Stryker: Hype Versus Reality

For more than two decades, POGO has attempted to give our troops and the taxpayers a voice that is all too often drowned out by the self-interests of defense contractors and Pentagon generals. In past years, we have advocated improvements in such weapons systems as the Bradley fighting vehicle and M1-A1 Abrams tank.

POGO has not called for the cancellation of the Stryker. We don’t doubt that the Stryker rides smoother than a Bradley, that its technologies provide a better view of the battlefield, or that it might have saved some soldiers’ lives. We’d certainly rather have all the troops in Strykers than in Humvees. That said, it doesn’t mean the Stryker is performing as promised, or that it can’t be better – and most importantly, safer. We have simply drawn attention to what we believe is a very independent and important study of the Stryker’s performance in Iraq by the Army’s own Kansas-based Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). The December 2004 CALL report was in some part based on anonymous comments by soldiers in an Iraq-based Stryker brigade. Quite frankly, we give more credibility to the CALL report than Army-produced promotional videos. For example, here are some of the CALL report criticisms of the Stryker that concerned us:

• Its gunner’s hatch is protected by sandbags rather than a steel shield.
• Its gun does not hit targets when the vehicle is moving.
• Its “slat” armor is not protecting against strikes by anti-personnel and anti-tank RPGs in Iraq.
• Its computers are slowing and overheating in the extreme Iraq heat due to a lack of air conditioning.

In addition to the comments on the POGO blog, we have also been contacted by roughly a dozen people inside the Stryker brigades or somehow involved with the program, and many have given factually-specific critical evaluations of the Stryker. The favorable comments we have received have called the Stryker “great,” but haven’t really told us why. We’re hoping for future comments on whether the problems identified in the CALL report have been fixed. Rather than spending money on a public relations campaign, the Army should spend the money fixing the problems.

Comments

[Posted on: May 13, 2005 at 12:10 AM]

Designing new systems to face a "conventional armored force" isn't and shouldn't be a priority for the U.S. military.

In both Iraq Wars, air power (both in the form of Apaches and A-10s) destroyed large numbers of enemy tanks. Bradleys destroyed large numbers of enemy tanks. Abrahms tanks destroyed large numbers of enemy tanks. Heck, even infantry destroyed a few enemy tanks. We have lots of systems that can destroy enemy tanks right now.

We also have a situation where there are currently lots of weapons out that are fairly light and good at destroying tanks even as good as our own. Hellfire missiles and TOW missiles are the two most common in our own arsenals. The basic philosophy of the various anti-tank missiles is to kill the enemy tank before it gets close enough to kill (or at least to see) you. An M1 tank that finds its backside or sides facing an enemy with a TOW equivalent missile is still going to end up out of commission, and no amount of engineering can fit more armor into a C-130 transportable vehicle than you have on an M1.

This isn't to say that armor is obsolete. If anything, it is more important now than it was, because the entire theater is now on the front lines. But, increasingly, we are learning that the best way to fight is not with infantry facing infrantry, and tanks facing tanks, but with missiles and aircraft destroying enemy tanks in the early phases of the battle, and with tanks being used against the evolving category of "heavy infantry" (i.e. infantry armed with RPGs and mortars and mines and large caliber guns).

There are few conflicts where we are likely to engage in conventional armored set piece battles tank v. tank, and those are unlikely to occur on the short notice that requires rapid deployment. It could happen on the Korean pennisula perhaps, but that wouldn't exactly be a stunning surprise that we hadn't planned to address. In contrast, there are many conflicts which could happen on short notice which would very likely be "low intensity". "Small wars" have been the dominant form of military deployment since World War II. This is the gap that the Stryker is designed to fix.

Indeed, rather than needing more anti-armor systems, the Army is rightly doing exactly the opposite. It is converting M1 Abrahms tanks from a primarily anti-armor configuration to a "Street Fighter" anti-heavy infantry configuration, because we have a shortage of armored systems to respond to heavy infantry, and an excess of both light unarmored Hummers and anti-armor configured M1 tanks.

The even smaller than Stryker ASVs which are finally being purchased, which were designed for MP missions, are really even better suited to the low intensity conflict patrols that the Strykers are being use for, and are also cheaper. They have roughly the same firepower with a smaller chasis and integral armor, but have far less passenger space.

[Posted on: May 07, 2005 at 11:44 AM]

I have been deployed in Mosul with the 1/25 ID (SBCT) since october 04 as a styker driver. The stryker has exellent survivability and many fine qualitys. The biggest problems have to do with it being undergunned and underpowered. Although the slat armor dosnt signifcantly impare the drivers ability to stop the vehicle, rollovers and extreemly slow acceleration are deffinitly an issue. Overall its a good vehicle for the job were doing. It just needs an improved RWS, DVE , and a variant with a 25mm or equivalent weapon.

[Posted on: May 04, 2005 at 12:26 AM]

The Stryker program has one overriding problem. Weight, the entire concept is based on the concept of being abile to deploy significant combat capability anywhere in a short time. In theory technology exists that would enable such a force to exist. We have a number of weapon systems, CROWS, LOSAT, Excalibur, that would enable a light force to fight above its weight class. The reality is, the Stryker is under armored, and undergunned. It is a fine, troop carrier and basic infantry support. It can perform basic anti-insurgency operations and low threat environments. It cannot stand up to a conventional armored force. If, we ever had a sistuation of sending a Stryker force into a combat environment without armor support (M1 & M2's), the Stryker force would be slaughtered.

[Posted on: Apr 30, 2005 at 07:04 AM]

As someone who has followed this issue from a distance, I don't know what the alphabet soup of comment means. But, it seems funny how the Stryker advocates continue to defend the vehicle at all cost instead of trying to make improvements to it. "Relatively new system" "work in progress" and phrases of the such appear to be excuses. If the gun doesn't work 100% when the Stryker is moving shouldn't it be fixed? What are people/Army/Pentagon/the manufactuer afraid of?

[Posted on: Apr 29, 2005 at 10:46 PM]

Stryker is a relatively new system. Political concerns for a faster, lighter deployable capability got it fielded fast compared to most systems. It remains a "work in progress". Before you start beating up on the system, using the CALL data, check and see how many of these have resulted in funded ECP's to the system. Then check to see whether the PM, Army AND Congress have supported funding of the ECP's. Then check on how many have been applied in theater, and how many as a production cut-in. (Urgent ECP's go in in-theater, the rest get production cut-in and the fielded stuff doesn't get it til a depor overhaul.) After knowing this, only then, will you have the beginning of a good picture on the merits or lack of the Stryker system.