. This goes against law enforcement best practices--guards need opportunities to see how their teammates actually communicate and respond during an emergency.   

POGO is pleased that NNSA Principal Deputy Bill Ostendorff seems to be taking this recent security lapse quite seriously, including raising "a number of areas that require immediate attention," with the Board of Governors of Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS),the private contractor who manages the Lab. However, additional training or gadgetry will not change the fact that the Lab is located in a growing residential community-there are now housing developments that sit only 300 yards from Building 332 (the Superblock), which houses the Lab's plutonium and highly enriched uranium.  Livermore Lab can never be a safe place to store SNM for the weapons complex.

We hope that this incident sounds a loud warning bell on Capitol Hill about the need to include language in upcoming appropriations bills that pressures NNSA to remove SNM from Livermore Lab by March 2009, a date that POGO determined after researching whether NNSA has adequate containers, transport, and space at other sites. After releasing our report in March, POGO has been disappointed to learn during meetings with congressional staffers that they are comfortable with NNSA's commitment to remove the material by the end of 2012.  Now is the time to secure this large homeland security vulnerability.

Be sure to check out our press alert and YouTube video (see below) on the security weaknesses at Livermore.

-- Ingrid Drake and Peter Stockton

Sensitive Military Equipment Available to the Highest Bidder

Many of us turn to eBay and Craigslist when we're in the mood for a spaceship or a grilled cheese sandwich that looks like the Virgin Mary.  But did you know that your favorite online classifieds and auction sites also offer sensitive military-grade equipment??

A hearing was held today before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee to discuss a recently released Government Accountability Office study that found numerous military items for sale on eBay and Craigslist.  From January 2007 through March 2008, undercover GAO investigators were able to successfully purchase around a dozen items, some of which were stolen, and some of which appear on the U.S. Munitions List, meaning there should be restrictions on their overseas sales.

As the study notes, "many of the sensitive items we purchased could have been used directly against our troops and allies, or reverse-engineered to develop countermeasures or equivalent technology."  The following table includes just a few examples:

Although the GAO acknowledges that the Department of Defense has taken measures to prevent the sale of sensitive military equipment on the Government Liquidation web site, this latest study confirms that sensitive items are still readily available to members of the public and potential adversaries.

-- Michael Smallberg

Props to Oberstar and the House Transportation Committee

House Transportation Committee Chairman Oberstar and his staff deserve to be commended for their tremendous FAA oversight work.  The ripples from their recent hearings are continuing to be seen.  Not only have they forced the FAA and the airlines to take maintenance and inspections more seriously, but they also highlighted the plight of FAA whistleblowers who suffered retaliation for just trying to do their jobs.  I heard some blowback on the radio today--industry representatives suggesting that Congress should rethink this oversight, given the inconvenience to air travelers while the airlines perform the checks they should have already conducted.  Instead of rethinking oversight, someone should publicly thank Chairman Oberstar and the Transportation Committee for their terrific work.  Remember, the critics would be the first to point fingers if there had been a crash.

As usual, Jon Stewart said it best on Tuesday's Daily Show: "It's all sort of ironic, when you think about it.  When you fly, you are inspected quite thoroughly, whereas the plane itself is, perhaps, occasionally vacuumed.  See, with this administration, if a passenger blows up a plane, it's a 'failure in the war on terror,' but if the plane just blows up on its own, it's 'the market self-regulating.'"

-- Danielle Brian

Coast Guard Blogger Fired

Our sympathies go out to Mike McGrath, a contributor to "An Unofficial Coast Guard Blog," who reports being fired from working for one of the Coast Guard's contractors in part for his blogging. McGrath comes from a Coast Guard family -- he has had a career working for the Coast Guard on and off since 1981 and a father with a 24-year career. On Coast Guard Report he describes what happened:

Was told that my position would have been downsized anyways within the next few months, my behavior on the blog sites just made it easier to make me the first to go.

I don't mind if someone wants to let me or any other contractor go because they have to reduce headcount, or some other "Business" reason - that makes perfect sense to me and I understand as a contractor that these contracts come and go with the wind - that's the risk we take as contractors and is the nature of our world.

What I take issue with is that CG leaders over-reacted to and I believe misinterpreted some of my blogs and comments - this drove them to handle my departure the way they did. While I won't go into the details, let me say that there are certainly more professional ways of handling a person's departure, rather than the explosive Friday afternoon yelling session with the contractor companies' senior folks via conference call, then having said contractor company send a letter in the mail to let said contractor know he is no longer employed, then firing off a late Friday afternoon email that in essence says go home and wait for said letter - which is exactly the way I interpreted the whole situation - and by the way all without letting said contractor know that any of this was going on.

Did I mention that I just had my performance evals completed within the last 2 weeks, scored perfect all across the board, got a raise (which I will never see) and that there was no indication from anybody that there was anything wrong occurring; no feedback, no counseling, no pointing out of where I might be violating any written policy, nothing - no indication whatsoever. Yeah, now you know why I have such heartburn with all this.

In January, McGrath described being told by his superiors to "back off" on his blogging:

I was sort of encouraged (with some very strong negative overtones) to be careful about posting my personal information and my opinions on these blogs....I just wanted to report that I now understand what it feels like to have that experience; and to state emphatically that I won't be backing down.

McGrath's last blog entry before being fired described his frustrations with an unfinished Coast Guard investigation into an incident in which his son died. Another blog entry was critical of efforts to reorganize the Coast Guard. Yet, in his blogging he frequently expressed his love of the Coast Guard and a sincere desire to make it better.

As the world wide web has grown, more and more employees at government agencies and contractors have taken the risk of expressing their opinions and exposing the inner workings of their institutions on blogs as well as on YouTube. Some of these individuals are also whistleblowers who expose corruption or possible harms to the public.

Government agencies and companies are all too happy to fire someone like McGrath in order to send a message to other employees to keep their mouths shut. Left unchallenged, these jack booted thug firings ultimately may help to keep the public in the dark about institutional corruption and risks to the public. Unfortunately, in an Orwellian turn of events, the Supreme Court ruled two years ago that government employees have no free speech rights to discuss their official work.

