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Apr 12, 2012

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A.A. Cunningham

"according to William Lawrence, who was in charge of testing the V-22s from 1985 to 1988."

First flight of the V-22 occurred on 19 March 1989. It would be interesting to learn the extent of the static testing Lawrence was engaged in prior to the commencement of flight testing.

I wonder what both you and Lawrence have to objectively say about the manner in which Brow and Gruber flew their Osprey on 8 April 2000. Their egregious violation of the 800/40 rule which they were both trained to follow; particularly Gruber who was an experienced CH-53 pilot, their deviation from NATOPS, loss of situational awareness and numerous violations of basic airmanship rules are never mentioned. Instead, all we get from the neophytes is that the aircraft was to blame. Wrong. The indisputable fact is that if Brow and Gruber had piloted any other rotary winged platform in the same reckless manner as they did that Osprey, the end result would have been the same. The aircraft did indeed experience VRS but thay was due to the numerous mistakes made by the aircrew which proved fatal. Jones is wasting his time in his revisionist history crusade.

Despite you and your colleagues continued wail to the contrary:

"but some crashes in the past have involved a dangerous flying condition of which the V-22 is prone to experience."

one Osprey has been lost to pilot induced VRS. The V-22 is less susceptible to encountering VRS than any other rotary winged platform in the inventory and when encountered has the ability to recover much quicker. Its maximum rate of descent at low ground speed is much higher than that of traditional rotary winged platforms. Those facts are never mentioned by people like you.

Why are you so bent on lying about the performance and history of this aircraft?

Project On Government Oversight

A.A. Cunningham, as I wrote earlier, while the cost has been high, supporters of the Osprey say the program has surmounted earlier technical challenges and that its flight envelope—the parameters of performance given certain factors needed for safe flight—are well understood now. But technical problems with the aircraft and its flight envelope were especially not well understood back in 2000 when the Arizona crash occurred, according to William Lawrence, who was in charge of testing the V-22s from 1985 to 1988.

Link: http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/alerts/national-security/walter-jones-v22-osprey-profile-20111107.html

A.A. Cunningham

Liebelson continues to perpetuate the ignorance regarding the V-22 and VRS. That's SOP for POGO and apparently a prerequisite for employment. Although much of the following report is obviously over her head and that of her colleagues at POGO, even a neophyte can understand the following. By the way Dana, how much United Technologies stock is currently in your and your colleagues portfolios?

V–22 HIGH RATE OF DESCENT (HROD) TEST PROCEDURES AND LONG RECORD ANALYSIS

ABSTRACT

In August 2003, the V–22 Integrated Test Team completed a thorough investigation of the V–22’s low-speed / HROD flight characteristics. Testing defined an operational envelope for the aircraft and demonstrated flight regimes free from vortex ring state (VRS). Tests also probed deeply into fully developed VRS to determine precise flight conditions where it may be encountered, and to confirm the ability of the V–22 to recover from the condition. The ability to tilt the nacelles proved to be a powerful and (in every case) reliable means for rapidly regaining aerodynamic function of the rotors, even when operating in VRS beyond the point of having sufficient controllability. Results for steady-state HROD conditions are presented and the methods for testing are described. In an operational sense, the test results show that the V–22 has a significantly higher rate of descent margin for avoiding VRS with respect to the published NATOPS limitation than conventional low disk-loading helicopters. Furthermore, dynamic maneuver testing of the V–22 showed that VRS cannot be initiated outside the steadystate VRS boundary. Simple engineering analysis is used to show that the V–22’s steady-state VRS boundary is predictable by simple methods that work for conventional helicopters. High blade twist, and the side-by-side rotor configuration of the V–22 do not play a significant role in defining the VRS boundary.

(Emphasis added for the bloggers much needed edification, again.)

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