The Defense Procurement Puzzle

There’s a move afoot to reform the Pentagon’s weapons acquisition system, but it’s becoming more and more obvious that the reformers – members of Congress – are struggling, growing frustrated with the complexity and absurdity of the Defense Department’s (DoD) procurement process.

The pressure for reform is coming from several directions. One is the fallout from the recent Boeing tanker lease scandal that resulted in the felony convictions of former Air Force acquisitions official Darleen Druyun and Boeing’s chief financial officer, Michael Sears. Another is the budget train wreck resulting from the billions of dollars being infused in the war in Iraq and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. It doesn’t help that the acquisition cost of the top five weapons systems has nearly doubled in the past five years. (For instance, DoD announced today that the Army’s Future Combat System costs increased 63 percent – or $62.5 billion – since July due to program restructure and extending the schedule by four years.)

To his credit, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England took the offensive earlier this year by appointing a special panel to find ways to clean up the DoD’s procurement process. Then in September, the Senate Armed Services Committee began the first in a series of acquisition reform hearings, and the House Armed Services Committee seems to be joining the fray.

But understanding what’s wrong and how to fix it is a daunting task. The difficulty was very apparent at a two-hour long hearing of Senator John McCain’s Airland Subcommittee on Tuesday. One expert testified that the military’s Joint Chiefs need more authority in the acquisition system, while another said that wouldn’t work. One said the system needs more discipline; another said it needs more talent. One said the acquisition force is too small, another downplayed the numbers factor. One even implied the current system could work if bureaucrats just followed their own rules, claiming the military isn’t getting the weapons it was promised, but instead is taking what it can get.

McCain, and Senators Joseph Lieberman and Saxby Chambliss appeared frustrated with it all at Tuesday’s hearing. McCain wanted to know why the Air Force purchased 50 C-130J aircraft that didn’t work and why the Army misused an acquisition strategy in awarding a contract to Boeing that is intended for smaller contractors. Lieberman questioned if the system is properly matching the threats the military is facing today with the weapons it needs to address them. Chambliss was perplexed why weapons take so long to develop and why they almost always end up costing so much more than projected.

The answers to the Senators’ questions were less than satisfactory. Stay tuned. Over the next few months, POGO will be preparing an acquisition system road map that will include recommendations to fix myriad problems.