Other contributors to "An Unofficial Coast Guard Blog" aren't backing down. In fact, they believe that efforts to silence Coast Guard critics are backfiring. Mike McGrath says he's starting to write a book about his experiences with the Coast Guard.

-- Beth Daley

Correction: POGO corrected this entry from its original - "26-year career working for the Coast Guard" was changed to "career working for the Coast Guard on and off since 1981" and "permanently brain damaged" was changed to "died."

Troubled Waters

Yesterday, in the Washington Times, David Axe reported that deployment of the Coast Guard's National Security Cutters will be delayed by six months because the ship's radios are not waterproof. That article sent the Coast Guard into a frenzy yesterday to challenge what they said were inaccuracies, according to CGBlog.org. Navy Times reports that the Coast Guard has demanded a retraction of the front page article. We'll be watching do see how the details work themselves out.

The Cutters are part of the troubled $24 billion Deepwater program which has been plagued by delivery delays, failures and scandal. Former Lockheed Martin engineer Mike DeKort blew the whistle early on the fact that the Coast Guard failed to ensure weather durability of external equipment in the program such as the radios.

Last week, the Navy Times reported that an internal Coast Guard report recommended ditching production of two National Security Cutters in favor of other alternatives. The article noted "the risk of 'connectivity problems' among Coast Guard assets and between it and other agencies."

That news followed a statement from the Coast Guard that suggested problems were brewing with the Cutters' classified communications system which involved "some risk" to the delivery schedule. That statement reaffirmed concerns raised by the disclosures of a second whistleblower, Coast Guard engineer Anthony D'Armiento. The statement outlined what has been called by some an unknown process for testing and deployment (Interim Authority to Operate) of the Cutters. The statement raised the specter that the Coast Guard would prematurely accept the Cutters from contractors Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman before major problems were resolved with the ships' communications system. The Coast Guard made this same mistake when it accepted eight 123-foot Deepwater boats despite numerous flaws in those boats, which were later taken out of service with plans to be scrapped. According to some reports, the Coast Guard has denied that it will sign the contract Form DD 250s acceptance forms until the Cutters until the problems are resolved. The Coast Guard will lose important leverage to compel Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to fix serious communications problems if it accepts the National Security Cutters before they are ready.

D'Armiento has been on administrative leave for more than 5 months after he leaked pages from a document which exposed that the Cutters were at high risk for not meeting contract requirements for TEMPEST and Information Assurance. While the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General ostensibly investigates him for leaking this document, the Coast Guard released a full unredacted version of the document to POGO. In 2005, POGO criticized the Department of Homeland Security for issuing a management directive which prohibits the disclosure of information that may be obtainable under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), raising the specter that whistleblowers like D'Armiento would be retaliated against for releasing information which Congress intended to make available to the public.

-- Beth Daley

UPDATE: David Axe provides a point by point response to the Coast Guard's full out attack on his blog. He also helpfully wrote in to our blog to clarify some points regarding the Troubled Waters blog entry (see comments below).

Attorney Urges End to Investigation Into Coast Guard Whistleblower

In a series of letters issued this week, Attorney Debra Katz urged the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General to end a 5-month investigation into Coast Guard whistleblower Anthony D’Armiento. The basis for the investigation had been on whether D’Armiento improperly disclosed information to the public. However, the information Mr. D’Armiento disclosed was provided by the Coast Guard to the Project On Government Oversight in response to a Freedom of Information Act request.

To read the letters, click here.

To learn more, see "POGO Criticizes Lack of Accountability in Coast Guard Program and Scurrilous Investigation of Whistleblower" or "Coast Guard Deepwater Program Whistleblower Suffers Retaliation."

-- Beth Daley

Good Government from an Unlikely Source

At first glance, it looked like that classic quadrennial, a story about political appointees "burrowing in" to career government positions in anticipation of a change in administrations.

But wait a minute, upon more careful perusal, we realized the Wall Street Journal piece was actually about the opposite of burrowing in: the Department of Homeland Security has begun to move career officials into the top slots at its component agencies, actually planning ahead for a smooth transition to a new administration next January.  Ten days later a follow-up appeared in the Washington Post.  It was starting to look like this could be true: the department everybody loves to diss as the most incompetent, disorganized mess since--oh, say, the Pentagon--was actually engaging in thoughtful, premeditated, good government.

This clearly called for an investigation.

Well, we've only just started poking around, and it could be we'll end up once more cruelly disappointed.  But so far, we like what we see…although we urge any readers with different information to let us know!

The planning began in spring of 2007, according to DHS spokeswoman Amy Kudwa, who herself is a career employee brought into the Department last October and designated a deputy press secretary; as she says, a "small piece of the larger plan."  The thinking was that with DHS's important mission to protect the nation from and respond to all forms of disasters, from terrorist strikes to hurricanes to chemical spills, it's crucial that a smooth and orderly transition occur.  Kudwa noted that recent bombings in Spain, the UK and Pakistan were deliberately timed for election periods or when newly-elected governments were just getting organized.  She said that terrorists likely saw those as periods of vulnerability for those nations, and the leadership of DHS was determined that the US would not present such an opportunity.

The planning began with a delegation of the order of succession at all DHS's components, and then the identification of critical positions.  Acting Deputy Secretary Paul Schneider maintains a color-coded chart of some 50 positions regarded as key, representing the number one or two position at each agency, plus a few number three's.  The idea was to move experienced, knowledgeable career officials into at least one of those top slots at each component agency.  There are a few exceptions; for example, at the US Secret Service, the top people are already career, and at the US Coast Guard, the commandant and his senior staff are military officers and will stay in place.

Already 25 of the 50+ positions are filled with career people. Twenty-three are political officials and there are three vacancies that will be filled with career employees.  Thus, at the change of administrations, an experienced cadre of at least 28 career employees will be there to step into their roles as acting chiefs, and to explain to the newbies why certain decisions were made in the past, or why it was determined that a course of action wouldn't work.

Of course, Kudwa pointed out, whether to leave those people in place will be up to the new administration.  But at least when they come in they won't find just a bunch of empty desks with briefing books on top.

Examples of career people already in leadership positions at their DHS agencies are:

• Gail Rossides, recently installed as Deputy Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, the number two slot at TSA. Rossides is a thirty-year federal employee who has been at TSA since it began six years ago.  Kudwa pointed out that Rossides replaced political official Robert Jamison, when he was moved over to be Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate.

• Jay Ahern, number two at Customs and Border Protection, has spent his 30-year career with the Border Patrol and will be ready to step up as Acting Commissioner during the transition.  Ahern told the Post that his goal for his employees is "to not have them distracted at all by the transition," and "to ensure that people maintain their focus on the mission."

• Theresa Bertucci, number two at Immigration and Customs Enforcement, spent most of her 26 years in the federal government at the Justice Department.  Kudwa says that Bertucci remembers the "empty hallways" during administration transitions at DOJ.

Kudwa said that Congress had appropriated $900,000 for a study of transition planning by the National Association of Public Administrators; their preliminary findings are expected mid-March.  But because there were funds left over from the appropriation, DHS also asked permission to spend $300,000 for the Council on Excellence in Government to study cross-government coordination in the planning process.  She said at a meeting last December, officials at OMB suggested to OPM that the DHS plan should be sent out to other agencies as a potential "best practices" example.  And the department's Homeland Security Advisory Council has been tasked with talking to officials from the state and local governments and the private sector on how best to manage transitions.

With the order of succession and key positions identified, once the three career vacancies are filled, the next steps will be the preparation of those briefing books--or "guidance documents"--and then there will be a series of leadership summits.  Finally, the current DHS leaders hope to have plans in place for training exercises, to invite the new guys to see how it's done.

As Kudwa said, it's better to make sure they're not exchanging business cards in the middle of an exercise--or worse, during an actual emergency.

-- Beverley Lumpkin

The Sun Sets on the Sunshine Project

The Sunshine Project, one of the nation's most outspoken watchdog organizations on biodefense research, has announced that, as of February 1, it will suspend its operations.  According to an article in the Chronicle of Higher Education, the decision was largely based on a lack of funding.  The article continues:

"One would have expected that with the billions of dollars being poured into biodefense research, there would be something of a better operating environment for NGO's like this," said Mr. Hammond.

The Sunshine Project was thought to be the only nongovernmental organization solely dedicated to monitoring biological-weapon research at a national and international level.

Richard H. Ebright, a professor of microbiology at Rutgers University at New Brunswick, said that the Sunshine Project has in some cases been reviewing biological-weapons research more aggressively than the federal government, and has accomplished much on a shoestring budget.

The biodefense industry has grown tremendously over the past few years in response to the anthrax attacks in 2001 and increased concerns about global epidemics and terrorism.  This has resulted in a boom for government research labs, university research projects, and government partnerships with pharmaceutical companies.

Yet few have questioned the professed benefits or raised concerns about the potential dangers of this increased interest in biodefense.  The Sunshine Project has played a critical role in this regard--providing information to the public on government biodefense projects and policies, on the resulting dangers of biological weapons proliferation, and on the implications for federal law and international treaties.

POGO would like to thank the Sunshine Project's Ed Hammond, Jan van Aken, and Susana Pimiento for all of their hard work to ensure government transparency and accountability.  Their efforts will be sorely missed.

-- John Pruett

Weapons Cache Reminds POGO of Weak Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Security Requirements

Hundreds of hand grenades, grenade launchers, .50 caliber sniper and assault rifles, and body armor were discovered in two Mexico City mansions during a bust on drug cartels last month, as reported in the Washington Post.  What is particularly relevant in this story for the U.S. is that federal nuclear regulators believe these items are too difficult for terrorists to access and use for attacking U.S. nuclear sites.

The NRC's Design Basis Threat (DBT) establishes the number of adversaries, the weapons they are likely to use, and the size of the truck bomb against which a nuclear power plant must defend.  The DBT is alleged not to include many of the weapons in the above picture, even though many security experts believe they would be used by adversaries in the event of an attack on a nuclear facility.  For example, insiders tell POGO that the NRC's security staff themselves recommended to the Commissioners that nuclear power plants be prepared to protect against Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) attacks and a series of other lethal weapons--but the Commission voted against this sensible security requirement in a 3-1 vote.  Their reasoning?  Terrorists would have a hard time purchasing or stealing these lethal weapons.  However, one of the deadliest of these weapons is the .50 caliber sniper rifle with armor-piercing incendiary ammunition, and it can be purchased at local gun stores around the country.

If nuclear power plants are not already required to defend against these weapons, they should be.  DOE nuclear weapons facilities are already expected to protect against these lethal weapons.  POGO and the GAO have repeatedly stated that NRC should get its DBT in-line with that of the weapons facilities.  We hope NRC regulators read this blog and do something about it.

-- Ingrid Drake

Congress on REAL ID: Stop us Before we Legislate Again!

Members of Congress are piling on the Homeland Security Department again, railing against its final rule, released on Friday, for implementing the REAL ID Act of 2005. House Homeland Security Chairman Bennie Thompson is peeved that details were leaked before he could peruse it, he complained in a letter to Chertoff. Governors, state legislatures, state DMVs, have all weighed in and pronounce themselves cautiously satisfied that many of their objections to earlier proposed rules have now been met.  Privacy and civil liberties groups are still vehemently opposed. Senators Leahy, Akaka, Sununu and others are still worried about privacy and concerned about unfunded mandates.

But let’s get real here.  All but one of the 9/11 hijackers used some form of government-issued ID, mostly driver’s licenses, to board aircraft or stay in this country.  One of the major recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in 2004 was to increase the security of driver’s licenses.  In response, Congress passed the Real ID Act in 2005 – yes, folks, we’re going on three years ago – but every time the Homeland Security Department has attempted to issue the rules that would carry out the law, it has been met with furious outcries from not only the states and privacy and civil liberties people, but also from the very Members of Congress who mandated those very rules. About 20 states have passed legislation opposing REAL ID, and six states have passed laws expressly prohibiting compliance.  As the department moves to implement the law, some in Congress are talking repeal.

As Chertoff explained on Friday, in an at-times contentious press conference, in order to reach the goal of uniform security standards for all states’ driver’s licenses, all persons seeking a driver’s license must provide their DMV office with documents that prove who they are and that they are in this country legally – generally a passport or birth certificate, or a Social Security card plus a utility bill should suffice.  The next step is that the state must verify that the documents presented are legitimate, and must take active steps to secure its own records and databases.  Third, the states must issue licenses that meet new tougher standards for being tamper-proof; and finally, the states must work together to ensure that individuals don’t try to obtain licenses from multiple states.  Chertoff also said that foreign nationals entering the country on legal visas will be able to obtain driver’s licenses that expire when their visas expire.

Since DHS first began issuing proposed rules for REAL ID, it has received about 21,000 comments and, according to Chertoff, has made major changes, allowing the states more flexibility in implementing the law that he said has reduced the costs to states by about three-quarters (down from earlier estimates of $11 billion to about $3.9 billion now).  He estimated the final cost to the states at about $8 per license on average.

Chertoff warned that if states refuse to begin complying by this May, their citizens will not be able to use their states’ IDs to board aircraft or enter federal buildings.  He raised the specter that “if you have states that decline to participate in REAL ID, they may well find that they become a magnet for illegal immigrants.”  And Chertoff betrayed his impatience with the lengthy process:  “I think the time for smothering this important 9/11 Commission recommendation with endless process and discussion is over.”

Pointing out that the date for final implementation is December 1, 2017, more than 16 years after the 9/11 attacks, Chertoff said, “I feel as keenly as anybody else the urgency about getting all these things done as quickly as possible.  On the other hand, whenever we try to do something, everybody who finds it inconvenient or expensive starts to complain about it.”

As indicated above, he’s absolutely right that people are complaining and some of them are powerful people in the US Congress. That would be the same Congress that has completely ignored another major recommendation of the 9/11 Commission:  “Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security … Congress does have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent standing committee with a nonpartisan staff.”

In a letter last September (pdf) to Rep. Peter King, Chertoff wrote that oversight of the department by a myriad of committees and subcommittees “creates a uniquely difficult and unnecessary burden for DHS.”  At that point, there were EIGHTY-SIX different committees and subcommittees to which the Department had to respond. And here are some more amazing stats, all for the year 2006, the most recent available at that point:

Number of DHS hearings                             206

Number of DHS briefings                          2,242 (approx.)

Number of DHS witnesses                           268

Number of required reports                          373

Number of questions for the record            3,745

Most ominously, Chertoff told Rep. King:  “In my view, the problem is getting worse rather than better.  Recent proposals by several committees to remove elements of DHS to other departments or force co-sharing of DHS authorities with other departments seems [sic] mainly designed to accommodate competing jurisdictional claims among Congressional committees.”

We at POGO believe strongly in government oversight and accountability, but we also believe executive departments should be encouraged to work effectively and efficiently.  Particularly in the case of this new, vast and sprawling leviathan of a department, it’s impossible to see how it can accomplish its mission when its leaders must spend untold hours briefing and testifying and responding to 86 different Congressional entities.  Congress really needs to streamline this process.

-- Beverley Lumpkin

Wackenhut CEO Resigns Amid Security Problems

As reported today in the Washington Post, the CEO of Wackenhut, Gary Sanders, has resigned amidst serious allegations of security lapses at nuclear plants around the country.  Until recently, the company held a virtual monopoly on security contracts.  Exelon, the largest U.S. private nuclear power generator, terminated Wackenhut’s contract last month at its ten nuclear plants.

Sanders’ resignation is directly related to an incident last year in which a security guard, Kerry Beal, videotaped fellow guards sleeping on the job at Peachbottom power plant in Pennsylvania. After his attempts to alert supervisors resulted in inaction, he shared the tapes with CBS News as a last resort. Unfortunately, when the plant managers finally took action it was only Mr. Beal who found himself out of a job. The House Energy and Commerce Committee plans to conduct a hearing on the security lapses at Peachbottom.

Despite Sanders departure and Exelon's termination of the Wackenhut contract, the underlying issue has yet to be corrected. POGO noted in a letter sent last October to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Chairman Dale Klein that the NRC has the ultimate authority to determine Exelon's security requirements:

It is time for the NRC to take responsibility for the excessive hours and fatigue of the security forces. The utilities are cutting costs by hiring as few security officers as possible, and working those officers 60 to 72 hours a week—that’s 12-hour shifts every day for five or six days every week.

The long history of this problem clearly shows that the NRC will get only what it demands, and that nuclear utilities will spend as little as possible to meet the NRC's requirements. Security expenditures come directly out of the utility’s profit margin, so the utility has every incentive to reduce those expenses as much as possible. It is bad enough that the utilities and their security contractors are overworking their security officers, but it is an outrage that the NRC continues to allow them to do so.

POGO's letter presented two options for the NRC to prevent overworked security guards  in the future. The first would require nuclear plants to implement a 48 hours-a-week limit within six months instead of the current 2-year timeline. The second would amend the 2003 Security Work Hour Order to include a "Fatigue Management" provision.

We hope that Mr. Sanders’ resignation will be a wake-up call for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well as all the nuclear plant managers around the country.  The men and women who guard our country’s nuclear plants deserve better working conditions and training. The rest of us would like to believe that the highest standards are being used to safe-guard our nation.

-- Marthena Cowart & Peter Stockton

So What's New?

Via former Federal Aviation Administration Special Agent Brian Sullivan:

Oct '05 - Jan '06: GAO investigators get bomb components through 21 of 21 airports tested.

March to June '07:  Same results at 19 airports.

-- Nick Schwellenbach

David Copperfield at the NRC

In a letter sent today to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regional administrator overseeing Peach Bottom power plant, David Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety Project Director at the Union of Concerned Scientists, derides what the administrator had referred to as "prompt compensatory measures and immediate actions" on the part of Peach Bottom operator Exelon to address the sleeping security guards controversy. Lochbaum then details a timeline of Exelon's consistent refusal to even acknowledge that a problem exists.

POGO has been actively involved with highlighting security concerns at the Peach Bottom facility and has pointed to a plant culture that overworks security employees and punishes anyone that attempts to correct security problems. This culture is evidenced by the recent Exelon firing of employee Kerry Beal, who had videotaped sleeping guards and brought the issue to management's attention. As for the NRC, the agency has reacted by investigating Beal and seizing his computer.

As Lochbaum stresses, the actions we've seen so far have been anything but "immediate" and have failed to correct Peach Bottom's underlying security and management problems.

-- John Pruett

NRC Commissioner Addresses Nuclear Plant Security

Commissioner Greg Jaczko, a top official at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), recently gave an important speech to the government employees charged with enforcing NRC regulations at our nation's nuclear power plants. Unfortunately, the speech took place in the remote Eastern Shores of Maryland on October 30th, so it likely got lost in the media’s Halloween coverage.

I’ll be honest. I especially enjoyed his speech because he echoed points that POGO has been making all along (most recently in a letter sent to NRC Chairman Dale Klein last week).  Nonetheless, Jaczko’s speech needs to be shouted from the mountain tops. First, Jaczko pointed out that the recent instances of sleeping security officers across the country "demonstrate the importance of broadening [the] safety culture to include security issues."

He also announced his intention to change the handling of safety and security allegations in three ways:

1.  Do not refer allegations of weakened security to the utility company which runs the plants over the objection of the whistleblower. It is pathetic that Jaczko even has to say this, but the recent Peach Bottom incident proves that he does.

2.  Refer fewer allegations to the utility companies for investigation in the first place. Currently, forty percent of whistleblower allegations sent to the NRC are turned over to the utilities, which means the industry is investigating itself. From POGO's experience, self-policing is a fine way to make sure the problem is at best minimized, yet it more likely ensures that problems are completely ignored, so any effort to reverse this pattern is a good thing.

3.  Even if the NRC, the utility company, and the whistleblower all agree that the utility should investigate, the NRC should remain actively involved in the investigation.

These recommendations all sound so common sense that those not familiar with nuclear regulatory policy might yawn and ask, "What's the big deal?" However, nuclear power plant security has been so controlled by industry that even these small steps in the right direction, if implemented, will make a big difference.

- Danielle Brian

Contagious Crossings

The multiple crossings into this country by a Mexican citizen with a highly-contagious form of tuberculosis continue to raise concerns.  Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Chairman Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) and Ranking Member Susan Collins (R-Maine) are not about to let up on the Homeland Security Department.  Last week during a hearing on terrorist watch lists Collins in particular made clear she was not satisfied with the responses to her questions about the case from department official Paul Rosenzweig.  Now they have fired off a letter to Secretary Michael Chertoff demanding he respond by November 6th to a rather daunting list of 31 questions surrounding the case of Amado Isidro Armendariz Amaya, who has been diagnosed with multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB). 

In their cover letter they point out that Amaya “was allowed to repeatedly enter the U.S. between April 16 and May 31, 2007, despite a lookout being placed in the CBP computer-based screening system for him."  Furthermore they write that: 

We are troubled by the slow release of information to our Committee from the Department about the Amaya case, some of which has proven to be contradicted by other government sources.  In particular, we are concerned that the Department claimed to have originally received only an alias for Mr. Amaya, but later reported that it received a complete last name and middle name for him.  Furthermore, DHS officials reported that they could not provide the Committee with information about the flights that Mr. Amaya took within the U.S. after DHS was alerted to his health status.  The CDC, however, stated that it had received Mr. Amaya’s flight information from the Office of Health Affairs at DHS.   We expect to receive complete and accurate information on this case in a timely manner.

The letter also points out that during the same time period, Department officials were:

...briefing Congress on the case of Andrew Speaker, an American who was also infected with MDR-TB and who was also admitted to the U.S. despite CBP having placed a lookout for him in their computer-based screening system.  During the week of June 4, 2007, personnel from the Department, including the Chief Medical Officer and CBP who were involved in both the Amaya and Speaker cases, briefed the Committee on the vulnerabilities in our border systems that allowed Andrew Speaker to re-enter the U.S undetected.  However, no one from DHS alerted the Committee of the Mexican national who had entered the U.S. undetected 21 times in the seven prior weeks.   We find it troubling that no one from your Department thought it prudent to advise the Senate of the Amaya case at the time that the Committee was investigating the vulnerabilities that allowed another person with MDR-TB and on a watch list to enter the U.S. undetected.

“Troubling” …. is that a polite way of saying “we’re mad as hell”?

-- Beverley Lumpkin

Chertoff Explains His Framework

Last week we noted that three key Senators had expressed disappointment with the Homeland Security Department’s draft National Response Framework.  In particular, Homeland Security and Government Affairs Chairman Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), Ranking Member Susan Collins (R-Maine), and Subcommittee Chair Mary Landrieu (D-La.), expressed unhappiness that changes they thought they had wrought in the structure and duties of FEMA following its Katrina debacle had been ignored by DHS in the “Framework.”

In a speech on Friday to California firefighters the International Association of Fire Chiefs, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff tried to explain what the Framework is and is not.  Here are excerpts:

Some people have been critical about this framework. And let me explain as clearly as I can what it is and what it’s designed to do. First of all, the framework is a framework. It is not a detailed set of plans. It is supported by more detailed sets of plans that look at 15 different kinds of emergencies and 15 different kinds of incidents, which are very different from one another. Some of them are natural disasters with which you are familiar, hurricanes and earthquakes. Others may involve terrorist types of things, multiple improvised explosive devices across the country, maybe devices that don’t cause a lot of damage, but that create a ripple psychological effect.

Another element of the plans that we have deals with the pandemic flu, not a fire incident, not an explosion, but a huge, very challenging public health emergency. Cyber attacks, again, would have no real necessarily explosive effect, although there could be some collateral explosions, but would be a huge impact on our infrastructure and our way of life.

So we have to develop a framework that embraces all of these, gives us the flexibility to adapt, depending on what the particular incident is, and then builds a set a specific plans down to the local and community level where the really specific process of identifying steps to be taken has to be put together. …… ***

As described in the National Response Framework, FEMA will continue to lead the federal response efforts for emergency management and for Stafford Act disasters. We are committed to supporting FEMA as it’s significantly increased in size and capabilities over the last two years, and that will continue. I think we all agree that’s appropriate.

Other incidents, of course, may not be FEMA incidents. A cyber attack will probably have a response led by other elements of DHS and other agencies. A public health emergency is likely to be led with HHS as the lead agency with the incident being coordinated by our department so as to make sure collateral consequences are being addressed.

What we are doing in the National Response Framework, and I encourage you to read it, is to give public leaders across the country in plain English the broadest concept of what incident management is, to allow them to understand that there are times they need to be dealing with emergency management, there are times they need to be dealing with computer issues, times they need to be able to deal with law enforcement issues. But whatever the challenge, they need to deal with them using a unified command system and an incident management system, which I might say, was pioneered by the Fire Service, particularly the Fire Service in California……

-- Beverley Lumpkin

Post-Katrina … but Still No Plan

More than two years after the federal government’s failed response to Hurricane Katrina, three Senators say the Homeland Security Department still does not have a satisfactory emergency response plan in place.

In a six-page letter sent late Monday to Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, Senators Joe Lieberman, (I-Conn.), chairman of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee; Susan Collins (R-Maine), ranking member of that committee; and Mary Landrieu (D-La.), chair of a disaster recovery subcommittee, expressed disappointment in the department’s draft “National Response Framework (NRF).”

Although the letter praises the department for the improvement in the NRF for using less jargon and fewer acronyms and being more user-friendly than an earlier version, they assert:  “…we still do not have sufficient operational plans for governing the response to disasters. … The continuing lack of such plans is a serious gap in our homeland security.  The draft NRF emphasizes how far away we are from accomplishing this admittedly complex and ongoing, but critically important, task.”

The senators are particularly disturbed at the somewhat cavalier way in which the department apparently dismisses the new role their committee created for the Federal Emergency Management Agency after its Katrina debacle.  Lieberman and Collins take particular pride of authorship in the restructuring of FEMA which they thought they’d accomplished in last year’s Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.  Their letter points out with dismay that their changes are being ignored:

The draft NRF, however, fails to recognize this expanded and elevated role of FEMA and its Administrator.  In the Roles and Responsibilities chapter, the draft Framework fails to even refer to either FEMA or its Administrator.  Rather, as drafted, the NRF suggests that the Department has delegated key leadership and coordination responsibilities to individuals or entities other than FEMA or its Administrator.  [emphasis in original]

Translation:  what part of CHANGE do you people not understand?

-- Beverley Lumpkin

Laissez-Faire back at ya – contractors shouldn’t control the government

Outsourcing, competitive sourcing, or A-76 … call it by any name, but the federal government continues to allow contractors to play a major role in how the government serves the public. Yesterday’s hearing by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee entitled “Is DHS Too Dependent on Contractors to Do the Government’s Work?,” tackled the very important issue of whether the government has lost control of itself.

The fear is that contractors are performing inherently governmental functions that must be performed by government employees. Federal regulations list some government activities that must be performed by civil servants and other activities that can be performed by contractor employees. A problem arises when contractor employees cross the faint line between those activities.

The Government Accountability Office report (pdf) that was the subject of yesterday’s hearing found that in fiscal year 2005, the DHS spent $1.2 billion contracting for professional and management support services that closely support the performance of inherently governmental functions. The report listed the following activities as “high risk” of approaching the line of work that must be performed by government employees:

• Acquisition support             
• Budget preparation
• Developing or interpreting regulations
• Engineering and technical services
• Intelligence services
• Policy development
• Reorganization and planning

How many people know that contractor employees are writing agency budgets and creating policy?

While contracting for such services has helped a brand-new agency like the DHS fulfill its needs for staff and expertise, the GAO found the DHS comes up short in making sure that vital agency decisions are not being influenced by contractor judgments and that contractors are performing as required. The report highlighted the disturbing example of the Coast Guard hiring a contractor to help determine whether DHS jobs should be contracted out. A conflict of interest? We think so!

By relying too heavily on contractors, agencies like the DHS run the risk of eroding institutional knowledge. The government also risks paying too much for services or not receiving the best possible services for the money. More importantly, the government loses control over its own decision making. Service to the public and not to private interests should always be the goal. We are unsure that companies like Enron, Worldcom, and many large federal contractors think the same way.

-- Neil Gordon and Scott Amey

9/11: Principle versus Compensation

To some close observers of the September 11th civil litigation that is still underway nearly six years after the horrible terrorists attacks in 2001, comments in late June of this year by Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein were not just shocking and disrespectful, but reflected the lack of accountability that September 11th families have long battled. 

More specifically, some 9/11 victim families are seeking to learn through the discovery process what, if any, role the airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) played in weakening security to make air travel faster and more convienent.  These particular families decided to pursue litigation for accountability reasons, rather than simply be content with the payout from the 9/11 Victims' Compensation Fund. However, Judge Hellerstein continues to press for resolution through settlements without discovery. 

While explaining his thoughts on principles versus compensation in support of his push for settlements, Judge Hellerstein said on June 25 this year, "It is very crass and it probably will come back to be critical of me, but there is an expression that is sometimes very useful, 'Money is the universal lubricant.'  It makes it easier to go on with one's life."

Judge Hellerstein further explained his view, "Somehow we need to get past September 11, 2001 as a country and individually for all clients, and I would like to bring about that possibility as best I can, as efficiently as I can in a short a period of time as I can." (a snippet of the transcript can be found here)

Former Boston Logan airport FAA security official Brian Sullivan, who is a close observer of the 9/11 families; cases, said in response, "We are a country founded on principles.  The remaining 9/11 plaintiffs seek justice through discovery and a trial.  To assume that compensation can dissipate their principles, and ease their pain, is an assumption the judge shouldn't make.

"Al Qaeda and their Islamic Fundamentalist Extremist brethren are fanatically dedicated to their cause.  If money can compromise our principles, they have us defeated before we've even begun to fight," he added.

Also at issue, complicating discovery in court are information security barriers--notably use of the Sensitive Security Information (SSI) label--that the FAA and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA; an inheritor of many of the FAA's records) have thrown up, frustrating access to information.

Sullivan also said, "The Sensitive Security Information designator is supposed to be used to protect information in the interests of national security, not as a shield to cloud government and/or airline negligence and incompetence....This has complicated and obfuscated the process, as the plaintiffs continue to battle for information in disovery and has been the main reason liability trials have been delayed for going on six years."

-- Nick Schwellenbach

THE COURT:  I learned long ago as a lawyer that many

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        1    cases of principle stop being cases of principle when there are

        2    elements of expense or recovery that are presented.  I have had

        3    clients come to me and say look, I want you to defend me, it is

        4    a case of principle.  Then when I presented my first bill, it

        5    stopped being a case of principle.  I think it is common

        6    experience.

        7             Similarly on the other side, people say I don't care

        8    what the recovery is, I want my day in court until someone

        9    gives them a check.  It is very crass and it probably will come

       10    back to be critical of me, but there is an expression that is

       11    sometimes very useful, "Money is the universal lubricant."  It

       12    makes it easier to go on with one's life.

       13             Out of the mundane, you can fashion something that

       14    makes a great deal of sense.  We are coming on six years from

       15    the terrible event of September 11th, 2001.  The public life is

       16    4 score and 10 if it is correct.  There is a great value in

       17    living out those years that God has allotted to each of us in a

       18    way that is most productive for the individual and for society.

       19    What happened on September 11th, 2001 is now a memory with

       20    different degrees of pain for different people, for some degree

       21    of pain for each and every American and perhaps beyond the

       22    United States of America.

       23             Each of us has a choice either to never forget that

       24    pain and have it ever present in our lives or to fashion a life

       25    beyond the pain.  If one looks at the issue in that way -- and

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        1    I suggest that it is the only way to look at it -- the question

        2    then becomes what's the fairest, the most efficient, what is

        3    the best way to get on with the rest of our lives.  It seems to

        4    me that if I were your client, Ms. Schiavo, and one day perhaps

        5    I'll be lucky enough to perhaps be your client or a client of

        6    someone else or perhaps maybe I'll be lucky, lucky to have

        7    avoided some of the terrible problems in life that brings us --

        8    in any event, if I were your client and I were presented with

        9    an opportunity to get a fair and proper disposition, I think I

       10    would jump at the chance.

       11             Perhaps if the opportunity came to Mr. and Mrs.

       12    Carstanjen with regard to the memory they have of their son,

       13    they would find the benefits of a fair and proper disposition

       14    so important and so appropriate as to go past their suffering.

       15    They have others.  They can do good for themselves and for

       16    others.  There is a value in this.

       17             In a way that I was called upon to express here, this

       18    is really what I am trying to achieve with all the settlements.

       19    I am not trying to cut values here, I am not trying to cut

       20    short any justice or compromise in any way.  I am trying to

       21    deal as best I can with a problem that is searing.

       22             Somehow we need to get past September 11, 2001 as a

       23    country and individually for all clients, and I would like to

       24    bring about that possibility as best I can, as efficiently as I

       25    can in a short a period of time as I can.

Contract Employee Arrested in Security Breach at Nuke Site

Agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested an employee at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (see update below) earlier today for trying to sell classified uranium enrichment materials to what he thought was a “foreign country.” The employee has been identified as Roy Lynn Oakley of Roane County, a former contract worker with Bechtel Jacobs at the East Tennessee Technology Park.

Today’s arrest was part of an FBI sting operation that began after agents raided a house in January searching for stolen materials from the lab. ABC News reports that another arrest was supposedly made several months ago. An AP source has stated that Oakley does not appear to be connected to any terrorist organizations and, according to NBC sources, he was primarily motivated by money.

POGO released a report last year which determined that Oak Ridge National Laboratory [update: again the arrest actually occurred at the nearby East Tennessee Technology Park] lacked some of the most basic security measures and also lacked a clear plan for strengthening security. In 2005, as part of a broader nuclear reorganization proposal, POGO recommended that Oak Ridge should be “de-inventoried of all Special Nuclear Materials.

Oakley’s breach of security is only the latest in a long series of lapses at the nation’s nuclear laboratories. You can read a list of past security issues since the Wen Ho Lee incident below the fold.

-- John Pruett

Update: Roy Lynn Oakley was an employee with Bechtel Jacobs and had worked at the East Tennessee Technology Park until earlier this year. The Park is located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee but is not a part of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. It was formerly named the K-25 site and was used during the Manhattan Project to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Since then, it served as a nuclear power center and was shut down in 1987. A process of "reindustrialization" began in 1996 to clean up the site and transform it into a new uranium enrichment facility and business park for private industry.

Update 2: Frank Munger with the Knoxville News Sentinel has reported new information on the case. A US District Court document obtained by the Sentinel reveals that Roy Oakley had been a maintenance worker for Bechtel Jacobs until caught in the FBI sting operation on January 26. According to the article:

“Mr. Oakley was assigned to break up rods with his hands into small sections to be thrown away,” the document filed in U.S. District Court said. “The rods were not radioactive and, broken into pieces, had no apparent use except to be disposed.”

The rods were associated with the former uranium-enrichment operations at the plant, and Oakley took three to five of the broken rods to his home and later decided they might be of interest to another country.

The French Embassy in Washington, D.C., reportedly turned down Oakley’s offer, but at some point later Oakley got a call from someone purported to be an official at the embassy. It turned out to be an FBI agent, the document said.

Negotiations over a plea agreement subsequently failed and the US attorney's office secured an indictment. When Oakley arrived at the US Probation Office in Knoxville today, the news media was already waiting for him, which led Oakley's attorney, Herbert Moncier, to accuse the Justice Department of leaking the story.

Update 3: The Justice Department has issued a press release (pdf) announcing that, following Oakley's arrest today, he  has been formally charged by a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Tennessee with two counts of violating federal law. Oakley is scheduled to appear before a US Magistrate Judge in Knoxville on July 19.

Nuclear Weapons Follies:

Major Security and Safety Failures of the Nuclear Weapons Complex since Wen Ho Lee

July, 2007 - Los Alamos lab worker with “highest possible security clearance” arrested in cocaine drug bust. July 6, 2007. SOURCE: AP

June, 2007 - Los Alamos board member sends highly classified email message unsecured, compromising “the most serious breach of U.S. national security. SOURCE: Time Magazine

May, 2007 – POGO notifies DOE Secretary Bodman that Pantex nuclear weapons plant has roughly 200 security officers protecting its facility during a union strike even though it normally has 537. SOURCE: POGO

October 20, 2006 - Los Alamos National Laboratory classified information found in a meth lab drug bust in a trailer park. The incident, in part, causes the resignation of National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Linton Brooks in January, 2007.  The DOE IG finds that the Lab still lacks adequate safeguards for approving clearances and handling classified information, despite years of foibles. SOURCES: POGO, the House Energy Commerce Committee, and Time Magazine

June, 2006 - NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks informs Congress that computer hackers got access to detailed personal information, including Social Security numbers for about 1,500 DOE contract workers in September, 2005. Yet neither the workers whose personal information was compromised, nor the DOE's cyber-security head were notified about the incident.  SOURCE: AP

May, 2006 -- A former Los Alamos employee files suit, saying "she was forced to resign from the lab in January because she refused to keep quiet about a work accident that damaged her lungs." SOURCE: Albuquerque Journal

August, 2005 - Two employees are exposed to hazardous chemical fumes at Los Alamos. One employee who was contaminated was told to keep working even though she complained of feeling dizzy. She then went on vacation and experienced severe respiratory problems. As a result, she had to be hospitalized for six days. SOURCES: POGO and DOE Occurrence report

July, 2005 - According to a search warrant issued by the U.S. District Court of New Mexico, a Sandia employee has stolen iPods, computers and a robotic dog and sold them on Ebay. SOURCE: POGO

July 14, 2005 - A worker contaminated with deadly Americium-241 at Los Alamos goes undetected for 11 days. As a result, contamination is spread from New Mexico to Kansas and Colorado, and later to Pennsylvania when contamination was then shipped through Federal Express. DOE subsequently notes that the University of California which managed Los Alamos would have been fined $1.1 million for the incident (LANL as a nonprofit was exempted from paying), the highest civil penalty ever under its nuclear enforcement program. SOURCES: POGO and DOE Occurrence reports

February, 2005 - A December, 2004 report finds serious deficiencies in protecting workers and the community from a nuclear release or accident by the Sandia National Laboratory. SOURCES: POGO and DOE report

September 2004 -- Wackenhut guard fired a weapon accidentally loaded with live ammunition (instead of the dummy rounds that were supposed to be used) during a training exercise in Y-12's cafeteria. The bullet went through a refrigerator and a wall, and ended up hitting a filing cabinet in the next room. SOURCE: POGO

 September 2, 2004 - Y-12 security guards almost shoot each other in a force-on-force exercise after managers fail to follow proper security protocols. SOURCE: New York Times

July 18, 2004 - POGO release exposes there were 17 incidents involving classified information sent over an unclassified email system at Los Alamos. SOURCE: POGO

May 20, 2004 - Los Alamos confirms that classified computer media can not be accounted for. On July 23, 2004, the Department of Energy shuts down operations involving Classified Removable Electronic Media (CREM) across the entire nuclear weapons complex. SOURCES: DOE,  POGO, and Govexec.com

December 9, 2003 - Los Alamos confirms that computer disks were identified as lost during an "inventory of classified computer media." In total ten disks were lost. SOURCES: LANL, and POGO

November, 2003 - DOE IG confirms that, in multiple incidents, Lawrence Livermore National Lab lost nine sets of master keys and three magnetic cards, causing it to replace 100,000 locks on 526 buildings at a cost of $1.7 million to the taxpayer. SOURCE: Washington Post

June 20, 2003 -- LANL admits losing plutonium. SOURCE: POGO

June, 2003 - In a letter to DOE Secretary Abraham, Senator Charles Grassley complains that security investigators at Sandia National Lab are retaliated against and confirms the theft of a Verizon van at the Lab noting: "The van was stolen from inside a classified area and crashed undetected through perimeter fences at 5 a.m. in what is described as a `high risk' exit maneuver.It was discovered a day and a half later in a local department store parking lot." SOURCE: New York Times

April, 2003 - William Cleveland, Jr., head of Lawrence Livermore's security office resigns after acknowledging he had an affair with Chinese double agent Katrina Leung, who later pled guilty to lying to the FBI. SOURCES: CNN/AP, and Washington Times

March, 20, 2003 - Sandia National Laboratory President announces an investigation finding a variety of security breakdowns including: "security police officers observed eating, watching TV, and sleeping on duty, to theft of government-owned computer parts and software, to disappearance and reappearance of a set of keys to Sandia buildings." SOURCE: Sandia

January 27, 2003 - DOE IG finds that security contractor Wackenhut has been cheating on security tests at the Y-12 nuclear facility for two decades. SOURCE: Associated Press

January 15, 2003 -- A computer hard drive that contains classified data has been missing from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) since October 2002, but top officials at